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Abstract 
 
As the investment treaty arbitration regime matures, consensus is emerging as to the 
need for public interest considerations to be taken into account in resolving disputes 
under international investment agreements (IIAs). However, the question of how 
such considerations should be reflected remains contentious. This thesis proposes 
that the remedies stage of the process can, and should, play a role in taking account 
of public interest considerations and so in easing the tension between host state 
regulatory sovereignty and investment protection that lies at the heart of the 
investment treaty regime.  
 
Thus, this thesis argues that, while, on the one hand, there is a need to introduce an 
element of reciprocity into the investment treaty arbitration process in order to 
ensure continuing state co-operation and to reflect the broader underlying purposes 
of IIAs, on the other, the primary object of the system remains the protection of 
foreign investors. These competing imperatives can lead to difficulties in taking 
account of public interest considerations at the merits stage of the arbitration 
process. Therefore, in order to reconcile these competing imperatives and to 
achieve an optimal balance between host state regulatory sovereignty and 
investment protection, this thesis proposes that public interest considerations should 
be recognised at the remedies stage where such considerations cannot be taken into 
account either sufficiently or at all at the merits stage and identifies a number of 
situations in which this approach would be appropriate. Potential doctrinal bases for 
implementation of this approach are also examined and the conclusion reached that, 
given the significant degree of discretion afforded to tribunals in applying the full 
reparation principle and the role that equity can permissibly play in quantifying 
damages, this approach can, save in the case of lawful expropriations, be 
implemented within the parameters of existing legal principles. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Thesis Overview 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The allegorical personification of justice as a blindfolded woman holding a set 
of scales encapsulates the notion that, in law, as in life, balance is everything. In 
other words, the balancing of interests is an inherent feature of the law and 
achieving a balance between the competing interests at issue in a particular case is a 
central function of all adjudicative bodies. In particular, disputes between an 
individual and a state tend to throw into sharp relief the question of how an 
appropriate balance between individual interests and collective or state interests 
may be achieved. The field of investment treaty arbitration is no exception to this 
rule. Indeed, reconciliation of these competing interests has been described as the 
‘core task’ of investment treaty arbitration.1 This assertion is underpinned by the 
fact that international investment agreements (IIAs) afford private entities, both 
individual and corporate, the ability to bring claims against a state at an 
international level (generally without having to exhaust local remedies) and by the 
fact that such claims may challenge the regulatory acts of that host state (and thus 
potentially compromise its regulatory sovereignty). Of course, one of the primary 
functions of IIAs is to regulate the manner in which a state exercises its sovereign 
rights and the act of agreeing to such controls is, in itself, an ‘attribute of state 
sovereignty’.2 Thus, as Alvárez memorably puts it, ‘[IIAs] are efforts by states to 
bind themselves to the mast to avoid the tempting sirens calling for breaches of 
investment contracts or nationalizations without compensation’.3 However, the fact 
that a state, by entering into IIAs, voluntarily cedes part of its regulatory 
sovereignty does not mean that host state sovereignty in the sense of the host state’s 
freedom to regulate its internal affairs is irrelevant to the application of IIAs. To the 
contrary, it is becoming increasingly widely acknowledged that, in resolving IIA 
disputes, a balance must be struck between investor interests and public interest 
                                                 
1
Campbell McLachlan, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Legal Framework’ in Albert Jan van 
den Berg (ed), 50 Years of the New York Convention: ICCA International Arbitration Conference 
(Kluwer 2009) 101. 
2
SS Wimbledon (United Kingdom v Japan), 1923 PCIJ (ser. A) No 1 (Aug 17) 25.  
3
José Alvárez, ‘The Return of the State’ (2011) 20 Minn J Intl L 223, 225. 
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considerations. However, the question of how, and at what stage of the arbitral 
process, public interest considerations should be reflected remains the subject of 
debate. It is upon this question that this thesis will focus. 
Thus, the central argument of this thesis is that the remedies stage of the investment 
treaty arbitration process can, and should, play a role in taking account of public 
interest considerations and so in easing the tension between host state regulatory 
sovereignty and investment protection that lies at the heart of the investment treaty 
regime. While, in recent years, the remedies stage of the investment treaty 
arbitration process has received increasing attention in the academic literature and 
while the possibility of a balancing of public and private interests occurring as part 
of the damages quantification process has been alluded to, the question of whether, 
and in what circumstances, the remedies stage constitutes an appropriate platform 
for public interest considerations has not been comprehensively examined. In 
particular, the possible inter-relationship between the merits stage and the remedies 
stage in terms of taking account of such considerations has not been explored nor 
have the primary methods of taking account of public interest considerations at the 
merits stage been evaluated together with a view to determining the efficacy and 
appropriateness of balancing investor and public interests at the merits stage. 
Finally, the question of whether any doctrinal basis exists under the existing 
investment treaty regime for taking account of public interest considerations at the 
remedies stage of the arbitration process has not been explored in the academic 
literature nor has much attention been focussed on possible remedies-related 
provisions that could be included in new or renegotiated IIAs. This thesis aims to 
address these questions and, having examined the need for public interest 
considerations to be taken into account in investment treaty arbitration generally 
and assessed the efficacy of the various methods of taking account of such 
considerations at the merits stage, will argue that, in order to achieve an optimal 
balance between host state regulatory sovereignty and investment protection, the 
merits and remedies stages of the arbitral process should play complementary roles 
in taking account of public interest considerations.  
However, before considering the bases for this proposition, the question of what is 
meant by the term ‘public interest considerations’ must be further explored. 
Although central to both politics and the law, defining what is meant by the term 
‘public interest’ is notoriously difficult and gives rise to a range of questions 
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including the question of how individual expressions of interest can be translated 
into some form of common, public or general good and the question of how the 
boundaries of the ‘public’ should be delimited.4 This uncertainty has led to the 
concept of public interest being invoked in manifold (and sometimes contradictory) 
ways.
5
 In particular, in the context of international investment law, while the 
granting of rights to foreign investors under IIAs can be considered to be in the 
public interest (on the assumption that protecting foreign investors will lead to 
further foreign investment and economic development),
6
 on the other hand, it is 
frequently argued that the rights conferred on investors by IIAs should be curtailed 
so as to permit host state regulation in the public interest. The definition of the term 
‘public interest considerations’ in this thesis cleaves towards the latter 
interpretation, while acknowledging the malleable nature of the concept of public 
interest (and the inherent tensions that arise in defining that concept in the sphere of 
international investment law).  
Thus, the term ‘public interest considerations’ is used in this thesis to connote any 
legitimate regulatory interests that a state has a right or duty to pursue or to promote 
under either domestic (constitutional) law or international law.
7
 Regulation, in this 
context, is used to describe the deliberate influence of the state to control or 
influence industrial or social behaviour and, in particular, the establishment by the 
state of operational conditions for foreign investment in the interest of the public 
good.
8
  Regulation includes both the general legal and administrative framework of 
host countries as well as sector or industry-specific rules. It also entails effective 
implementation of rules, including the enforcement of rights.
9
 The interests which 
underlie host state regulation may pertain not only to domestic concerns but 
                                                 
4
For an overview see Stephen M King, Bradley S Chilton and Gary E Roberts, ‘Reflections on 
Defining the Public Interest’ (2010) 41 Administration & Society 954.  
5See generally Paul de Jersey, ‘Public Interest and Public Policy: Unruly Horses Alike?’ (2003) 6 
Legal Ethics 16. 
6See for example Nigel Blackaby, ‘Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration’ in Albert Jan 
van den Berg (ed), International Commercial Arbitration: Important Contemporary Questions: 
ICCA Congress Series 2002 (Kluwer 2003) 355. 
7
For the avoidance of doubt, the term ‘public interest considerations’ as used in this thesis does not 
encompass the collective interests of the claimant investor’s home state. Although the possibility 
that a particular investment dispute may have an impact on the interests of the investor’s home state 
cannot be excluded, generally where a dispute has arisen the interests of the home state are, to the 
extent that they are considered at all, seen to be best served by the maximisation of the private 
interests or expectations of the aggrieved investor in protecting its investment.  
8
Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (OUP 
1999) 1-2. 
9
UNCTAD, Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (UNCTAD 2012) 12-13. 
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frequently also extend to the international level. Thus, the right of a state to regulate 
becomes a duty to protect where regulation becomes necessary in order to uphold a 
state’s non-investment related treaty obligations such as its obligations under 
human rights or environmental treaties. For example, investments in natural 
resources may have severe environmental consequences and conflict with norms set 
out in international environmental treaties or in international human rights treaties, 
if the host state’s population is negatively affected by the investment. The right to 
regulate is an essential aspect of state sovereignty while the duty to protect its 
population or the environment from harm arises out of both international and 
domestic legal instruments.
10
 The term ‘legitimate regulatory interests’ is therefore 
used to refer to a broad range of aims that regulation may pursue that would appear 
congruent with the welfare of society and the term ‘taking into account public 
interest considerations’ refers to the consideration of such legitimate regulatory 
interests in circumstances where the measures taken by the host state in pursuance 
of such interests are the subject of challenge under an IIA.   
Having defined what is meant by the term ‘public interest considerations’, the 
question of whether, as a threshold matter, such considerations should be taken into 
account in investment treaty arbitration at all (whether at the jurisdiction, merits or 
remedies stage of the arbitral process) must be addressed.  This will be the topic of 
the second chapter of this thesis, which will argue that public interest considerations 
should be taken into account when resolving disputes under current IIAs, regardless 
of whether the international investment treaty regime is viewed through a public 
law or private law lens. Thus, Chapter 2 will demonstrate that, although the two 
questions have, at times, been conflated, the question of whether public interest 
considerations should be taken into account in investment treaty arbitration can be 
separated from the question of whether international investment law constitutes a 
form of public law or, alternatively, whether each IIA constitutes a ‘private’, quasi-
contractual bargain between the contracting states. Accordingly, the second chapter 
of this thesis will argue that investment treaty arbitration tribunals can permissibly 
take into account public interest considerations within the parameters of the 
principal substantive rights typically contained in IIAs as such rights are open-
                                                 
10
Suzanne A Spears, ‘The quest for policy space in a new generation of international investment 
agreements’ (2010) 13 J Intl Economic L 1037, 1038.  
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ended in nature, lack a well-defined normative basis and therefore confer an 
unusually broad margin of interpretative discretion on arbitrators.  
Having demonstrated that investment treaty arbitration tribunals have the ability to 
take account of public interest considerations, Chapter 2 will then go onto argue 
that arbitrators should avail of this ability and interpret IIA rights in a manner 
sensitive to public interest considerations. It will be argued that this should occur as 
many IIA disputes relate to delicate policy issues which go to the ability of the host 
state to legislate in the public interest and the text of IIAs generally does not clarify 
the extent to which the host state’s regulatory sovereignty has been ceded. In such 
circumstances, according the broadest possible scope to IIA rights could preclude 
elected authorities and administrative agencies from being able to alter policy in the 
public interest. Furthermore, given that IIAs may not necessarily reflect the 
democratic choices of states and that the longevity of IIAs may lead to the choices 
of one elected government binding a future government in a manner that 
fundamentally restricts its policy options, it will be argued that the need for public 
interest considerations to be taken into account by investment treaty arbitration 
tribunals is intensified. Finally (and perhaps most importantly), it will be argued 
that IIAs should not be interpreted in a manner that consistently disregards public 
interest considerations as this would likely lead to both traditional capital importing 
states and traditional capital exporting states exiting the investment treaty 
arbitration regime. Thus, Chapter 2 concludes by noting that the open-ended nature 
of IIA rights is such that the interpretation of the IIA text by each individual 
tribunal is crucial to maintaining a balance between investor protection and host 
state regulatory sovereignty and that this is a balance that tribunals should strive to 
achieve.  
Having argued in Chapter 2 that public interest considerations should be taken into 
account by investment treaty arbitration tribunals, the third chapter of this thesis 
will examine the extent to which public interest considerations have been taken into 
account at the merits stage of investment treaty arbitrations to date and will analyse 
the efficacy and appropriateness of the methods used. Three, inter-related, methods 
of introducing public interest considerations will be analysed for this purpose: first, 
the balancing of public interest considerations and investor interests in determining 
the content of substantive treaty obligations through the use of proportionality 
analysis; second, the interpretation of IIA rights in a manner consistent with a host 
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state’s non-investment related international obligations and, third, reliance on the 
customary international law defence of necessity and/or on a non-precluded 
measures (NPM) clause. It will be argued that each of these methods does not 
constitute a wholly satisfactory means of taking account of public interest 
considerations.  
Turning first to proportionality analysis, it will be argued that, although 
proportionality analysis potentially offers a methodologically robust structure for 
balancing competing interests, it is subject to certain limitations both generally and 
also in the specific context of investment treaty arbitration. First, proportionality 
analysis is not suitable for addressing conflicts between rules or rule-like 
provisions. Secondly, the manner in which proportionality testing has been applied 
in investment treaty arbitration to date has lacked analytical and procedural rigour. 
There has also been little consistency as to the standard of review applied by 
investment treaty arbitration tribunals (which is equally important to the method of 
review employed). However, while investment treaty arbitration tribunals could 
over time potentially introduce further rigour into their application of 
proportionality analysis and develop a more coherent standard of review, it will be 
argued that a more fundamental issue is the question of why the majority of 
tribunals have eschewed proportionality analysis to date. It will be suggested that 
tribunals’ hesitancy in this regard may stem partly from the conceptualisation of 
certain IIA disputes by claimant investors or by tribunals themselves as involving 
rules rather than principles. A second reason which may underlie this hesitancy is 
that arbitrators may harbour doubts as to whether proportionality analysis should be 
applied in the field of investment treaty arbitration at all, given the hybrid nature of 
the investment treaty arbitration system and its focus on protecting the interests of a 
particular group of individuals. Finally and on a related note, the focus of 
investment treaty arbitration on the interests of foreign investors makes it difficult 
to argue that public interest considerations should be accorded equal weight to 
investor interests in the balancing exercise and, as alluded to above, leads to 
uncertainty as to how the ‘public interest’ in protecting foreign investors’ rights 
should be reconciled with public interest considerations.  
Chapter 3 will also examine the issues that arise in introducing a host state’s non-
investment related treaty obligations into an IIA dispute through the ‘gateway’ of 
Article 31(3) (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In particular, as 
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is the case with proportionality analysis, this interpretative technique cannot be 
used to resolve conflicts between rule-like provisions. In addition, the function and 
scope of application of Article 31(3)(c) rests entirely on the interpretation of its 
component parts (and, in particular, the terms ‘relevant rules’ and ‘applicable to the 
relations between the parties’). Furthermore, even assuming that these terms are 
interpreted in a manner that permits the obligations of the host state under, for 
example, a particular human rights treaty to be considered for interpretative 
purposes, the weight to be attributed to those obligations in determining whether an 
IIA breach has occurred is open to question. This gives rise to similar issues as 
those faced by investment treaty arbitration tribunals in attempting to balance 
investor interests and public interest considerations through proportionality 
analysis. 
Finally, Chapter 3 will, by reference to a number of cases arising out of the 
Argentine economic crisis and sovereign default of 2000 to 2002, illustrate the 
difficulties associated with relying on the customary international law defence of 
necessity or on a NPM clause when the host state has acted to protect its essential 
interests in times of crisis. While the defence of necessity could conceivably be 
applied by future investment treaty arbitration tribunals in a manner which accords 
greater deference to the host state than has been accorded by some investment 
treaty arbitration tribunals to date, it will be argued that the defence will always 
have to be narrowly drawn. Similarly, given that NPM clauses are only included in 
a minority of IIAs and that they vary quite considerably in scope, Chapter 3 will 
argue that NPM clauses constitute a ‘patchy’ means of protecting states’ right to act 
to protect essential national interests in times of crisis. 
Chapter 3 concludes by noting that the common thread underlying all of the 
methods used to take account of public interest considerations at the merits stage is 
that application of such methods can ultimately lead only to a black-or-white 
decision as to liability, which requires one set of interests to be prioritised in order 
to come to that determination and so may lead to either investor interests or host 
state interests not being optimised. This gives rise to the question of whether this 
‘all or nothing’ approach to liability is appropriate or, alternatively, whether the 
remedies stage can play a role in taking account of public interest considerations, 
which is considered in Chapter 4.  
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Thus, having examined the legal standards applicable in quantifying damages for 
unlawful acts and compensation for lawful expropriations as well as the valuation 
methods customarily applied in quantifying such damages or compensation, 
Chapter 4 will proceed to argue that, although tribunals necessarily exercise a 
considerable degree of discretion in quantifying damages (and so conceivably may 
take account of public interest considerations in a clandestine manner), investment 
treaty arbitration tribunals have, to date, generally not explicitly referred to public 
interest considerations at the remedies stage or purported to adjust the 
compensation or damages payable by respondent host states on the basis of such 
considerations.   
While the consideration of public interests in the formulation of remedies is a 
feature of other legal regimes (notably state liability law), Chapter 4 will argue that 
the approach taken to remedies under another legal regime cannot simply be 
transposed into the sphere of investment treaty arbitration and that justification 
reflecting the distinctive features of the investment treaty arbitration system is 
necessary to support the proposition that public interest considerations should be 
taken into account in quantifying the damages payable under IIAs.  Thus, it will be 
argued that the primary justification for such a proposition is the need to introduce 
an element of reciprocity into the investment treaty arbitration process in order to 
ensure continuing state participation in the investment treaty system and to reflect 
the broader underlying purposes of IIAs. This is the case as the rights conferred on 
investors by IIAs are conferred on that particular societal grouping for broader 
public interest-related purposes (namely the promotion of investment and of further 
economic co-operation with the ultimate aim of promoting development in the 
state) rather than because investors have an inherent entitlement to such protection. 
However, given that the primary object of the system nonetheless remains the 
protection of foreign investors, a position that public interest considerations should 
inevitably take precedence over investor interests is untenable. Therefore, in order 
to reconcile the ‘asymmetric’ nature of IIAs and the need to introduce an element of 
reciprocity into the investment treaty arbitration process, a nuanced approach which 
takes account of both public interest considerations and investor interests to the 
greatest extent possible in each particular case is necessary. Given the difficulties 
associated with taking account of public interest considerations at the merits stage 
and the black-or-white decision as to liability that is required at that stage, it will be 
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argued that the merits and remedies stages should play complementary roles in this 
regard and that, in order to ensure that investor rights are not diluted, an approach 
that assesses the extent to which countervailing interests were considered at the 
merits stage in determining whether (and the extent to which) such interests need to 
be considered at the remedies stage is preferable to an approach that allows for 
countervailing interests considered insufficient to override investor rights at the 
merits stage to subsequently be considered de novo in quantifying damages.  
Bearing these guiding principles in mind, Chapter 4 identifies and elaborates upon a 
number of specific situations in which recognition of public interest considerations 
at the remedies stage may be appropriate: first, where the impugned host state 
measure was taken in furtherance of the host state’s obligations under a non-
investment related treaty or in furtherance of the fundamental rights provisions 
contained in the host state’s highest law; secondly, where the customary 
international law defence of necessity has been successfully invoked and, finally, in 
the case of certain breaches of a procedural nature. In each of these situations, there 
are specific policy reasons militating in favour of taking account of public interest 
considerations at the remedies stage. However, these specific reasons all centre on a 
common premise: namely that, in some cases, the fact that the host state acted in 
pursuance of a bona fide public purpose in introducing the measures challenged 
under an IIA may need to be considered at the remedies stage as this fact cannot be 
reflected either sufficiently or at all at the merits stage. This premise equally applies 
in respect of expropriations (and in particular lawful expropriations), 
notwithstanding the focus of the expropriation clause on the loss caused by 
governmental conduct rather than on the nature of that conduct. Indeed, it will be 
argued that the need to acknowledge host state regulatory sovereignty at the 
remedies stage is enhanced where lawful expropriations are concerned as, currently, 
the public function performed by the state is effectively disregarded given that the 
pronouncement that an expropriation is lawful in nature generally has little 
meaningful effect on the quantum of compensation payable. 
Having outlined, in Chapter 4, a number of normative arguments as to why taking 
account of public interest considerations at the remedies stage is appropriate, the 
fifth chapter of this thesis will proceed to consider potential doctrinal bases for 
implementation of such an approach. It will be argued that tribunals are already 
afforded a significant degree of discretion in quantifying damages and that this 
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‘normal’ discretion, combined with the flexibility afforded to tribunals by causation 
principles, may already allow for recognition of certain public interest-related 
matters in applying the full reparation principle. However, having examined the 
role of equity in international law generally and in the international law of remedies 
in particular as well as the role that equity has played in investment treaty 
arbitration to date, it will be argued that increased reliance on equity could 
‘enlighten’ the exercise of arbitral discretion and could reinforce the doctrinal basis 
for taking account of public interest considerations at the remedies stage.  
However, given that investment treaty arbitration tribunals may be reluctant to 
acknowledge the influence of equity, Chapter 5 will go onto consider a number of 
possible alternatives to the full reparation principle that could be included in new or 
renegotiated IIAs. Having evaluated these provisions, it will be argued that, while 
amending the text of IIAs could potentially provide a more concrete doctrinal basis 
for reliance by tribunals on equity and/or for taking account of public interest 
considerations in quantifying the damages payable for unlawful acts, care would 
have to be taken to ensure that such wording is not overly prescriptive or, 
conversely, overly amorphous to provide sufficient guidance to arbitrators. 
Furthermore, it will be argued that a complete disaggregation of the amount of 
damages payable from the claimant’s loss would not accord with the nature and 
functions of the investment treaty arbitration system. Accordingly, Chapter 5 argues 
that treaty negotiators should be cautious in deviating from the current approach 
whereby IIAs are generally silent as to the approach to be taken to remedying 
unlawful acts.  
Chapter 5 separately evaluates the question of whether the recognition of public 
interest considerations is possible in quantifying the compensation payable in 
respect of lawful expropriations, given the different standard of compensation 
applicable to lawful expropriations. It will be argued that the fair market value 
standard (which is the predominant valuation standard currently prescribed by IIAs) 
leaves little room for recognition of public interest considerations or for the 
application of equity and that, in order for such considerations to be meaningfully 
reflected, deviation from the fair market value standard is required. However, 
having evaluated a number of possible alternative provisions that could be included 
in new or renegotiated IIAs, it will be argued that, while given that public interest 
considerations cannot currently be taken into account within the parameters of the 
11 
 
fair market value standard,  the need to consider alternatives to the fair market value 
standard is arguably greater than in respect of the full reparation principle, 
negotiators and drafters should nonetheless be cautious in completely 
disaggregating the compensation payable for lawful expropriations from the market 
value paradigm.  
Finally, Chapter 5 examines how reforms that have been proposed as means of 
facilitating the consideration of certain public interests in investment treaty 
arbitration and which primarily affect the earlier stages of the arbitral process may 
relate to the taking into account public interest considerations at the remedies stage. 
It will be argued that, although it is impossible to predict how such provisions may 
affect the application or interpretation of substantive investor rights in future, there 
are grounds for suggesting that such provisions will not obviate the need for taking 
account of public interest considerations at the remedies stage.  
Chapter 6 synthesises the conclusions reached in the thesis as a whole and 
concludes by noting that, while the proposals put forward in this thesis cannot, and 
do not purport to, constitute a complete solution to the problem of how to ease the 
tension between investment protection and host state regulatory sovereignty in 
investment treaty arbitration, they constitute a part of the answer. 
Overall therefore, it is hoped that this thesis will make a contribution to the corpus 
of literature relating to the balancing of public and private interests in investment 
treaty arbitration and, more importantly, will cause academics, practitioners and 
arbitrators to examine (or re-examine) the possibilities of the remedies stage from a 
public interest perspective. Although, in one sense, this may seem an ambitious 
aim, the proposals contained in this thesis are avowedly ‘system-internal’ in nature 
(i.e. it is assumed that the procedural framework for investment treaty arbitration 
and the focus of IIAs on investor rights and freedom of investment will remain 
unchanged for the foreseeable future). Some commentators have argued that 
proposals of this nature, by assuming the survival of the investment treaty regime as 
it is currently configured are insufficient and that a complete overhaul or abolition 
of the current system is necessary.
11
 In particular, commentators have criticised the 
effect of international investment law on host state regulatory sovereignty, 
particularly in the case of developing countries, and have claimed that many 
                                                 
11See for example Howard Mann, ‘Reconceptualising International Investment: Its Role in 
Sustainable Development’ (2013) 17 Lewis & Clark L Rev 521. 
12 
 
developing countries enter into IIAs with more developed countries without 
knowledge of the implications and not wholly voluntarily due to inequality of 
bargaining power.
12
 Furthermore, it has been argued that, even if foreign direct 
investment is encouraged by IIAs (a proposition which is hotly disputed), positive 
social and environmental results do not automatically result as foreign direct 
investment needs to be managed by the host state in order to encourage a developed 
domestic economy.
13
 Thus, it is claimed that the benefits flowing from IIAs are 
questionable and that IIAs may not in fact be necessary to resolve the problems of 
‘obsolescing bargain’ and ‘credible commitment’ since investor-state contracts can 
perform such functions equally well (if not better).
14
 Finally, the unequal allocation 
of rights and obligations in IIAs has also been emphasised: foreign investors are 
granted much greater rights against host states than those available under customary 
international law while little to no obligations are placed on them vis-á-vis host 
states and host state citizens.
15
  
While not detracting from the value of these arguments as compelling critiques of 
neoliberalism, it is submitted that the implementation of focussed, incremental, 
improvements within the parameters of the investment treaty arbitration system, 
which take account of the specific features of the system, is also of value.
16
 In this 
regard, the following comments of the late Thomas Wälde are particularly apt:  
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excessive focus only on moral sentiments – a kind of autistic moralism – 
may even be counterproductive. We need to understand how things work 
before we can try to change the world to make it somewhat better. The great 
risk is that the emotive animosity against investment arbitration leads to the 
opposite of what was…intended.17 
Thus, although investment treaty arbitration may not be the perfect forum for 
resolving investor-state disputes and although the dominant paradigm underlying 
the regime should arguably be shifted to reflect sustainable development concerns, 
it is submitted that what one commentator dismissively refers to as ‘tinkering at the 
margins’18 within the parameters of the existing system is worthwhile if it operates 
to ease the tension between regulatory sovereignty and investment protection that 
characterises (and arguably plagues) the regime.
19
 This thesis aims to address such 
tension by examining the point of the arbitral process likely to be of most concern 
to both claimant investors and respondent host states from a practical perspective 
and arguably also, due to the fact that it is more comprehensible than the 
jurisdiction or merits stage, most likely to fuel backlash against the investment 
treaty arbitration process – the remedies stage.20 
Before embarking on this task however, the remainder of this introductory chapter 
will review the existing academic literature on the subject, outline the thesis 
methodology and its limitations and, finally, define key terms and concepts to be 
used throughout the thesis. 
1.2 Literature Review 
 
The interaction between host state regulatory sovereignty and investor protection 
can be approached by focussing either on the potential for the rights conferred on 
foreign investors by IIAs to be interpreted in a manner that is likely to interfere with 
host state or public interests or, alternatively, by considering the actual 
interpretation of IIAs by investment treaty arbitration tribunals to date. In relation to 
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the former issue, there is extensive discussion in the academic literature of the 
potential for conflict between international investment law and other normative 
orders due to the broad-ranging nature of the investor rights generally contained in 
IIAs, particularly in circumstances where investors have challenged legislative or 
administrative measures that ordinarily would fall within the host state’s regulatory 
sphere or which were introduced in order to implement the host state’s obligations 
under a non-investment related treaty.
21
 A sub-set of this literature explores various 
mechanisms such as general exceptions clauses which have been included in more 
recent ‘new generation’ IIAs and which could be inserted into new or renegotiated 
IIAs in order to potentially remove some of this indeterminacy and to aid arbitral 
tribunals in taking into account public interests.
22
 The potential ‘chilling effect’ of 
this indeterminacy on host state regulation has also been emphasised in a portion of 
the literature.
23
 Overall therefore, the literature on the potential for conflict between 
international investment law and other normative orders is quite comprehensive.  
Turning to the issue of the actual interpretation of investor rights by investment 
treaty arbitration tribunals to date, the methods of review employed by tribunals in 
order to balance competing interests at the merits stage of the arbitral process have 
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been analysed at length, the most prominent of such methods being proportionality 
analysis.
24
 The problems associated with the current application by tribunals of 
proportionality analysis have also been explored in the literature
25
 and the issue of 
the appropriate standard of review to be applied by tribunals has been considered.
26
 
The related question of whether it is appropriate to take into account the human 
rights and other non-investment related treaty obligations of the host state in 
interpreting IIA rights has also been extensively examined in the literature, 
particularly with regard to the potential use of the technique of systemic integration 
as embodied in Article 31(3) (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
27
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The current uncertainty as to the scope of the customary international law defence 
of necessity and as to the interaction of that defence with NPM clauses has also 
been the subject of a substantial body of literature.
28
 However, while these issues all 
broadly relate to how investment treaty arbitration tribunals have balanced investor 
and public interests at the merits stage of the arbitral process and while the body of 
literature in relation to each of these issues is quite comprehensive, they have not 
been assessed together with a view to determining the efficacy and appropriateness 
of balancing investor and public interests at the merits stage. Furthermore, the 
advantages and disadvantages of balancing investor and public interests at the 
merits stage vis-à-vis the remedies stage have not yet been explored. 
Indeed, up until comparatively recently, the remedies stage of the investment treaty 
arbitration process as a whole had not received much attention in the academic 
literature.
29
 In the last number of years however, this deficit has quite rapidly been 
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addressed and a substantial number of books and articles on the subject of remedies 
in investment treaty arbitration have appeared.
30
 However, much of this substantial 
(and ever-growing) body of literature aims to describe the mechanics of the 
valuation methods that have customarily been applied by investment treaty 
arbitration tribunals in assessing damages and, thus, certain lacunae exist in the 
literature.
31
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In particular, only a small sub-set of the literature on remedies makes even passing 
reference to taking into account public interest considerations or the host state’s 
non-investment related treaty obligations at the remedies stage and an even smaller 
sub-set directly addresses the question of whether such considerations or 
obligations are, or should be, relevant to the assessment of damages. Thus, Liberti 
describes one arbitral award in which the host state’s obligations under a non-
investment related treaty appeared to be taken into account but does not purport to 
explore the normative arguments in favour of taking such obligations into account 
at the remedies stage. Nor does Liberti attempt to delineate any guidelines as to 
how public interest considerations could be taken into account by tribunals in 
future.
32
 Somewhat similarly, Kulick has argued that public interest considerations 
may have been introduced by investment treaty arbitration tribunals clandestinely 
by taking account of such interests at the remedies stage rather than at the merits 
stage.
33
 However, apart from opining that taking account of public interest 
considerations at the remedies stage in a transparent manner is doctrinally 
preferable to the consideration of such interests at the merits stage and from 
touching upon some of the issues associated with taking into account public interest 
considerations at the merits stage,
34
 Kulick does not examine the particular 
doctrinal basis for this conclusion or comprehensively examine the normative 
reasons supporting this approach. Finally, Gallus, in the context of discussing the 
FET standard, notes that some investment treaty arbitration tribunals have adjusted 
their damages awards to reflect the circumstances of the host state but does not 
discuss the benefits and drawbacks of this approach. He also explicitly leaves open 
the question of how this development affects or relates to the taking into account of 
the circumstances of the host state at the merits stage.
35
  
Admittedly, a small number of commentators have raised normative arguments in 
relation to the balancing of investor and public interests at the remedies stage. 
However, each of these falls short of a complete analysis. Thus, in his book ‘Global 
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Public Interest in International Investment Law’, Kulick, drawing on the German 
constitutional law principle of praktische Konkordanz whereby all competing rights 
have to be reconciled in a differentiated manner that aims at the optimal outcome 
for every such right, notes that the outcome of proportionality analysis at the merits 
stage ‘must find reflection in the amount of compensation and damages’ (i.e. the 
tribunal must determine whether a lower amount of damages is necessary, suitable 
and the least restrictive measure to address the public interest considerations 
underlying the host state measure).
36
 However, while Kulick considers both 
possible doctrinal bases for proportionality analysis in international investment law 
and the normative reasons supporting its application, he does not focus upon the 
doctrinal basis for application of an overarching proportionality analysis affecting 
both the merits and the remedies stage nor on the particular normative reasons why 
an approach that envisages derogation from the full reparation principle may (or 
may not) be desirable. 
Tudor, in discussing the FET standard, advocates the view that elements that may 
excuse, justify or which may have contributed to the behaviour of the host state 
such as its specific circumstances or the behaviour of the claimant investor should 
be taken into account exclusively at the remedies stage.
37
 However, Tudor 
acknowledges that this approach is only appropriate to breaches of the FET 
standard which involve no expropriation-like effect, which, she admits, are quite 
rare.
38
 In addition, Tudor acknowledges that the ‘general characteristics’ of the host 
state must still be taken into account at the merits stage in order to construct a 
standard against which the fairness and equitableness of the host state’s behaviour 
can be measured and to attach the state to a general category of similar states. Thus, 
Tudor’s approach is confined to a quite narrow category of breaches and, given the 
vagueness of the terms used, does not purport to adequately describe the inter-
relationship between the merits and remedies stages in this regard. Furthermore, 
beyond the assertion that taking account of the claimant investor’s behaviour at the 
merits stage could impact on the decision of the tribunal as to the legality of the 
host state’s behaviour, which could deprive the fair and equitable treatment 
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standard of its raison d’être and result in an extension of the tribunal’s competence 
beyond the scope of review conferred on the tribunal by the dispute resolution 
clause, Tudor does not consider the normative arguments supporting her suggested 
approach. 
Similarly, Kriebaum, drawing on the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, argues that, in order to move away from the current ‘all or nothing’ 
approach to liability applicable in respect of lawful expropriations, proportionality 
analysis should be applied after an expropriation is deemed lawful in nature, which 
may serve to reduce the quantum of compensation payable. However, Kriebaum’s 
analysis does not extend to unlawful acts and, in addition, does not consider how 
this approach would interact with the provisions on compensation for lawful 
expropriations contained in most current IIAs.
39
  
Finally, in a number of articles,
40
 Desierto has discussed why (and how) certain 
non-investment related treaty obligations, namely the minimum core obligations of 
states under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), should be taken into account in quantifying damages where compliance 
with such obligations constituted the reason underlying the host state’s IIA breach. 
While such host state obligations are clearly of crucial importance in protecting the 
most essential interests of its population and while the conflict between such 
obligations and IIA rights represents the archetypal example of a problematic 
restraint on host state sovereignty, nonetheless Desierto’s analyses do not constitute 
(nor do they in any way purport to constitute) a complete analysis of whether public 
interest considerations generally should be taken into account in formulating 
remedies for IIA breaches. Overall therefore, while there has been some discussion 
of the issue of taking into account public interest considerations at the remedies 
stage, the analysis has not been comprehensive and, in particular, has not explored 
the inter-relationship between the merits and remedies stages in this regard. 
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However, on a related note, a number of commentators have suggested that public 
law concepts should be introduced at the remedies stage but have not elaborated 
substantially on how these concepts should be applied.
41
 For example, Wälde and 
Sabahi have proposed that, in the context of claims based on the FET standard, the 
concept of legitimate expectations ‘can not only be a concept to describe a 
subcategory of the fair and equitable treatment standard, but it can also be used to 
expand or delimit the scope for compensation’.42 However, the potential benefits 
and drawbacks of such a development are not explored by Wälde and Sabahi or by 
other commentators who have proposed (or have at least alluded to) the possible 
application of public law principles at the remedies stage.  
Indeed, much of the literature which argues that public law principles should inform 
the approach of investment treaty arbitration tribunals towards remedies focuses on 
the fact that sovereign misconduct in public law has traditionally been addressed by 
non-pecuniary remedies (such as orders for specific performance, annulment or 
declaratory relief) rather than damages and argues that an award of damages does 
not sit easily with the nature of disputes dealt with by investment treaty arbitration 
tribunals.
43
 Proposals have thus been made for the increased use of non-pecuniary 
measures in investment treaty arbitration, while acknowledging the significant 
difficulties associated with non-pecuniary relief.
44
 Thus, from a theoretical 
                                                 
41
See for example Thomas Wälde and Borzu Sabahi, ‘Compensation, Damages and Valuation’ in 
Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law (OUP 2008); Borzu Sabahi and Nicholas J Birch, ‘Comparative 
Compensation for Expropriation’ in Stephan W Schill (ed), International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law (OUP 2010); Irmgard Marboe, ‘State Responsibility and Comparative 
State Liability for Administrative and Legislative Harm to Economic Interests’ in Stephan W Schill 
(ed), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (OUP 2010); Anne van Aaken, 
‘Primary and Secondary Remedies in International Investment Law and National State Liability: a 
Functional and Comparative View’ in Stephan W Schill (ed), International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law (OUP 2010). 
42
ibid, 1089. 
43
See for example Carole Malinvaud, ‘Non-pecuniary Remedies in Investment Treaty and 
Commercial Arbitration’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), 50 Years of the New York Convention: 
ICCA International Arbitration Conference (Kluwer 2009); Anne van Aaken, ‘Primary and 
Secondary Remedies in International Investment Law and National State Liability: a Functional and 
Comparative View’ in Stephan W Schill (ed), International Investment Law and Comparative 
Public Law (OUP 2010); Brooks E Allen, ‘The Use of Non-pecuniary remedies in WTO Dispute 
Settlement: Lessons for Arbitral Practitioners’ in Michael E Schneider and Joachim Knoll (eds), 
Performance as a Remedy: Non-Monetary Relief in International Arbitration (Juris Publishing 
2011); Gisele Stephens-Chu, ‘Is it Always All About the Money? The Appropriateness of Non-
Pecuniary Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2014) 30 Arbitration Intl 661. 
44
See for example Christoph Schreuer, ‘Non-Pecuniary Remedies in ICSID Arbitration’ (2004) 20 
Arbitration Intl 325; Martin Endicott, ‘Remedies in Investor-State Arbitration: Restitution, Specific 
Performance and Declaratory Awards’ in P Kahn and T W Wälde (eds), New Aspects of 
International Investment Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2007); Mavluda Sattorova, ‘Investment Treaty 
22 
 
perspective, the ordering of non-pecuniary relief by investment treaty arbitration 
tribunals is viewed by some as an undue interference with host state sovereignty as 
such reliefs compel the host state to act in a certain manner.
45
 While the proposition 
that the granting of non-pecuniary relief necessarily or invariably interferes with 
host state sovereignty more than the granting of pecuniary relief has been 
questioned,
46
 there remain, in any event, more practical problems associated with 
the granting of non-pecuniary relief. For example, the host state may be unwilling 
or unable to undo its actions (due to political, legal or constitutional constraints) or 
the relationship between the host state and the claimant investor may be irreparably 
damaged. Furthermore, investment treaty arbitration tribunals, given their ad hoc 
nature, have limited ability to supervise and enforce transfers of property or other 
restitutionary acts. These factors are likely to make restoration either impractical or 
futile and to cause the claimant investor to request pecuniary relief only, which, in 
turn, circumscribes the ability of the investment treaty arbitration tribunal to award 
alternative forms of relief. Lastly, the terms of the relevant IIA may preclude the 
granting of non-pecuniary remedies.
47
 Given these difficulties and, accordingly, the 
limited circumstances in which non-pecuniary remedies are likely to be 
appropriate,
48
 it is submitted that the literature on this topic is already quite 
comprehensive.  
Finally, largely as a result of the investment treaty claims that arose out of the 
Argentine economic crisis and sovereign default of 2000 to 2002, a substantial body 
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of literature has developed in relation to the (uncertain) effect of successful 
invocation of the customary international law defence of necessity and/or of NPM 
clauses on the obligation to pay damages.
49
  However, this analysis has not 
generally been connected to the wider question of whether taking into account 
public interest considerations at the remedies stage is desirable. 
In conclusion, despite the growing body of literature relating to both the balancing 
of investor and public interests in investment treaty arbitration and on the remedies 
stage of the arbitral process, the question of whether, and in what circumstances, 
the remedies stage represents an appropriate platform for the taking into account of 
public interest considerations has not been comprehensively examined. This thesis 
aims to address this deficit. 
1.3 Methodology and limitations 
 
Doctrinal analysis of the primary sources of international investment law, namely 
IIAs and the awards of investment treaty arbitration tribunals, will be utilised 
throughout this thesis. This analysis, however, departs from the narrowest form of 
doctrinal analysis in that it seeks to break away from the idea of legal systems as 
self-contained systems and instead envisages a role for legal scholars in critiquing 
the law and in suggesting legal reforms.
50
 Therefore, in the context of this thesis, 
doctrinal analysis refers to the analysis of legal sources in order to examine how 
investment treaty arbitration tribunals have decided cases of a given kind and how 
those tribunals ought to decide those cases in light of an underlying normative 
proposition (namely that public interest considerations should be taken into account 
in investment treaty arbitration).
51
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In conducting this analysis, the case for institutional and procedural reform of the 
investment treaty dispute resolution system will not be examined in detail. Rather 
the related issue of the need for public interest considerations to be taken into 
account in investment treaty arbitration and the means by which this has been, and 
could be, achieved will form the focus of the study. However, the efficacy of 
mechanisms such as general exceptions clauses which have been included in some 
‘new generation’ IIAs will not be extensively evaluated except where such 
mechanisms have a potential impact on the remedies stage of the arbitral process. 
Furthermore, since the payment of damages has been the remedy awarded by the 
vast majority of investment treaty arbitration tribunals to date and given the 
significant difficulties associated with the use of non-pecuniary remedies in 
investment treaty arbitration, this thesis will focus on the remedy of damages. 
Finally, although interim or provisional remedies (which are increasingly being 
ordered by investment treaty arbitration tribunals)
52
 may significantly affect the 
parties’ incentives and may, in many cases, assist in reaching early settlement of the 
dispute (which may have an indirect effect on the public interest), this thesis deals 
only with the remedy of damages awarded at the final stage of the arbitral process. 
1.4  Definitions and key concepts 
(a) International Investment Agreements (IIAs) 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are the most common form of IIA.
53
 As at the 
end of 2014, the IIA regime consisted of 3,268 IIAs, which included 2,923 BITs (of 
which approximately 2,223 remain in force) and 345 other IIAs, such as integration 
or cooperation agreements with an investment dimension (of which approximately 
275 remain in force).
54
 BITs place substantive obligations on each contracting state 
vis-à-vis investors from the other contracting state. While each IIA is, in theory, the 
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product of its own negotiation, in practice the rights conferred by IIAs share many 
common features, although the exact meaning of each right or standard will depend 
on the wording of the individual treaty. This similarity can be explained in part by 
the history behind IIAs (and in particular BITs). The need for such investment 
treaties arose due to the inadequacies of relying on diplomatic means or, 
exceptionally, on inter-state adjudication as means of resolving investment disputes 
following the end of the age of European empire.
55
 As there was no duty on the 
home state to grant a national diplomatic protection, states might decline to pursue 
a particular claim for political reasons.
56
 Similarly, for inter-state adjudication to 
occur, the consent of both states was required. Such consent was generally preceded 
by bilateral negotiations, the outcome of which depended more on the relative 
strength of the parties than on the merits of the claim. In either circumstance 
therefore, investors were at the mercy of their governments.
57
  In addition, even if 
compensation was recovered by the home state, there was no obligation on the 
home state to pass on the compensation to the investor who had suffered the 
damage.
58
  In many cases, investors therefore had to absorb the cost of adverse 
government action by either doing nothing or by making a claim under their 
political risk insurance.
59
 
Therefore, business lobbies in the major Western states and Western states 
themselves began to push for a multilateral treaty which would protect foreign 
investors from expropriation and other interferences by host states. However, the 
many attempts to reach consensus on a multilateral investment code, such as the 
Draft Convention on the Treatment of Foreigners in 1929,
60
 the Abs-Shawcross 
Draft Convention of 1959
61
 and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment of 
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1998,
62
 all ran aground.  This deadlock occurred for several reasons, not least 
because certain developing states viewed these draft treaties as just another method 
of domination, which would hinder their attempts to gain more control over their 
own natural resources.
63
 In accordance with this view, many developing countries, 
in particular those in Latin America and in the Soviet Bloc, subscribed to the so-
called Calvo Doctrine (associated with Carlos Calvo, a nineteenth century 
Argentine diplomat and jurist) which essentially holds that the responsibility of a 
government toward foreigners cannot be greater than that which a government owes 
towards its own citizens.
64
  Alternative proposals that affirmed this right of states to 
regulate foreign investors – primarily the Havana Charter65 – were rejected by the 
US and by Western capital.
66
 
Due to this lack of consensus, states began to conclude bilateral, regional or sector-
specific investment treaties instead.
67
 Germany is credited with being the first state 
to sign a BIT: the Germany-Pakistan BIT of 1959.
68
 However, although such 
treaties usually have a fixed lifespan and may be easier to renegotiate than 
multilateral agreements, they in fact adopt many of the protections put forward in 
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the failed multilateral treaties.
69
  Thus, despite the lack of a multilateral investor 
code, a high level of protection for international investors has been achieved in 
practice
70
 and this patchwork of treaties has become the dominant international 
vehicle through which investment is regulated.
71
  
Adding to the historical factors which have encouraged convergence in investment 
treaty provisions, convergence is also stimulated by the inclusion in most 
investment treaties of most-favoured-nation (MFN) clauses, which encourage states 
to grant the same benefits to the nationals of each state they sign a treaty with. 
Finally, the ability of investors to forum-shop means that states have to assume that 
investors are covered by the highest investment protection standards.
72
 Thus, while 
in relation to peripheral issues, there is increasing variation among IIAs,
73
 it is 
possible to generally describe the principal features of IIAs and this thesis proceeds 
on that basis. For example, it is possible to state that the definition of ‘investment’ 
in IIAs tends to asset based and therefore broad
74
 and that the definition of 
‘investor’ is generally also broad, although variation amongst IIAs exists, for 
example in relation to the basis on which the nationality of a juridical person is 
determined.
75
 While the approximately 1,400 BITs entered into by EU Member 
States will be terminated in coming years following the conferral by the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union of exclusive competence on the EU to 
conclude agreements covering all matters relating to foreign investment,
76
 these 
BITs will, it seems, be progressively replaced by IIAs or investment chapters in 
FTAs concluded by the EU with third countries, the pillars of which should mirror 
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the investor rights included in existing Member States’ IIAs.77 Therefore, the 
commentary on existing IIAs is likely to retain much of its validity.  
(b) The investment treaty arbitration system 
Turning to the concept of investment treaty arbitration, this refers to a process used 
to resolve disputes between a foreign investor and a state under an IIA.
78
 This is to 
be distinguished from other forms of prospective investment arbitration. Thus, a 
state can consent to arbitration of future investment disputes by contract, by 
domestic legislation or by treaty. Contract-based arbitration relies on the specific 
consents of private parties (or of the state acting in its private capacity) and the 
consent is typically regarded as being limited to a commercial relationship with 
another private party. While legislation-based arbitration is closer to treaty-based 
arbitration in that it involves the host state acting in its sovereign capacity in the 
regulatory sphere, the delegation of authority to arbitrators is subject to the direct 
control of the legislature or judiciary of the state in question.
79
 Treaty-based 
arbitration, in contrast, removes investment disputes from the legal domain of the 
contracting states entirely as IIAs give investors from the other contracting state the 
right to bring claims directly against the host state without, in most cases, having to 
exhaust local remedies.
80
 This by-passing of the requirement to exhaust local 
remedies is an anomaly in the general international law context.
81
 Furthermore, a 
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prior contractual relationship between the host state and a claimant investor is not 
required in order for an investor to bring a claim. Rather the state, by entering into 
the IIA, effectively gives a general consent to all nationals of the other contracting 
state to have recourse to arbitration.
82
 In these arbitration proceedings the claimant 
will almost always be an investor and the respondent will always be the host state.
83
 
This system differs from the WTO dispute settlement system, and from most other 
international adjudication systems, which rely on governments to file claims against 
one another. Indeed, due to this right of direct recourse for investors to binding 
arbitration, the numbers of investment disputes now vastly exceed those brought to 
the WTO's interstate dispute settlement system.
84
 
In 1966 a dedicated self-contained framework for the arbitration of investor-state 
disputes was put in place by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (the ICSID Convention)
85
 
and an International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 
affiliated to the World Bank, was established. ICSID was granted jurisdiction over:  
any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment between a Contracting 
State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State 
designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting 
State, which the parties to the dispute consent to in writing to submit to the 
Centre.
86
  
However, ICSID’s early case load was modest and was dominated by contract-
based claims.
87
 In 1987 the first investment arbitration under a BIT was registered
88
 
but it was not until the 1990s that investment treaty arbitration really came into its 
                                                 
82
Jan Paulsson, ‘Arbitration without Privity’ (1995) 10 ICSID Rev 232. 
83
A state-to-state dispute resolution mechanism is also a feature of many IIAs. However, formal 
state-to-state disputes under IIAs are rare: Luke Eric Peterson, ‘All Roads Lead out of Rome: 
Divergent Paths of Dispute Settlement in Bilateral Investment Treaties’ in Lyuba Zarsky (ed), 
International Investment for Sustainable Development: Balancing Rights and Rewards (Earthscan 
Publishing 2005) 127. 
84
José E Alvárez, ‘Meador Lecture Series 2007-2008: Empire: Contemporary Foreign Investment 
Law: An “Empire of Law” or the “Law of Empire”?’ (2009) 60 Ala L Rev 943, 959. 
85
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, 575 UNTS 159 (18 March 1965).  
86
ibid, art 25(1).  
87
See for example Holiday Inns SA v Morocco, ICSID Case No ARB/72/1 (an unpublished ICSID 
award discussed in Pierre Lalive, ‘The First ‘World Bank’ Arbitration (Holiday Inns v. Morocco) - 
Some Legal Problems’ 1 ICSID Rep 645); AGIP SpA v Congo, ICSID Case No ARB/77/1, Award 
30 November 1979, 1 ICSID Rep 306. 
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own.
89
 Since then, ICSID has become the most popular forum for settlement of 
investor-state disputes due to the self-contained nature of the ISCID Convention 
system, although investors also bring a substantial minority of claims outside the 
ICSID framework. Under the ICSID Convention, each contracting state, whether or 
not a party to the dispute, is required to recognise an award as binding and to 
enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by the award as if it were a final 
judgment of that state’s courts.90 Thus, ICSID awards are not subject to review by 
the local courts prior to enforcement and the only review available is that provided 
for under Articles 50 to 52 of the ISCID Convention.
91
 This annulment process 
deals with procedural error and so falls short of being a comprehensive review 
process.
92
  
Apart from the ICSID Arbitration Rules, other institutional arbitration rules applied 
in investor-state arbitrations include the ICC Arbitration Rules
93
 and the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules.
94
 In addition, the ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules,
95
 which authorise ICSID to administer disputes involving non-
signatory states and their investors, can be chosen.
96
 However, the ICSID 
Additional Facility is not governed by the ICSID Convention and, as a result, an 
award under the ICSID Additional Facility does not fall within the ICSID 
enforcement system. In ad hoc arbitrations (where arbitration procedures are 
                                                 
89
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the ICSID Convention. However, where neither the home state nor the host state is a party to the 
ICSID Convention, these rules cannot be used: ibid, art 2. 
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conducted without supervision by any administrative institution), the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules
97
 
are most popular, although arbitrations can also be conducted in a classical ad hoc 
fashion, with no prescribed rules apart from the provisions of the relevant IIA.
98
  
Most IIAs provide the investor with a choice of dispute resolution options. For 
example, Article 10(5) of the Argentina-Netherlands BIT is quite typical in 
providing that the investor may submit the dispute either to ICSID or to an ad hoc 
arbitration tribunal established under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
99
 
However, other IIAs make the choice between ICSID arbitration and arbitration 
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules subject to agreement by both the claimant 
investor and the host state and provide for arbitration under the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules as a default where agreement cannot be reached.
100
 Yet another 
group of treaties provide for the application of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules only 
in circumstances where the ICSID Arbitration Rules and the ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules are unavailable.
101
 Finally, some IIAs provide that for arbitration 
under ICSID Arbitration Rules only
102
 and some provide for arbitration under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules only.
103
 
In non-ICSID arbitrations (including arbitrations under the ICSID Additional 
Facility rules), awards or their enforcement can be challenged under the 
commercial arbitration framework established by national law, the New York 
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Convention
104
 and other relevant treaties. Therefore, the national law at the place of 
arbitration controls the losing party’s request to set aside the award, or as the case 
may be, to refuse enforcement.
105
  Article V of the New York Convention allows a 
state to refuse recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award. However, the 
grounds for refusal are quite narrow. Thus, recognition and enforcement of the 
award may be refused if, inter alia, the subject matter of the dispute is non-
arbitrable in the state in which recognition and enforcement is sought or if it is 
contrary to public policy in that State. However, this ‘public policy’ ground has 
generally been narrowly construed by domestic courts.
106
 Article VII of the New 
York Convention further reduces the likelihood that an award will be refused 
enforcement as it enables courts hearing annulment actions to effectively disregard 
the grounds for recognition and enforcement under the New York Convention if 
local arbitration law contains grounds more favourable to the validity and 
enforceability of the award.
107
 Thus, the system of supervision by domestic courts 
in the seat of commercial arbitration or enforcement (in the case of non-ICSID 
awards) or by an ISCID annulment committee remains essentially limited to 
jurisdictional errors, procedural improprieties and serious violations of ordre 
public, and the latter only in the case of non-ICSID awards. More deference is 
afforded to foreign arbitral awards than to domestic awards in many countries
108
 
and, in most cases, almost automatic recognition and enforcement of awards is 
likely in relation to non-ICSID awards.
109
   
(c) The substantive rights contained in IIAs 
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Apart from the dispute settlement provisions contained in IIAs, which have been 
characterised by investment treaty arbitration tribunals as arrangements provided to 
better protect the rights of foreign investors rather than as mere procedural 
mechanisms,
110
 modern IIAs tend to include most of the following substantive 
rights, albeit with different formulations and qualifications: the fair and equitable 
treatment (FET) standard,
111
 the guarantee of full protection and security, the 
contingent standards of national treatment and of MFN treatment and the duty to 
pay compensation in the event of an expropriation or nationalisation. Umbrella 
clauses are also an important feature of a sizeable minority of IIAs and most IIAs 
also contain a guarantee in relation to the repatriation of profits. Some IIAs also 
contain stipulations as to the conditions of admission of the investment and 
prohibitions on the imposition of performance requirements. The principal 
substantive rights typically contained in IIAs will be explored further in the 
following chapters. 
(d) The remedies stage 
As with other adversarial adjudicative processes, an investment treaty arbitration 
tribunal must first decide whether it has jurisdiction over a particular dispute (the 
jurisdiction stage), before moving on to consider whether the claimant investor’s 
rights have been breached (the merits stage) and, if liability is established, to 
determining the remedy to be awarded to the claimant investor (the remedies stage). 
While some tribunals have rendered an award which deals with all three stages 
together (if such is necessary),
112
 other arbitral tribunals have rendered a separate 
award in respect of each of the stages,
113
 while yet another group of arbitral 
tribunals have rendered an award covering two stages of the process while 
considering either the jurisdiction stage or the remedies stage separately.
114
 A 
separate award relating to remedies may be favoured due to the need for input from 
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valuation experts at this stage of the process. However, even where the 
consideration of remedies is dealt with in the same award as the other stages of the 
arbitral process, it still clearly constitutes a distinct stage of the adjudication 
process. 
1.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined the purpose of the thesis and the principal arguments that 
will be made in this thesis. The existing literature relating to the tension between 
investor interests and public interests in investment treaty arbitration and, in 
particular, the literature relating to the remedies stage of the investment treaty 
arbitration process has also been analysed and the conclusion reached that, despite 
the growing body of literature on both the balancing of investor interests and public 
interests in investment treaty arbitration and on the remedies stage of the arbitral 
process, the question of whether, and in what circumstances, the remedies stage 
represents an appropriate platform for the taking into account of public interest 
considerations has not been comprehensively examined. This thesis addresses this 
question. However, before focussing on the remedies stage, the issue of why public 
interest considerations need to be taken into account in resolving disputes under 
IIAs in the first place must be considered. Chapter 2 will examine this issue. 
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Chapter 2: Why should investment treaty arbitration tribunals 
take account of public interest considerations?  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will consider why public interest considerations should be taken into 
account by investment treaty arbitration tribunals (whether at the jurisdiction, 
merits or remedies stage of the arbitral process). It is necessary to consider this 
question as, while consensus is emerging as to the need for public interest 
considerations to be taken into account in the sphere of investment treaty arbitration 
per se, whether this can be accomplished only in the context of the introduction of 
‘new generation’ national and international investment policies (including new or 
renegotiated IIAs), which would explicitly recognise the duty of host states to 
regulate in the public interest, is open to question. However, this chapter will 
present a number of reasons why public interest considerations should also be taken 
into account by investment treaty arbitration tribunals when resolving disputes 
under the majority of current IIAs that make little or no reference to such 
considerations. This question will be considered by reference to the nature of the 
investment treaty arbitration regime (and, in particular, the ‘public-private’ 
distinctions which underlie the regime) and to the principal substantive rights 
typically contained in IIAs.  
2.2 The nature of international investment law and arbitration 
 
International investment law and arbitration can be considered to be a hybrid 
system as it can be viewed through either a public law or a private law lens and it 
contains characteristics of both public and private law.
1
 Indeed, even within the 
domain of public law, commentators have different views as to how investment 
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Private in International Investment Law: An Integrated Systems Approach’ (2013-2014) 54 Va J Intl 
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treaty arbitration should be categorised and as to how it interacts with extant public 
law. Thus, some have argued that the investment treaty regime has an effect on 
general public international law and may constitute the ‘new’ custom in the field of 
investment protection such that even states that are not signatories to IIAs may be 
subject to some of the rules emerging from the regime.
2
 Viewed through this lens, 
international investment law constitutes a set of rules applicable to all states which 
regulate the exercise of states’ sovereign powers and investment treaty arbitration 
constitutes a process of law-making.
3
 Other commentators have taken a different 
view, while still emphasising the public law nature of investment law. Thus, it has 
been argued that the relationship between the respondent host state and the claimant 
investor in investment treaty arbitration is analogous to the relationship between the 
citizen and the state in domestic state liability law as the essential issue in both 
cases is how to keep a government from abusing its role as sovereign and 
regulator.
4
  
If one subscribes to either of these views (or, indeed, if investment treaty arbitration 
is conceived of as forming part of public law in any way), this opens the door to 
criticism of the current adjudication model used to resolve investor-state disputes, 
which has borrowed its main elements from the international commercial 
arbitration model and which therefore can be perceived to lack certain features of 
public law adjudication such as consistency, transparency and accountability.
5
 
Thus, perhaps the principal criticism of the commercial arbitration model is that it 
                                                 
2
Andreas F Lowenfeld, ‘Investment Agreements and International Law’ (2003) 42 Colum J 
Transnational L 123; José E Alvárez, ‘A BIT on Custom’ (2010) 42 N Y Univ J Intl L & Pol 17, 63. 
See also Campbell McLachlan, ‘Investment Treaties and General International Law’ (2008) 57 
ICLQ 361, 392-93. This is argued to be the case although international investment law, given the 
relatively recent genesis of IIAs and IIA disputes, does not wholly accord with the usual definition 
of custom (i.e. a constant and uniform (though not necessarily unanimous) practice of states in their 
international relations and the belief that such practice is required by law). 
3
Alex Mills, ‘Antinomies of Public and Private at the Foundations of International Investment Law 
and Arbitration’ (2011) 14 J Intl Economic L 469. 
4
Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law’ (2006) 17 Eur J Intl L 121; Daniel Kalderimis, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration 
as Global Administrative Law: What this might mean in practice’ in Chester Brown and Kate Miles 
(eds), Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (Cambridge University Press 2011). 
5
Alec Stone Sweet and Florian Grisel, ‘Transnational Investment Arbitration: From Delegation to 
Constitutionalization?’ in Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Francesco Francioni 
(eds), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (OUP 2009); Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann, ‘Constitutional Theories of International Economic Adjudication and Investor-State 
Arbitration’ in Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Francesco Francioni (eds), Human 
Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (OUP 2009); Cornel Marian, ‘Balancing 
Transparency: The Value of Administrative Law and Mathews-Balancing to Investment Treaty 
Arbitrations’ (2010) 10 Pepp Disp Resol L J 275. 
37 
 
fails to ensure arbitrator independence and accountability. In constituting 
investment treaty arbitration tribunals, each party to the dispute typically has the 
right to appoint one arbitrator to the panel of three arbitrators that will preside over 
the dispute. A third individual, the chair of the panel, will then be appointed 
through agreement of the two party-nominated arbitrators and ideally the parties as 
well.
6
 Thus, arbitrators receive appointments only if investors bring claims and they 
lack security of tenure. Furthermore, so-called ‘issue conflicts’ may arise if a 
person is at the same time an arbitrator in one case and counsel in another
7
 and this 
can give rise to the risk of real or perceived bias.
8
 While the presence of 
institutional safeguards could help to address this perception of bias, such 
safeguards would appear to be absent in investment treaty arbitration as arbitrators 
are not accountable to any higher judicial authority or elected public authority as 
there is no appellate body for investment treaty arbitrations apart from the ICSID 
annulment procedure which is limited to procedural error only. Moreover, as noted 
in Chapter 1, judicial supervision of arbitrators by domestic courts in either the seat 
of the arbitration or in the place of enforcement is limited.  
Linked to the issue of arbitrator impartiality are the issues of the lack of a formal 
doctrine of precedent in investment treaty arbitration, the perceived lack of 
transparency surrounding the arbitral process and the question of amicus curiae 
participation in arbitral proceedings. In relation to the former issue, although a de 
facto doctrine of precedent is emerging in investment treaty arbitration,
9
 the lack of 
a formal doctrine of precedent adds an element of unpredictability to arbitral 
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decisions
10
 and, it is argued, could potentially threaten governments’ ability to 
regulate for social and environmental purposes given that states are given little 
guidance as to how possible future cases against them would be resolved.
11
 In 
relation to the lack of transparency surrounding the investment treaty arbitration 
process and the lack of public participation, steps have been taken towards 
addressing these issues. For example, in investment disputes under ICSID it is now 
routine for the basic details of the arbitration to be in the public domain
12
 and 
several recent arbitrations have conducted public hearings on closed circuit 
television
 
or online
13
 or at least have provided access to transcripts of the hearings 
and to a range of documentation relating to the proceedings.
14
 In addition, some 
more recent IIAs allow for, or require, the publication of the award and other 
documents relating to the proceedings.
15
 Finally, UNCITRAL has issued a set of 
transparency rules which require disclosure of information submitted to, and issued 
by, arbitral tribunals throughout proceedings, mandate open hearings and expressly 
allow for participation by non-parties to a dispute.
16
 However, notwithstanding 
these developments, it is argued that there is still room for improvement in terms of 
transparency and public participation
17
 and, in particular, the fact that amicus curiae 
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submissions have been allowed in only a small number of cases has been criticised 
as has the treatment of amici in those cases in which amicus curiae submissions 
were permitted.
18
  
Overall therefore, it has been argued that investment treaty arbitration as it currently 
operates does not display the procedural features necessary for its normative 
production to count as law as, among other features, awards do not have enjoy the 
force of precedent and quite often go unpublished, because there is no effective 
device to avoid multiple proceedings in relation to the same dispute and because the 
manner of appointment of arbitrators brings with it an inherent perception of bias.
19
 
This perception of pro-investor bias
20
 in particular is troubling from a host state 
perspective and also may not be in the long-term interests of investors and, as a 
result, many commentators have argued that a new international investment court 
with tenured judges should be established or, alternatively, some form of 
supervision of arbitral tribunals, either by courts or by an appellate body, should be 
introduced.
21
  
However, while these arguments are quite persuasive (and pervasive), it is 
important to recognise (and, indeed, it has been explicitly acknowledged)
22
 that 
these arguments are based on the premise that international investment law is a 
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form of public law. However, although this is a view that has become increasingly 
popular in recent years, the characterisation of international investment law as a 
form of public law is not universal.
23
 Thus, international investment law can also be 
characterised as an aspect of the bilateral relationship between particular states. 
Taking this view, IIAs are seen as ‘private’, quasi-contractual, agreements between 
individual states, under which those states make specific commitments to each 
other in the hope of gaining a competitive advantage over other states in attracting 
and retaining foreign direct investment.
24
 While some proponents of this view 
accept that IIAs may contribute to the consolidation of already existing rules of 
custom in international investment law and to the crystallisation of new rules of 
customary international law in the future, they reject the proposition that IIAs 
represent the ‘new’ customary international law of investment protection.25 Thus, 
this view would hold that international investment law is a term used to describe the 
multitude of individual investment treaties entered into by states and that, in 
interpreting such treaties, the intentions of the particular state parties to each 
individual treaty should be paramount.
26
 Thus, since these treaties are regarded as 
quid pro quo arrangements, the use of arbitration as an adjudication model is not as 
problematic and, viewed through this lens, provides a depoliticised, neutral forum 
for dispute resolution much preferable to the ‘gunboat diplomacy’ upon which 
foreign investors in the past were forced to rely.
27
  
In reality, both of these seemingly contradictory perspectives as to the 
characterisation of international investment law have some validity as, while on one 
hand, the particular procedural requirements of each IIA for the initiation of the 
investor-state dispute settlement process would seem to reflect a specific bargain 
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entered into by the contracting states,
28
 on the other hand, the substantive rights 
conferred by many treaties explicitly or implicitly rely on general international law 
or affirm established principles of state responsibility to aliens,
29
 while also 
mirroring concepts that appear in domestic administrative law.
30
 In addition, the 
subject matter of investment treaty arbitrations range from disputes which touch on 
core public law concerns (such as the ability of the state to achieve legitimate 
policy objectives) to disputes which are closer to commercial disputes between 
private entities. Thus, Maupin describes international investment law as ‘at once 
neither and both of these things’ and notes that these opposing perspectives as to 
the characterisation of international investment law are ‘two sides of the same coin, 
and each shapes and defines the other’.31 
The ‘public law’ perspective may be more attractive to commentators as it allows 
one to draw some general conclusions as to the interpretation of IIA provisions and 
to view international investment law as part of the development of a global 
administrative law (i.e. law that is concerned with the exercise of public authority 
by bodies outside the state or by states in ways that reach beyond the state and its 
law)
32
 or as part of customary international law.
33
 This approach is supported by the 
fact that IIAs generally do not characterise the obligations which they establish as 
specific to that particular treaty.
34
 Furthermore, for historical reasons and due to the 
inclusion of a MFN clause in most IIAs which encourages uniformity in treaty 
drafting, it is possible, as a matter of fact, to describe the principal investor 
protections contained in IIAs, despite increasing variation among investment 
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treaties on peripheral issues. The presence of a MFN clause in most IIAs also 
means that investment treaty arbitration tribunals may have to substitute the 
substantive rights in the relevant IIA for more favourable provisions from the 
investor’s perspective.35 For example, in Rumeli v Kazakhstan36 the FET standard 
was not present in the applicable BIT between Turkey and Kazakhstan. However, 
the tribunal used the MFN clause to import the FET standard from the Kazakhstan-
UK BIT.
37
 The presence of a clause that essentially facilitates the importation of 
rights from one IIA into another somewhat undermines the argument that each 
investment treaty constitutes an individual quasi-contractual bargain. Overall 
therefore, one can say that international investment law, as a matter of fact rather 
than theory, contains some systemic elements in that the majority of IIAs contain 
broadly similar investor protections. However, beyond this rather limited 
proposition, the characterisation of international investment law remains a question 
of perspective.
38
 
Crucially however, although the balancing of public and investor interests in 
interpreting IIA rights also creates a ‘public-private’ distinction, this distinction is 
not necessarily connected to the question of whether international investment law 
constitutes a system of public law or a set of ‘private’ agreements between 
sovereign states, although some commentators have linked the two questions by 
arguing that the use of proportionality analysis in balancing investor and public 
interests may contribute to the ‘constitutionalisation’ and ‘judicialisation’ of 
investment law (i.e. may contribute to making it more ‘public law’ in nature).39 
Accordingly, while balancing investor and public interests may seem (and perhaps 
is) more consonant with the characterisation of international investment law as a 
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public law system, in fact, different participants in international investment law and 
arbitration may adopt different combination of perspectives in different situations. 
Thus, in contentious situations, Mills notes that respondent states are likely to argue 
in favour of a ‘public-public’ perspective whereas a claimant investor is likely to 
argue in favour of a ‘private-private’ analysis.40 A ‘public-public’ perspective 
would hold that investment treaty arbitration should be conceived of as part of 
public law and should be interpreted in a manner that takes account of (public) state 
regulatory interests whereas a ‘private-private’ analysis would hold that the 
obligations imposed by IIAs are quasi-contractual in nature and that they should be 
interpreted in a manner that emphasises the protection of the (private) rights of the 
investor.
41
 This proposition is borne out by examining investment treaty arbitration 
awards. For example, in Azurix v Argentina
42
 Argentina argued that the FET 
standard should be construed in accordance with the minimum international 
standard of treatment under customary international law rather than in accordance 
with the provisions of the relevant BIT which provided that, ‘investment shall at all 
times be accorded fair and equitable treatment,…and shall in no case be accorded 
treatment less than required by international law’43 and further argued that the BIT 
should be interpreted with due deference to the right of the state to act in the public 
interest.
44
 In contrast, the claimant investor pointed to the precise text of the FET 
provision and argued that the comma separating the phrase ‘fair and equitable 
treatment’ from the phrase ‘treatment required by international law’ suggested that 
the latter was intended to be a self-contained standard, independent of the former.
45
 
The claimant investor further argued, by reference to the treaty’s preamble, that the 
contracting states to the BIT had entered into the treaty with the aim of stimulating 
investment and that the tribunal should be mindful of this objective in interpreting 
the treaty, thereby urging the tribunal to interpret the investor’s rights in an 
expansive manner.
46
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However, ‘public-private’ and ‘private-public’ perspectives have also manifested 
themselves in academic commentary and in investment treaty arbitration awards, 
although such perspectives can be considered more likely to come into play when 
an IIA is being analysed outside the context of a dispute.
47
 Thus, a ‘public-private’ 
perspective would hold that international investment law should be viewed as an 
emerging system of public law but that it should consist of strong standards of 
protection, in order to protect investors’ interests and to liberate investors from state 
regulatory control. This view is consonant with the belief that foreign investment is 
likely to lead to economic growth and to improvements in host state governance 
and so should be robustly protected.
48
 On the other hand, those who are more 
concerned with the ability of states to regulate in the public interest and to act freely 
are more likely to adopt a ‘private–public’ perspective. Thus, the ‘private’ nature of 
individually negotiated treaties is emphasised to demonstrate that, in accordance 
with state sovereignty, investment standards should only be applicable where a state 
has specifically given its consent to such a standard. However, advocates of this 
perspective would simultaneously argue that standards of protection should allow 
states the ability to regulate in the public interest, in circumstances where the extent 
to which a state has ceded regulatory sovereignty is unclear.
49
  
Thus, the aim of the remainder of this chapter is to argue that, regardless of whether 
one characterises international investment law as a form of public law or whether 
one views each IIA as a ‘private’, quasi-contractual arrangement between sovereign 
states, investment treaty arbitration tribunals should, in either case, take account of 
public interest considerations in appropriate circumstances. In accordance with the 
above analysis, the answer reached will be a matter of perspective. However, the 
aim is to explain the reasons why this perspective is a valid one. 
2.3  The open ended nature of IIA rights  
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Before considering the reasons why investment treaty arbitration tribunals should 
take account of public interest considerations, the question of whether such 
tribunals have the ability to take account of such considerations must be examined.  
In this regard, the merits stage is the first point at which the interaction between 
investor interests and public interests can directly and explicitly be considered as, 
while the manner in which ‘investment’ and ‘investor’ are defined and the approach 
of investment treaty arbitration tribunals towards the question of jurisdiction are 
important from a public interest perspective,
50
 these issues do not directly go to the 
key concern of interference with the ability of sovereign states to regulate.
51
  
Turning therefore to the merits stage of the arbitral process, much has been written 
about the potential for the principal substantive rights conferred by IIAs to be 
interpreted in a broad and investor-friendly manner.
52
 However, the fact that such 
rights are generally open-ended in nature may conversely also provide investment 
treaty arbitration tribunals with the opportunity and ability to take account of public 
interest considerations. The principal substantive rights conferred by IIAs will now 
be examined in order to demonstrate their open-ended nature and the wide-ranging 
interpretative discretion accorded to investment treaty arbitration tribunals as a 
result.
53
   
(a) The expropriation clause 
Expropriation clauses prohibit the expropriation or nationalisation of the foreign 
investor’s investment without the payment of compensation. Thus, the notion of 
expropriation is not primarily concerned with proscribing governmental behaviour 
but rather with ensuring that compensation is provided. Beyond this basic concept 
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however there are many uncertainties associated with expropriation clauses as the 
term ‘expropriation’ is generally not defined in IIAs. First¸ most expropriation 
clauses cover both direct and indirect expropriation. Terminology such as 
‘measures tantamount to nationalisation or expropriation’54 or ‘measures having an 
effect equivalent to expropriation’55 is also frequently used, meaning that measures 
which have the same effect as a physical expropriation but which accomplish this in 
a less direct manner are also caught by the prohibition. While it is clear that a direct 
expropriation occurs where an investment is nationalised or otherwise expropriated 
through formal transfer of title or outright physical seizure, this type of 
expropriation is no longer as common and the meaning of indirect expropriation or 
of related concepts such as ‘measures tantamount to expropriation’ is less 
straightforward. The indirect expropriation concept is intended to apply where the 
state interferes in the use of property or with the enjoyment of the benefits 
associated with property even where the property is not seized and the legal title to 
the property is not affected.  
Thus, examples of acts, which on their own or in combination with other acts, could 
amount to indirect expropriation include denial of judicial access,
56
 substantial 
interference with the management or control of a business enterprise,
57
 the 
imposition of taxes that are confiscatory in magnitude,
58
 government-organised 
boycotts or the creation by the government of a monopoly for itself or another 
supplier, thereby forcing the foreign investor’s company out of business.  
Contractual rights can also be expropriated by host states, where the measure is 
taken in exercise of that state’s sovereign powers.59 Even if one activity on its own 
is not enough to constitute expropriation, a cumulative series of  regulatory acts or 
omissions, which may be interspersed with lawful state regulatory actions, may be 
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held to meet the threshold, thereby constituting a creeping expropriation.
60
 For 
example, a creeping expropriation could occur if the host state government first 
blocked employee access to the foreign investor’s plant, then took over a key 
supplier of the foreign investor’s company and subsequently refused to supply it.61  
The most controversial aspect of the indirect expropriation concept is that 
regulatory measures which adversely affect the investment could potentially also be 
held to constitute indirect expropriation. The reasoning behind this may be that 
many policies requiring what used to be a clear-cut taking of tangible property are 
now being operated by ‘regulation’ and so should be caught by the expropriation 
clause.
62
 However, it may be difficult to distinguish between an indirect 
expropriation and a legitimate and non-compensable regulatory measure taken by 
the host state in furtherance of social or environmental goals.
63
 This is potentially 
problematic as a state’s right to regulate is the closest approximation of the 
obligation to protect and promote human rights and if host state regulation is 
covered by the indirect expropriation concept, the state’s ability to fulfil its human 
rights obligation could be undermined. For example, if the government introduced 
price freezes in relation to the provision of water by private enterprises based on its 
citizens’ right to water, this could be challenged as constituting an indirect 
expropriation.
64
 In fact, quite a number of investment treaty arbitrations have 
centred on disputes relating to the provision of essential services such as water, gas 
or electricity supply or waste management services by private entities.
65
 Similarly, 
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it has been suggested that a government’s decision to issue a compulsory license for 
a patent-protected drug to allow that drug to be produced by a generic manufacturer 
at a lower price so as to provide increased access to that drug could be challenged 
as constituting an expropriation of intellectual property.
 66
  
Investment treaty arbitration tribunals must therefore address the complex question 
of the extent to which a government may affect the value of investor property by 
regulation, whether of a general nature or by specific actions in the context of a 
general regulatory framework, for a legitimate public purpose without effecting an 
expropriation and having to compensate the investor. In practice, three different 
approaches to this question can be identified in the jurisprudence. First, some 
tribunals have looked only at the effect of the measure on the investment in 
determining whether an expropriation occurred (the controversial ‘sole effect’ 
doctrine). The prime example of this occurred in Metalclad Corporation v Mexico
67
 
in which the establishment of an ecological protection zone was held to amount to 
expropriation. In that case the tribunal decided that the motivation and intent behind 
the government measure in question was irrelevant and that what is required to 
establish an expropriation is ‘interference with the use of property which has the 
effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or 
reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to 
the obvious benefit of the host State’.68 This approach is problematic when applied 
to indirect expropriations as it does not differentiate between mala fide 
discriminatory takings in breach of due process and non-discriminatory measures 
introduced for a bona fide public purpose as the degree of interference with the 
investor’s property may be the same in each case.69 In addition, the focus on 
‘deprivation’ in determining the existence of internationally proscribed host state 
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conduct renders the test liable to a potentially very broad interpretation as the 
concept of ‘deprivation’ is relative and can be easily circumvented by, for example, 
presenting an investment as consisting of several components, with each of these 
components possessing an economic value.
70
 
However, while the ‘sole effect’ doctrine has been applied by tribunals in a number 
of cases,
71
 the open-ended nature of most expropriation clauses allows for different 
interpretations. Thus, at the other end of the spectrum, some tribunals have 
excluded non-discriminatory bona fide regulations from the scope of the 
expropriation clause entirely. Thus, in Methanex Corporation v United States,
72
 the 
tribunal stated that: 
As a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for 
a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, 
which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed 
expropriatory and compensable unless specific commitments had been 
given by the regulating government to the then putative foreign investor 
contemplating investment that the government would refrain from such 
regulation.
73
 
This approach accords with the view that ‘police powers’ should be exempted 
automatically from any duty of expropriation and has been echoed, to some extent, 
in the text of the US Model BIT and in recent Canadian BITs.
74
 ‘Police powers’ is 
the international law term used to describe non-discriminatory regulatory measures 
introduced by a state to protect or enhance the public welfare, which traditionally 
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encompasses measures taken to protect, inter alia, public health, safety or morals.
75
 
The exact scope of the ‘police powers’ doctrine is unclear however76 and the 
number of expropriation cases in which this approach has been applied to date 
remains relatively small.
77
 
Finally, in between these two approaches is an approach which involves balancing 
the public interest protected by the impugned measure against the effect of the 
measure on the investment in order to determine whether an expropriation has 
occurred, which will be considered further in the following chapter. However, none 
of these three approaches is currently prevailing and it is difficult to predict how a 
tribunal will approach the issue of indirect expropriation.
78
 Although this lack of 
consistency is problematic in itself (and while the de facto system of precedent 
which is emerging in investment treaty arbitration could potentially consolidate the 
position of the controversial ‘sole effect’ doctrine), on the other hand the fact that 
the latter two approaches can permissibly be taken by tribunals does indicate the 
open-ended nature of the expropriation clause and the potential scope for tribunals 
to take account of public interest considerations in interpreting the clause.  
(b) The FET standard 
The FET standard is contained in most IIAs
79
 and has existed as a concept of 
international economic law at least since the 1919 Covenant of the League of 
                                                 
75
UNCTAD, Expropriation: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II 
(UNCTAD 2012) 79-90. 
76For example, it is unclear to what extent (all) human rights form part of the concept of ‘police 
powers’. Indeed, from the viewpoint of human rights law, the wording ‘police powers’ may signify a 
particular connotation with civil and political rights: Jasper Krommendijk and John Morijn, 
‘Proportional by What Measure(s)? Balancing Investor Interests and Human Rights by Way of 
Applying the Proportionality Principle in Investor-State Arbitration’ in Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst- 
Ulrich Petersmann and Francesco Francioni (eds), Human Rights in International Investment Law 
and Arbitration (OUP 2009) 435. 
77
For criticism of this approach see Tra T Pham, ‘International investment treaties and arbitration as 
imbalanced instruments: a re-visit’ (2010) Intl Arbitration L Rev 81. 
78
Markus Perkams, ‘The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law – Searching 
for Light in the Dark’ in Stephan W Schill (ed), International Investment Law and Comparative 
Public Law (OUP 2010) 110. 
79
A study conducted by Knoll-Tudor reviewed 358 BITs and of these only 19 did not mention the 
FET standard either in their preambles or in the body of the treaty: Ioana Knoll-Tudor, ‘The Fair and 
Equitable Treatment Standard and Human Rights Norms’ in Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann and Francesco Francioni (eds), Human Rights in International Investment Law and 
Arbitration (OUP 2009) 312. 
51 
 
Nations.
80
 The precise meaning of the concept depends on the specific wording of 
each treaty, as well as the context of the treaty and its negotiating history. The US-
Mexico Mixed Claims Commission in the 1926 Neer case
81
 set out the customary 
international law standard at that time by stating that a state has breached the fair 
and equitable treatment obligation when the conduct of the state could be qualified 
as outrageous, egregious or in bad faith or so below international standards that a 
reasonable and impartial person would easily recognise it as such. There is an on-
going debate as to whether the FET standard is limited to the international 
minimum standard of customary international law or whether it is to be constructed 
independently as a self-contained standard.
82
  The text of the relevant IIA can be 
determinative in this regard as some IIAs explicitly state that the concept of fair and 
equitable treatment does not require treatment in addition to, or beyond that, 
required by the international law minimum standard.
83
 In practice, there may not be 
much difference between the two approaches when applied to the specific facts of a 
case as the international minimum standard is as indeterminate as the FET 
standard.
84
  
It is only in recent years that some shape has been given to the FET standard by 
investment treaty arbitration tribunals. For many years it was thought that the FET 
standard could encompass any claims that could not be qualified in a more specific 
manner, due to the deceptively simple wording used.  However, nowadays the FET 
standard is associated with a number of specific situations, although in future other 
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scenarios may also be covered.
85
 The cases that consider the FET standard can be 
divided into two broad categories: the first concerning treatment of investors by the 
courts of the host state and the second dealing with administrative decision-making. 
The second category comprises the majority of cases since IIAs generally do not 
require the exhaustion of local remedies (although recourse to national courts or 
arbitral tribunals may be mandated under a concession contract concluded with the 
state or a state agency).
86
 Overall, the FET standard gives expression to a general 
principle of due process in its application to the treatment of investors: it is 
concerned primarily with the process of decision-making in the host state, rather 
than with the prescription of substantive outcomes.
87
  Thus, where the state fails in 
its obligation of vigilance and protection as regards foreign investment, its 
responsibility will be engaged. This obligation of vigilance has been considered to 
be a standard deriving from customary international law.
88
 In such cases the FET 
standard is considered in conjunction with the guarantee of full protection and 
security which may be included in IIAs as a separate obligation or which may be 
contained in the same paragraph as the FET standard.
89
 Similarly, where coercion 
or harassment by the organs of the host state can be proven, the host state may be 
held in breach of the FET standard.
90
 Failure to implement or enforce national laws 
can, in certain contexts, give rise to a breach of the FET standard
91
 as can an 
absence of transparency in host state procedures or arbitrary or discriminatory 
treatment of the claimant investor by the host state.
92
 Bad faith on the part of host 
state organs can also in certain situations be sufficient ground to recognise a breach 
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of the FET standard although usually it is an additional element to a substantive 
obligation and is not considered to be a prerequisite to finding that the FET 
standard has been breached.
93
 
However, perhaps the most important grounds for a finding of breach of the FET 
standard are where there has been either a denial of justice or where the investor’s 
legitimate expectations have been frustrated. Different views as to the scope of the 
denial of justice concept have been taken by both scholars and international 
tribunals ranging from the narrowest view that the term applies only to a refusal to 
grant access to, or hearing in, a court, or a refusal of a court to pronounce a definite, 
just sentence, to a broader view that it applies to most acts of the judiciary, to an 
even broader view that the term encompasses any failure of local remedies and all 
internationally illegal acts by any branch of government connected with the 
administration of justice.
94
 Case law to date in the sphere of investment treaty 
arbitration would seem to indicate that a state will not be held responsible for a 
breach of international law constituted by a lower court’s decision when there was 
an available, effective and adequate appeal within the state’s legal system,95 
although considerable uncertainty exists on this point.
96
  
The legitimate expectations principle is the only part of the FET standard which is 
not well grounded in customary international law.
97
 However, in Saluka v Czech 
Republic the tribunal referred to the concept as the ‘dominant element of that [FET] 
standard’.98 Investment treaty arbitration tribunals have also taken markedly 
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different views on the range of expectations that might potentially qualify as 
legitimate expectations.
99
 Thus, the narrowest interpretation seems to require that 
an expectation be based on specific legal entitlements vested in a foreign investor 
under the law of the host state.
100
 A second, broader, view is that a legitimate 
expectation does not need to be based on legal rights but must be based on specific, 
unilateral representations made by a government official.
101
 A third group of 
decisions suggests that an investor may legitimately expect the regulatory regime in 
place at the time of the investment to remain in force, even if the government has 
not promised to retain the regulatory regime and the investor has no legal rights 
under domestic law to its continuance.
102
 Finally, in some cases, the investor has 
succeeded on the basis of breach of legitimate expectations, despite the identified 
expectation having no basis in the legal rights of the claimant under domestic law, 
or in representations made by the host state or the regulatory arrangements in place 
at the time the investment was made.
103
  
Overall therefore, the content of the FET standard is difficult to explain without 
reference to factual situations
104
 since the concepts involved are so interlinked and 
are broad enough to allow arbitrators to consider a wider range of elements than 
other standards of treatment.
105
 Furthermore, the vast majority of IIAs do not 
contain any exceptions or derogations limiting the applicability of the FET 
standard. Thus, the vagueness and broad-ranging nature of the FET standard is such 
that it ‘goes beyond commonplace assertions in legal theory that law is inherently 
vague and indeterminative’.106 This is because the traditional methods of treaty 
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interpretation are relatively ineffective in clarifying the meaning of the FET 
standard and so tribunals have not followed a uniform methodology in interpreting 
the standard. Thus, some tribunals have merely described the facts of the case and 
then characterised them as a violation of the FET standard.
107
 Other tribunals have 
merely posited a particular set of requirements as part of FET and subsequently 
subsumed the facts of the case under this standard.
108
 For example, in Tecmed v 
Mexico the FET standard was elucidated as follows:  
this provision of the Agreement...requires the Contracting Parties to provide 
to international investments treatment that does not affect the basic 
expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make 
the investment. The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a 
consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its 
relations with the foreign investor so that it may know beforehand any and 
all rules and regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals 
of the relevant policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able 
to plan its investment and comply with such regulations.
109
 
This statement broadens the obligation of transparency from the availability of host 
state rules and regulations to the availability of the goals of host state rules and 
regulations. Moreover, the notion that an investor, prior to investing, should be 
entitled to know ‘any and all rules’ applied to its investments introduces a high 
degree of rigidity, whereby governments cannot change the rules to respond to 
domestic pressures or changed circumstances.
110
 This elucidation of the FET 
standard is now frequently cited by tribunals as the principal authority for the 
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requirements of the FET standard,
111
 despite the fact that it failed to establish a 
clear normative content for the FET standard.
112
  
Thus, due to its inherent flexibility, the FET standard has, in practice, become a 
‘master tool’ for dealing with investment disputes and breach of the standard is 
accordingly the most common allegation made by foreign investors before 
investment tribunals as well as being the most common successful basis for a 
claim.
113
  The tribunal in Suez and Vivendi v Argentina went so far as to state that 
‘it is no exaggeration to say that the obligation of a host state to accord fair and 
equitable treatment to foreign investors is the Grundnorm or basic norm of 
international investment law’.114 
(c) The guarantee of full protection and security 
The guarantee of full protection and security is often contained in the same clause 
as the FET standard.
 
 For example, Article 5(1) of the US Model BIT provides that 
‘Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with 
customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security.’115 The full protection and security guarantee is concerned 
with failures on the part of the host state to protect the investor’s property from 
actual damage caused either by miscreant state officials or by others, where the 
state has failed to exercise due diligence. The cases in which it has figured as the 
principal cause of action have concerned damage or injury to persons and property 
during internal armed conflict, riots and acts of violence. Such circumstances are 
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usually provided for in specific provisions in IIAs
116
 as well as falling under the 
general full protection and security standard and a number of IIAs also state that 
what is required under the full protection and security guarantee is the level of 
police protection required under customary international law.
117
 However, in recent 
years, the question of whether the full protection and security guarantee extends 
beyond physical security to encompass regulatory and legal security has been 
raised.
118
 Some tribunals have accepted this extension of the concept,
119
 while 
others has proven reluctant to embrace this approach stating that this interpretation 
would equate the standard with the FET standard. For example, in Suez and Vivendi 
v Argentina,
120
 the tribunal observed as follows in relation to the FET and full 
protection and security standards: 
in interpreting these two standards of investor treatment it is desirable to give 
effect to [the] intention [of the Contracting Parties] by giving the two 
concepts distinct meanings and fields of application. In this respect, this 
Tribunal is of the view that the stability of the business environment and legal 
security are more characteristic of the standard of fair and equitable treatment, 
while the full protection and security standard primarily seeks to protect 
investment from physical harm.
121
  
While some IIAs provide that the concepts of FET and full protection and security 
do not require treatment beyond that which is required by the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens,
122
 given the uncertainty 
as to the parameters of the customary international law minimum standard, there 
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still remains scope to argue that the guarantee of full protection and security should 
extend beyond ensuring the physical security of investors’ property. 
(d) The non-discrimination standards  
The national treatment standard and the MFN treatment standard are bound together 
by the common thread of non-discrimination and are contingent standards since 
their content is determined by reference to the treatment granted to other persons or 
entities. By contrast, non-contingent standards (such as the FET standard) are 
absolute as they apply to protect a given entity irrespective of the treatment granted 
to others. The national treatment standard, which has a long pedigree in 
international law, requires a host state to treat foreign investors no less favourably 
than a domestic investor ‘in like circumstances’, thus targeting protectionist 
measures. Both procedural and substantive treatment can be examined under this 
standard and both direct and indirect discrimination are covered by the 
prohibitions.
123
 Similarly, the MFN treatment standard requires foreign investors to 
be treated no less favourably than investors from other third countries ‘in like 
circumstances’, although states often specify certain qualifications or exceptions to 
the MFN treatment standard when extending MFN treatment to other states.
124
 The 
two standards combined ensure that foreign investors and their investments obtain 
the opportunity of equal competition with all other investors and their investments, 
since applying the national treatment standard alone might not be sufficient as the 
treatment of domestic investors could fall below the minimum international 
standard of treatment to which aliens are entitled. A general non-discrimination 
standard or a prohibition of arbitrary and/or discriminatory measures is sometimes 
included in IIAs in addition to these two standards.
125
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In some cases however, there may be legitimate public policy reasons for treating 
domestic investors more favourably than foreign investors.
126
 In such cases, while 
the text of most IIAs does not explicitly allow tribunals to consider whether there is 
a bona fide regulatory purpose behind a host state measure,
127
 such purpose can 
implicitly be taken into account in identifying the relevant comparator. Thus, the 
tribunal’s interpretation of the phrase ‘in like circumstances’ becomes crucial in 
setting the boundaries of the host state’s right to regulate and, in particular, its right 
to treat domestic investors more favourably for legitimate policy reasons. Thus, the 
more broadly a tribunal defines likeness, the more it inhibits the host state’s ability 
to differentiate between different economic actors for policy reasons.
128
 To give a 
simple example, a state enacts a measure limiting the use of a particular polluting 
technology, although this technology does significantly increase the efficiency of 
the production process. The measure affects foreign investors in a particular sector 
but not domestic investors in the same sector as the (less efficient) domestic 
investors had not yet introduced this technology. In such circumstances, to construe 
the term ‘in like circumstances’ purely in terms of the economic sector in which the 
claimant investor operates would restrict the state’s ability to pursue certain 
environmental policy goals.  Another important question that arises in interpreting 
the ‘in like circumstances’ proviso is whether the claimant investor has to show that 
the impugned treatment reflects a pattern of conduct in the state’s treatment of a 
group or whether a violation can arise from the circumstances of a single investor. 
The tribunal’s answer to this question will also have a significant effect on the 
degree to which states must alter their regulatory behaviour in order to avoid 
liability.
129
  
(e) Umbrella clauses  
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Approximately 40 per cent of IIAs contain umbrella clauses (also known as 
observance of undertakings clauses).
130
 An umbrella clause is a promise made by 
one contracting state to an IIA to comply with all obligations or commitments that 
it has assumed towards investments of investors from the other contracting state. 
Although they can be worded in different ways and while the specific wording of 
each clause is crucial to ascertaining its scope and effect, a typical umbrella clause 
may provide as follows: ‘Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it 
may have entered into with regard to investments of investors of the other 
Contracting Party.’131 While this wording appears straightforward, the application 
of umbrella clauses has become one of the most controversial issues in investment 
treaty arbitration. In this regard, such clauses can be considered to have two 
aspects: first, a jurisdictional aspect whereby such clauses grant foreign investors 
access to an international forum in order to settle disputes about obligations arising 
out of the alleged breach of investor-state contracts and similar promises and, 
secondly, a substantive aspect in terms of their effect on the substantive law 
governing investor-state relations.
132
  
Turning first to the jurisdictional aspect, in general, in the absence of an umbrella 
clause, tribunals have reserved their jurisdiction over treaty-based claims while 
declining jurisdiction over contract-based claims on the basis that the forum-
selection clause in the contract between host state and investor must be respected in 
relation to claims under that contract.
133
 However, where an umbrella clause is 
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present in the relevant IIA,
134
 the question arises as to the scope of jurisdiction 
conferred on the tribunal by the clause and the nature of the investment-related 
promises covered.
135
 It is only within the last decade that umbrella clauses have 
found their way into enough IIAs that tribunals have had to grapple with their 
implications.
136
 However, even in that relatively short time, two competing lines of 
jurisprudence have developed.  
The approach taken in SGS v Pakistan
137
 was that the tribunal had jurisdiction over 
the investor’s treaty-based claims but not over its contractual claims, despite the 
inclusion of an umbrella clause in the Pakistan-Switzerland BIT.
138
 The tribunal 
instead gave effect to the contractual forum-selection clause. The tribunal held that 
an umbrella clause can only transform a contractual claim into a treaty claim if 
clear evidence is provided that the contracting states intended the umbrella clause to 
have such a far-reaching effect and where the state is acting as a sovereign rather 
than commercially. On the other hand, the tribunal in SGS v Philippines
139
 accepted 
jurisdiction over ‘simple’ commercial contractual claims. However, the tribunal 
decided to give effect to the contract’s forum-selection clause and to allow the court 
selected in the contractual forum-selection clause to determine if and to what extent 
the agreement was breached. After that determination the tribunal would exercise 
its jurisdiction in order to decide whether such breach, if established, amounted to a 
breach of the BIT. Thus, the tribunal in SGS v Philippines viewed its task as 
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residual and made a distinction between having jurisdiction over contract-based 
claims and the admissibility of such claims.
140
  
Since the decision in SGS v Philippines, some tribunals have gone one step further 
than the SGS v Philippines tribunal and have held that, where an umbrella clause is 
contained in the relevant IIA, the tribunal constituted under the IIA can decide upon 
the alleged violation of a contract, regardless of the nature of the breach (whether 
sovereign or commercial), without having to prove some other breach of the 
relevant IIA.
141
 However, other tribunals have inclined towards the narrower view 
expressed in SGS v Pakistan that umbrella clauses relate only to breaches of a 
sovereign nature.
142
 Tribunals have also differed as to whether umbrella clauses 
cover only investor-state contracts or also functional substitutes for such contracts 
and as to whether umbrella clauses cover obligations that are not due directly from 
the state to the investor (for example, where either a state agency or an investor 
subsidiary is party to the relevant contract).
143
 Overall therefore, while the view 
taken in SGS v Pakistan arguably renders the clause redundant,
144
 on the other 
hand, allowing for an alleged breach of contract by a state to be adjudicated upon at 
an international level can be viewed as a departure from the established norms of 
international law, which provide that a breach of contract by a state is not sufficient 
to engage international responsibility on the part of the state in the absence of a 
denial of justice.
145
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While this jurisdictional function of umbrella clauses can be considered the primary 
function of such clauses, umbrella clauses also have a substantive aspect.
146
  
Therefore, while umbrella clauses engage the host state’s international 
responsibility for breaches of its investment-related promises,
147
 umbrella clauses 
do not affect the content of the obligations arising out of the underlying contract or 
promise or the law applicable to it. In other words, a breach of contract is 
determined by the treaty-based tribunal on the basis of the applicable domestic 
law.
148
 However, while this principle is clear, its implications are not. In particular, 
the issue of whether, and to what extent, the host state can regulate or terminate 
investor-state contracts or other investment-related promises in a non-opportunistic 
manner and in the public interest is open to question. While it has been argued that 
a ‘police powers’ based exception can, and should, be read into the application of 
umbrella clauses as an implied exception and that a balancing of investor and public 
interests can occur in determining whether international liability should be imposed 
in cases of non-opportunistic regulation of investor-state contracts by the host 
state,
149
 this claim remains controversial.
150
  
The fact that the investor-state contract in question may contain a stabilisation 
clause heightens the relevance of this question as such clauses attempt to address 
the risks created by a state’s capacity to exercise its sovereign powers to affect its 
contractual relationship with the investor. Stabilisation clauses are usually included 
in contracts with states that lack an effectively functioning internal mechanism of 
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statehood (i.e. where the central government’s power is very limited, law and order 
is outside its control and the judicial system lacks the attributes of a modern 
Western judicial system) and are potentially problematic as they may go further 
than the guarantees contained in IIAs in generally requiring compensation for any 
interference by the host state that increases the costs of a project, thereby 
precluding a balancing of investor and host state interests.
151
 Furthermore, the 
decision of the tribunal in Duke Energy v Peru
152
 would seem to suggest that 
stabilisation clauses (depending on their wording) can cover not only regulatory 
changes but also changes in the judicial or administrative application or 
interpretation of existing legislation. However, there has yet to be a publicly-
available decision suggesting how a tribunal might respond to a stabilisation clause 
that would limit a host state’s capacity to regulate for the public good.153  
Thus, there remains considerable uncertainty in relation to both the jurisdictional 
and substantive aspects of umbrella clauses
154
 and for this reason such clauses are, 
in practice, frequently relied upon by investors as a ‘catch-all’ provision where the 
host state’s conduct may not amount to a breach of other treaty obligations.155 Most 
pertinently for these purposes, in terms of the type of state actions that are 
prohibited by umbrella clauses, while one view, based on comparative public law 
analysis, is that umbrella clauses do not exclude the state’s right to regulate or even 
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terminate investor-state contracts in the public interest,
156
 the contrary view is that 
umbrella clauses effectively create a blanket guarantee against interferences with 
contractual rights regardless of whether such interferences are non-discriminatory, 
compliant with due process and/or justified by reference to a rational policy 
objective. 
(f) Freedom of Transfer Guarantee 
IIAs generally contain a provision allowing for the unrestricted transfer of 
investment-related funds in a freely usable currency. To give an example, Article 8 
of the Azerbaijan – Finland BIT157 provides as follows:  
(1) Each Contracting Party shall ensure to investors of the other Contracting 
Party the free transfer, into and out of its territory, of payments in connection 
with an investment… 
(2) Transfers referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be made without 
any restriction or delay, in a freely convertible currency and at the prevailing 
market rate of exchange applicable on the date of transfer in the currency to 
be transferred. If a market rate is unavailable the applicable rate of exchange 
shall be the most recent rate of exchange for conversion of currencies into 
Special Drawing Rights.  
(3) Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, a Contracting Party 
may delay a transfer through the equitable, non-discriminatory and good faith 
application of measures ensuring investors’ compliance with the host 
Contracting Party’s laws and regulations relating to the payment of taxes and 
dues, provided that such measures and their application shall not 
unreasonably impair the free and undelayed transfer ensured by this 
Agreement. 
Such clauses therefore restrict the host state’s monetary sovereignty. From an 
investor perspective, this is one of the most important treaty-based obligations but it 
has not featured in many investment treaty arbitrations or, until recently, in 
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academic writings.
158
 Since, in times of crisis, a large repatriation of capital by 
foreign investors may create balance of payments difficulties, some BITs (and most 
multilateral treaties) contain a balance of payments clause, which allows the parties 
to temporarily restrict the transfer of funds in such a situation in order to prevent an 
exacerbation of an economic crisis.
159
 However, many BITs do not contain such a 
safeguard.
160
 Given the global economic situation over the last number of years and 
the protection granted to portfolio investment by most IIAs, the question has been 
raised as to whether, in the absence of a balance of payments clause or where the 
conditions of such a clause are not fulfilled, this right of transfer can be suspended 
or restricted in times of emergency (i.e. whether capital controls can be imposed).
161
 
The fact that US trade and investment treaties, in particular, do not allow for the 
imposition of capital controls has made this a controversial question.
162
 However, 
this question has yet to be addressed comprehensively in arbitral practice. In 
Continental Casualty v Argentina
163
  the free transfer provision in the Argentina-US 
BIT (Article V) was considered but the tribunal found that the transfer in question 
did not fall within the meaning of the term ‘transfers related to an investment’ and 
thus held that Article V was not breached. The award is therefore inconclusive as to 
whether a defence based on balance of payments difficulties would succeed.  
2.4 Reasons for taking account of public interest considerations  
 
Having considered the principal substantive rights typically contained in IIAs, it is 
clear that these rights are open-ended in nature and lack a well-defined normative 
content, which means that the scope and substance of investment treaty arbitration 
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is left unclear to a significant extent. The broad-ranging nature of the investor rights 
contained in IIAs is arguably somewhat inevitable given that treaty drafters and 
negotiators cannot predict the range of issues that will arise in an investment 
dispute and given that a degree of discretion and policy choice is inherent in any 
process of adjudication.
164
 Further, Trachtman notes that such broad framing may 
permit states ‘to agree to disagree for the moment in order to avoid the political 
price that may arise from immediate hard decisions or to cloak the hard decisions in 
the false inevitability of judicial interpretation’.165 Whatever the reasons for this 
indeterminacy, its consequence is that while, on the one hand, these rights have the 
potential to affect a host states’ freedom of action across all branches (executive, 
legislative and judicial) of a state’s sovereign jurisdiction, on the other hand, they 
can potentially be interpreted by investment treaty arbitration tribunals in a manner 
that is sensitive to public interest considerations. This accords a strikingly wide 
range of discretion to investment treaty arbitration tribunals. From an investor 
perspective, this is problematic as it is difficult to predict when an investor will be 
entitled to a remedy. From a host state perspective, the potential for a wide 
interpretation of investor rights by future tribunals may lead to ‘regulatory chill’, 
whereby states are discouraged from introducing bona fide regulatory measures by 
the possibility or threat of investor claims.
166
 A possible example of this ‘chilling 
effect’ occurred in Canada:167 after the tobacco company Philip Morris publicly 
threatened on several occasions to challenge restrictions on the packaging of 
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cigarettes under NAFTA and hired a former US Trade Representative to advocate 
its case, Canadian officials abandoned plans to introduce plain packaging.
168
  
However, the primary concern associated with wide-ranging investor rights is that 
the extent to which regulatory sovereignty has been ceded by the contracting states 
to the relevant IIA is unclear. The question then becomes whether, in concluding an 
IIA, the contracting states relinquish irrevocably their sovereign right to regulate in 
circumstances where such regulation could potentially impact upon protected 
foreign investors. In other words, should investor rights be construed in as broad as 
possible a manner since the contracting states to the relevant IIA have agreed to 
cede their regulatory sovereignty to an unspecified extent or, alternatively, should 
investment treaty arbitration tribunals interpret investor rights in a manner that is 
cognisant of public interest considerations?  
It is submitted that, given the margin of discretion typically afforded to investment 
treaty arbitration tribunals by IIAs, the latter approach should be favoured for a 
number of reasons. First, although many investment treaty arbitrations involving 
investor-state contracts may be closer to commercial disputes between private 
entities,
169
 a number of the disputes which have arisen to date under IIAs have 
undoubtedly touched on delicate policy issues relating to the ability of the state to 
legislate in the public interest.
170
 These disputes include the more than forty 
arbitrations concerning the lawfulness of Argentina’s legislative response to its 
economic crisis and sovereign default of 2000 to 2002;
171
 arbitrations involving 
water concessions;
172
 an arbitration challenging an affirmative action program that 
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aimed at remedying the injustices of apartheid in South Africa;173 arbitrations 
challenging the ban of harmful substances;
174
 arbitrations challenging measures for 
the protection of the environment;
175
 arbitrations challenging anti‐tobacco 
legislation
176
 and Vattenfall’s claim for €4.7 billion against the German government 
in relation to its challenge to Germany’s exit from nuclear power production.177 In 
dealing with such disputes, the ambiguity of the principal substantive rights 
typically conferred by IIAs is such that the state could potentially be deprived of its 
basic freedom to pursue public policies in relation to political, social, cultural and 
economic matters.
178
 Thus, although one could argue that the government of each 
of the contracting states to a IIA should have taken into account its other 
obligations before agreeing to be bound by such treaty and that accordingly it (and, 
at least in democratic states, the people that it represents) should be bound to abide 
by the terms of the IIA to the full extent,
179
 according the broadest possible scope to 
the rights conferred on investors by IIAs regardless of the circumstances cannot 
form the basis of a bargain which was concluded by the mutual agreement of states. 
This is the case as it would be unreasonable to expect a freezing of the status quo at 
the time at which a state entered into the IIA, which would essentially preclude 
elected authorities and administrative agencies from being able to change policy in 
the public interest.
180
  
On a related note, it is questionable the extent to which IIAs, in fact, reflect the 
democratic choices of states as, first, quite a few of the states participating in the 
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international investment regime are not democracies,
181
 and secondly, even in 
democratic states, the terms of most IIAs do not contain any exception for 
legislative decisions even where the legislature makes a decision of a general 
nature, when it responds to a national crisis or where its decision is supported an 
overwhelming majority of the country’s elected representatives.  Furthermore, IIAs 
generally bind states for a considerable period, only allow a brief window for 
opting-out before the treaty is automatically renewed and generally maintain the 
state’s obligations for an extended period for foreign investors whose investments 
existed at the time a treaty is cancelled. For example, Article 12 of the Albania-
Finland BIT is quite typical in providing for the treaty to remain in force for 20 
years and thereafter for an unlimited period unless either contracting party serves 
notice on the other party twelve months before its expiration.
182
 The treaty is then 
stated to remain in force for a further twenty years from the date when the notice of 
termination becomes effective in respect of investments made prior to that date.
183
 
This effectively means that the choices of one elected government may bind a 
future government in a manner which fundamentally restricts its policy options. In 
this regard, although international law has long held that a change in government 
does not relieve the state from responsibility for the international undertakings of a 
former regime,
184
 this does not mean that open-ended obligations entered into by a 
state must be interpreted in a particular manner and, accordingly, does not preclude 
the taking into account of public interest considerations in interpreting IIAs.
185
 
Indeed, the longevity of most IIAs can, of itself, be argued to intensify the need for 
public interest considerations to be taken into account in interpreting IIAs given the 
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range of social, economic and political circumstances that may fall to be addressed 
in a particular state over such a prolonged period.  
Finally and crucially, if investment treaty arbitration tribunals were to consistently 
accord the broadest possible scope to investor rights without paying any attention to 
host state regulatory concerns, it is likely that states would exit the system, either as 
a whole or selectively.
186
 This is particularly the case given that investment treaty 
arbitrators are empowered to adopt a broad interpretation of IIA provisions even 
where this conflicts with the unanimous submissions of the states that negotiated 
and concluded that treaty and, potentially, with the right of such states to regulate in 
the public interest.
187
 Furthermore, given that states that traditionally recognised 
themselves as capital exporters now also see themselves as importers of capital and 
that countries that once were thought to be capital importers are now finding their 
nationals investing abroad, it is likely that not only traditional capital importers 
would exit the system.  In fact, one commentator has opined that for arbitrators to 
proceed ‘with a heavy thumb pressed permanently down on the investors’ side of 
the scales’ would prove ‘suicidal’.188 Thus, states could just stop entering into IIAs 
or could decide to exit IIAs either by not prolonging them or by explicitly 
renouncing them. Alternatively, states could choose non-compliance with IIAs or 
could require foreign investors in investor-state contracts to waive their right to 
pursue investment treaty arbitration in the event of a dispute arising under that 
contract.
189
 Another possibility is that national parliaments or constituent 
assemblies could set up specific constraints that reduce the negotiating discretion of 
future governments to include specific provisions in IIAs.
190
 Indeed, this 
phenomenon can already be seen in the denunciation of several Latin American 
countries of the ICSID Convention,
191
 in the termination of several IIAs by South 
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Africa and its publication of a Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill as an 
alternative to entering into IIAs,
192
 and in the position taken by the Australian 
government in relation to investment treaty arbitration in its 2011 Trade Policy 
Statement.
193
 The on-going debate as to whether investor-state dispute settlement 
provisions should be included in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership Agreement can also be seen as indicative of this phenomenon.
194
 Such 
behaviour can be viewed through the lens of the concepts of ‘Exit’ and ‘Voice’:  
Exit is the mechanism of organizational abandonment in the face of 
unsatisfactory performance. Voice is the mechanism of intra-organizational 
correction and recuperation…a stronger “outlet” for Voice reduces pressure 
on the Exit option and can lead to more sophisticated processes of self-
correction. By contrast, the closure of Exit leads to demands for enhanced 
Voice.
195
 
Thus, if the investment treaty arbitration system as a whole is perceived as giving a 
‘voice’ to the concerns of states regarding their ability to regulate in the public 
interest (even in circumstances where the state’s right to regulate is ultimately 
subordinated to investor rights in particular factual scenarios), states are less likely 
to seek to ‘exit’ that system.196  
In conclusion therefore, since the textual provisions of IIAs generally do not relieve 
the tension between host state regulatory sovereignty and investor protection and 
since relief of such tension is, for the reasons stated above, necessary, investment 
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treaty arbitration tribunals must perform this unenviable role. This effectively 
makes the interpretation of the IIA text by each individual tribunal crucial to 
maintaining an optimal balance between investor protection and host state 
regulatory sovereignty. Furthermore, while in recent years, an increasing number of 
‘new generation’ IIAs have been concluded which contain preambular statements 
that refer to social and environmental objectives,
197
 provisions that clarify or adjust 
the scope of IIA rights
198
 and/or general exceptions clauses that exclude from the 
scope of the IIA protections certain actions taken in pursuit of certain social or 
economic policy objectives,
199
 fundamentally such provisions do not displace this 
balancing role as they do not indicate how much deference should be shown to 
sovereign regulatory decisions and do not purport to determine to whom the costs 
associated with the impugned host state measures should be allocated. Accordingly, 
as noted by Spears, ‘none of the innovations in ‘new generation’ IIAs actually 
resolve the tension that will continue to arise between competing policy objectives 
in investor-state cases’.200 Thus, even if such provisions are introduced on a more 
widespread basis than is currently the case, the interpretation of IIA rights by 
investment treaty arbitration tribunals will remain crucial in balancing investor 
rights and public interest considerations.  
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the rights conferred on investors by 
IIAs are generally open-ended in nature and to explain why, in interpreting those 
rights, investment treaty arbitration tribunals take account of public interest 
considerations. This argument can, it is submitted, be separated from the debate as 
to whether international investment law constitutes a form of public law or whether 
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each IIA constitutes a ‘private’, quasi-contractual bargain between the contracting 
states and, accordingly, from the question of whether arbitration is a suitable 
adjudication model for dealing with disputes under IIAs. The next chapter will 
proceed to analyse how investment treaty arbitration tribunals have taken into 
account public interest considerations and will examine the efficacy of the methods 
utilised by tribunals to date. 
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Chapter 3: The merits stage and public interest considerations: an 
uneasy balance 
3.1 Introduction 
 
At the merits stage of the investment treaty arbitration process, the question of 
whether one or more investor rights have been breached is considered by the 
tribunal. In considering this question, not all international investment disputes will 
raise matters of public interest. Furthermore, even among those that do, it is far 
from inevitable that the final result will be an award that negatively affects the 
public interest. Indeed, a number of empirical studies focussing on case outcomes 
have tended towards the conclusion that investment treaty arbitration tribunals do 
not exhibit bias in favour of either claimant investors or respondent states.
1
 
However, given the broad range of circumstances that may give rise to an IIA 
dispute and that data on outcomes as a measure of actual behaviour is open to a 
wide range of possible explanations,
2
 it is submitted that such outcome-based 
analysis does not provide sufficient evidence of investment treaty arbitration 
tribunals’ engagement with public interest considerations in assessing investor 
claims at the merits stage of the arbitral process or of the efficacy of the methods 
used by such tribunals in order to do so. It is on this question that this chapter 
focusses.  
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number of factors including the topic isolated for study, the choice of methods, the availability of 
data and the inferences drawn by the researcher: Richard Lempert, ‘Empirical Research for Public 
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In this regard and despite a degree of overlap or congruence between the two,
3
 a 
distinction can be drawn for analytical purposes between, on the one hand, the 
balancing of public interest considerations and investor interests in determining the 
content of substantive treaty obligations and, on the other, the interpretation of IIA 
rights in a manner consistent with a host state’s non-investment related international 
obligations. A third way of introducing public interest considerations into 
investment law is through the invocation by a host state of the customary 
international law defence of necessity and/or through reliance on a NPM clause. It 
is clear that the first method (namely the balancing of public interest considerations 
and investor interests) has the broadest application and, due to this, may be 
considered more likely to allow for a more comprehensive consideration of both 
investor and host state interests as it allows for a ‘thorough airing’ of all aspects of 
the claim.
4
 However, an examination of all three, interrelated, methods is required 
in order to assess their efficacy as a whole.  
3.2 Proportionality analysis 
 
With the notable exception of expropriation clauses, which explicitly require the 
public purpose underlying a measure to be considered in determining whether an 
expropriation is lawful or unlawful (but nonetheless require a remedy to be 
provided to the claimant investor in both cases), the other principal rights typically 
contained in IIAs do not explicitly require that the public purpose underlying a host 
state measure be considered in determining whether those rights have been 
breached. Nevertheless, in recent years, a number of tribunals have referred to the 
notion of proportionality or have applied some form of proportionality testing in 
balancing public interest considerations against the effect of the impugned measure 
on the investment in deciding whether investor rights have been violated. 
Proportionality analysis, in its pure sense, is an analytical framework originally 
developed by administrative and constitutional courts in order to manage legal 
disputes of a particular structure, the paradigmatic example of which concerns a 
                                                 
3
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4
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tension between, on the one hand, a right and, on the other, a constitutionally 
recognised public interest pursued by the state.
5
 Traditionally, the analysis has 
consisted of three criteria: suitability, necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu. 
The criterion of suitability requires that the means be suitable or helpful in some 
way to achieve a legitimate objective. This allows measures taken for patently 
illegitimate purposes to be filtered out at an early stage along with measures that are 
wholly ineffective in pursuing a legitimate purpose. The criterion of necessity 
requires that the means be necessary to achieve the end. This has been interpreted to 
mean that the state must choose from among all the potential measures that would 
achieve its desired objective the measure which would least restrict the applicant’s 
rights and interests while still being capable of producing the same result. Finally, 
the most stringent criterion – that of proportionality stricto sensu – requires that the 
measure is not excessive with regard to the objective pursued and means that the 
tribunal must take into account all available factors such as cost-benefit analysis, 
the importance of the right affected, the importance of the right or interest 
protected, the degree and length of interference with the affected right and the 
availability of alternative measures that might be less effective, but also 
proportionally less restrictive for the right affected.
6
 This third step is crucial as 
stopping at the necessity test stage would allow restricting a right severely in order 
to protect a negligible public interest.
7
  
Robert Alexy in his seminal work on proportionality analysis proposed that 
proportionality analysis is suitable for balancing principles as opposed to resolving 
conflicts between rules. Alexy distinguished between rules and principles on the 
basis that, whereas a rule is either fulfilled or not fulfilled, principles are capable of 
being reconciled or harmonised with each other such that each principle is brought 
to bear to the greatest possible extent given the circumstances. This means that the 
‘defeated’ principle may be used to influence the interpretation and application of 
the prioritised law.
8
 Therefore, in respect of certain IIA breaches which can be 
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characterised as rules, the application of proportionality analysis may not be 
appropriate.
9
 As an example of this, the application of proportionality analysis has 
not generally been accepted in the context of denial of justice claims. Jan Paulsson, 
acting as sole arbitrator in Pantechniki v Albania, stated that there would appear to 
be two reasons for this: 
The first is that international responsibility does not relate to physical 
infrastructure; states are not liable for denial of justice because they cannot 
afford to put at the public’s disposal spacious buildings or computerised 
information banks. What matters is rather the human factor of obedience to 
the rule of law. Foreigners who enter a poor country are not entitled to 
assume that they will be given things like verbatim transcripts of all judicial 
proceedings – but they are entitled to decision-making which is neither 
xenophobic nor arbitrary. The second is that a relativistic standard would be 
none at all. International courts or tribunals would have to make ad hoc 
assessments based on their evaluation of the capacity of each state at a given 
moment of its development. International law would thus provide no 
incentive for a state to improve.
10
 
To give a further example, where a host state can either only comply with its 
obligations under another non-investment related treaty (such as a human rights 
treaty) by failing to comply with an IIA (or vice versa) or where the goals of one of 
these treaties frustrates the goals of another treaty without strict incompatibility 
between their provisions, a direct treaty conflict occurs.
11
 In such circumstances, 
this conflict between different treaties simply cannot be resolved through 
mechanisms such as proportionality (or indeed through application of customary 
methods of treaty interpretation) as both treaty obligations constitute rules.
12
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Thus, the application of proportionality analysis may not be appropriate in the case 
of some conflicts between competing rights or interests and its major field of 
application is rather those cases in which the state redistributes or interferes with 
property rights in the interest of protecting some non-economic interest by means of 
general legislation or administrative regulation.
13
  However, even in those awards in 
which proportionality has been referred to, an award that applies all three steps of 
suitability, necessity and proportionality stricto sensu is rare
14
 and, in several 
awards, tribunals have moved straight to the third step of proportionality analysis – 
proportionality stricto sensu – without considering (at least explicitly) the questions 
of suitability and necessity. For example, in Tecmed v Mexico, which concerned a 
refusal by a Mexican government agency to renew an authorisation to operate a 
landfill site, the tribunal proceeded directly to the strict proportionality test by 
stating that there must be ‘a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the 
charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor and the aim sought to be realized 
by any expropriatory measure’.15 Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights was referred to in support of applying such a test, although the tribunal did 
not explain its reasons for so doing.
16
  In applying the proportionality test, the 
Tecmed tribunal took the view that ‘a serious urgent situation, crisis, need or social 
emergency’ could be ‘weighed against the deprivation or neutralization of the 
economic or commercial value of the Claimant’s investment’ to lead to the 
conclusion that an otherwise expropriatory regulation does not amount to an 
expropriation under the investment treaty and international law.
17
 The tribunal then 
went on to examine the two main public interest reasons put forward by the host 
state for its actions: the protection of the environment and public health and the 
need to provide a response to community pressure. The tribunal concluded on the 
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evidence that the impugned host state measure was motivated in part by the latter 
socio-political factor but held that ultimately neither the environmental concerns 
nor the threat of civil disturbance due to public protests could provide a satisfactory 
justification for the host government’s effective taking of the claimant’s investment 
and so an expropriation was deemed to have occurred.
18
 Thus, the host state’s 
motivations in adopting the impugned measure were examined as part of 
proportionality stricto sensu analysis rather than at the suitability and necessity 
stages of the analysis. This approach, which has also been taken in other subsequent 
cases,
19
 is problematic in that it lends itself to decision-making based on arbitrators’ 
value judgments along with a lack of appreciation for the context in which the 
impugned measures were taken and, in particular, the alternatives available to the 
host state.
20
 
In addition to this lack of rigour in the application of proportionality analysis, the 
application of the concept of proportionality has been uneven as across the principal 
rights conferred by IIAs with indirect expropriation becoming ‘the main arena for 
the development of legal tests close to proportionality’.21 This has occurred despite 
the fact that the application of proportionality analysis to indirect expropriations is 
particularly problematic given that the public purpose underlying the host state 
measure must also be considered as one of the criteria in deciding whether the 
expropriation is lawful or not. Thus, consideration of the purpose of the measure in 
determining whether an expropriation occurred in the first place (as part of 
proportionality analysis) can lead to conceptual difficulty as expropriation is not a 
priori prohibited in international law but rather is lawful provided certain 
requirements are met (i.e. that the measure was taken for a public purpose, on a 
non-discriminatory basis, in accordance with due process of law and that 
compensation is provided).
22
 Despite this difficulty however, references to 
proportionality are less explicit and the analysis is undoubtedly less well developed 
under the FET and non-discrimination standards than in respect of indirect 
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expropriations.
23
 Thus, in relation to the FET standard, instead of applying 
proportionality analysis, tribunals have instead tended to weigh the investor’s 
reasonable and legitimate expectations against the host state’s legitimate regulatory 
interests in the particular circumstances.
24
 For example, in Saluka v Czech Republic 
the tribunal noted that no investor could reasonably expect that the circumstances 
prevailing at the time the investment was made remain totally unchanged and that, 
in order to determine whether frustration of the foreign investor’s expectations was 
justified and reasonable, the host state’s legitimate right to subsequently regulate 
domestic matters in the public interest should be taken into consideration. The 
tribunal thus concluded that the determination of whether a breach of the FET 
standard had occurred ‘requires a weighing of the Claimant’s legitimate and 
reasonable expectations on the one hand and the Respondent’s legitimate regulatory 
interests on the other’.25 Similarly, in applying the national treatment and MFN 
standards, which require comparison of the treatment of the claimant investor with, 
in the case of the national treatment standard, the treatment of domestic investors in 
like circumstances, and in the case of the MFN standard, the treatment of other 
foreign investors in like circumstances, proportionality has generally not been 
referred to but some tribunals have instead applied the ‘like circumstances’ concept 
as a justification mechanism for taking account of public interest considerations.
26
 
For example, in Parkerings v Lithuania
27
 the tribunal stated that the claimant 
investor and a competitor were not ‘in like circumstances’ due to differences in the 
size of the construction projects undertaken by the two as well as a significant 
extension of the claimant’s project into the Old Town area of Vilnius which raised 
concerns as regards historical and archaeological preservation and environmental 
protection. Thus, the tribunal determined that the city of Vilnius had legitimate 
grounds to distinguish between the two projects.
28
 The national administrative 
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authorities in this case had referred to international treaties, especially the 1972 
UNESCO World Heritage Convention, and expressed their fear of infringing their 
international obligations if the claimant investor’s plans were realised.29 To give a 
further example, in GAMI v Mexico the tribunal concluded that the Mexican 
government had expropriated certain mills on the basis of its perception that it was 
in the interest of the national economy to have public participation in mills 
operating at near insolvency and, on that basis, concluded that those mills that had 
not been expropriated were not in like circumstances as the expropriated mills so as 
to give rise to a violation of the national treatment standard.
30
 
Overall therefore, indeterminacy of both a procedural and analytical nature 
surrounds the balancing exercise currently conducted by most investment treaty 
arbitration tribunals
31
 and, despite the wealth of academic commentary describing 
the manner in which proportionality testing has been applied to date and discussing 
how it should be applied in future investment treaty arbitration cases,
32
 the concept 
of proportionality has in reality only been mentioned in a relatively small number of 
investment treaty arbitration awards.
33
  
There has also been little coherence in arbitral practice to date as to the standard of 
review to be applied by investment treaty arbitration tribunals.
34
 While IIAs tend to 
say nothing, or only very little, about the appropriate standard of review, in fact, the 
standard of review applied by arbitrators is crucial as proportionality analysis, as a 
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method of review, does not produce substantive outcomes or provide any normative 
guidance to arbitrators.
35
 Thus, while methods of review are techniques used to 
determine the permissibility of interference with the primary norm, standards of 
review refer to the intensity with which the method of review is applied.
36
 
Therefore, as noted by Pirker:  
An understanding of proportionality analysis that does not incorporate 
features like the flexibility of adjudication, the standard of review and the 
burden of proof is simply incomplete.
37
 
In particular, the crucial effect of the standard of review utilised in interpreting IIA 
rights has increasingly been recognised by commentators as well as by some 
investment treaty arbitration tribunals as, depending on the standard of review 
chosen, a tribunal may either defer entirely to the justifications provided by national 
authorities, may undertake a completely independent review of the measure in 
question or may steer a middle course between these two extremes.
38
 A strict 
standard of review whereby the tribunal undertakes an independent review of the 
host state measure and substitutes its own views for those of the host state is 
problematic in that it can potentially undermine host state regulatory sovereignty, 
particularly in the case of certain regulatory purposes such as protection of health or 
of the environment, which operate on a different level of generality to principles of 
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investor protection
39
 and which do not lend themselves easily to cost-benefit 
analysis.
40
 Furthermore, given the inability of tribunals to obtain all relevant 
information after the fact and the lack of proximity of non-tenured arbitrators to the 
social, economic and political circumstances of the host state at the time the 
measure was taken,
41
 a strict standard of review ignores the greater institutional 
competence and expertise of host state authorities. In light of both of these issues, a 
standard of review that accords a degree of deference
42
 to the host state’s decisions 
has been favoured by several commentators,
43
 with the proviso that a deferential 
standard of review cannot be applied in all circumstances as to do so would lead to 
serious procedural flaws and arbitrary behaviour going unsanctioned.
44
 In this 
regard, some commentators have argued that the ‘margin of appreciation’ standard 
of review, most known for its application by the European Court of Human Rights, 
could be drawn upon.
45
 The ‘margin of appreciation’ standard of review can be 
defined as the ‘breadth of deference’ that the European Court of Human Rights is 
willing to grant to national decision makers and recognises that the normative 
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requirements articulated in the text of the European Convention on Human Rights 
can be legitimately met by a range of different measures, which strike an acceptable 
balance between individual rights and governmental interests.
46
 However, this 
standard is premised on what binds the members of the European human rights 
regime, namely their common democratic systems of government,
47
 which unifying 
principle is not present in the area of investment law.
48
 While this does not, of 
itself, detract from the argument that a deferential standard of review should be 
applied in the field of investment treaty arbitration, it does suggest that the 
conceptual bases for granting deference to host states must be consonant with the 
specific nature of investment law and of investment treaty arbitration in order to 
both recognise regulatory autonomy but also to avoid diluting the substance of 
investor rights on the basis of ‘deference’.49 However, investment treaty arbitration 
tribunals to date have not approached the question of deference to host state 
authorities in a principled manner and there has been little indication of the 
development of a coherent standard of review in arbitral practice.
50
 
While not wishing to downplay the significance of the issues associated with the 
lack of coherence displayed by investment treaty arbitration tribunals in the 
standard of review applied in reviewing host state acts and with the perfunctory 
engagement of tribunals with proportionality analysis to date,
51
 these issues, do not, 
in and of themselves, go to the efficacy of proportionality analysis. Thus, tribunals 
could, over time, conceivably begin to apply proportionality analysis more 
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consistently and to develop conceptual bases for deferring to host state decisions in 
appropriate circumstances
52
 (albeit that comparative law analysis indicates that 
other adjudicative fora have had limited success in this regard).
53
 However, it is 
submitted that a more fundamental issue is the question of why the majority of 
investment treaty arbitration tribunals have to date steered clear of proportionality 
analysis or, more generally, of the notion of proportionality or balancing, despite 
the wealth of academic commentary on the issue, much of which endorses the 
application of some form of proportionality analysis in investment treaty 
arbitration. As suggested above, this reluctance may partly stem from the 
conceptualisation of certain IIA disputes by claimant investors or by tribunals 
themselves as involving rules rather than principles.
54
 For example, the elucidation 
of the FET standard in Tecmed
55
 (which has been cited by many subsequent 
tribunals) and the Tecmed tribunal’s subsequent decision that the FET standard had 
been breached
56
 represents an instance of rule-like decision-making,
57
 which 
rendered the application of proportionality analysis inapposite. This pronouncement 
can be seen as somewhat ironic given that Tecmed is generally regarded as the first 
publicly available award in which an investment treaty arbitration tribunal 
explicitly invoked the proportionality principle (such invocation being in the 
context of the expropriation clause). Incidentally, this highlights a further, more 
practical, issue with the application of proportionality analysis (i.e. that the effect of 
the application of proportionality analysis may be limited in circumstances where it 
is not applied to all alleged breaches of the relevant IIA).  
A further reason for the cursory engagement of investment treaty arbitration 
tribunals with proportionality analysis to date may be doubts on the part of certain 
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tribunals as to whether this quintessentially public law concept (which is typically 
applied in the fields of human rights or constitutional rights adjudication) should be 
applied in the field of investment treaty arbitration at all given the hybrid nature of 
the investment treaty arbitration system.
58
 This uncertainty may be accompanied by 
concerns as to whether investment treaty arbitration tribunals are best placed to 
engage in the complex evaluations required to apply proportionality analysis (and, 
in particular, the criterion of proportionality stricto sensu).
59
 While the application 
of a deferential standard of review could assist in overcoming the latter issue, the 
hybrid nature of investment treaty arbitration and the distinctions that can be drawn 
between it and the fields of human rights or constitutional rights adjudication are 
likely to continue to pose a challenge to the widespread application of 
proportionality analysis by investment treaty arbitration tribunals. 
Finally and crucially, the ‘asymmetric’ nature of the investment treaty arbitration 
system (i.e. the fact that the system is focussed on the protection of the interests of a 
particular group of individuals (namely foreign investors))
60
 sits uneasily with the 
proposition that investor and host state interests should be accorded equal weight in 
the balancing exercise.
61
 Thus, typically proportionality analysis is applied to 
reconcile the tension between a right on the one hand and a public interest that is 
recognised within the relevant legal text (such as a constitution or international 
human rights treaty) and where the text in question may, either expressly or by its 
tenor, require that a balance between those interests be maintained.
62
 However, 
there is scant recognition of interests other than those of investors in the text of 
IIAs. This means that, while the proposition that states have a right to regulate in 
the public interest is universally recognised, given that the core assumption 
underlying IIAs can be considered to be that protecting the rights of foreign 
investors will lead to further foreign investment and economic development (which 
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can be considered in the public interest), uncertainty exists as to what exactly is 
meant by a public interest in circumstances where such interests are proffered as a 
reason why investor rights should be curtailed.
63
 One possible means of 
differentiating between the two types of interest is that, while investment can be 
described as going to the ‘efficiency’ aspect of the public interest (i.e. the size of 
the overall benefits available to society), arguments based on the public interest that 
aim to limit investor rights may align more closely to the ‘equity’ dimension of the 
public interest (i.e. the relative distribution of those endowments to individuals 
under a fair and just process).
64
 However, while useful conceptually, this distinction 
does not offer substantial guidance as to how the two types of interest should be 
balanced and the ‘asymmetric’ nature of the investment treaty arbitration system 
also means that it is not possible to draw guidance from how the concept of public 
interest has been delineated in other legal contexts.
65
 This uncertainty is 
problematic as balancing requires clearly defined rights and public interests.
66
 
Furthermore, although there are strong arguments to be made in favour of the 
application of a more deferential standard of review in investment treaty arbitration, 
the application of a deferential standard of review can nonetheless be seen as 
somewhat at odds with the nature of the investment treaty system as, within the 
parameters of such a system, investor rights can be considered fundamental rights 
and the protection of such rights the primary object of the system, which may 
suggest that a more intense level of scrutiny is appropriate.
67
   
In order to address some of these difficulties associated with the application of 
proportionality analysis in the sphere of investment treaty arbitration, it has been 
suggested that a modified form of proportionality analysis be applied which 
focusses primarily on the first two sub-tests (suitability and necessity). Under this 
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modified form of analysis, the final sub-test of proportionality stricto sensu would 
only be applied in exceptional cases.
68
 It has been suggested that this would accord 
with the ‘asymmetric’ nature of the investment treaty arbitration system as the 
suitability and necessity sub-tests, while still requiring some value judgment on the 
part of arbitrators, do not require the balancing of values that is required by the final 
sub-test of proportionality stricto sensu.
69
 However, reducing the role of 
proportionality stricto sensu to a marginal one could potentially allow an investor 
right to be severely restricted in order to protect a negligible public interest. 
Conversely, curtailing proportionality analysis in this manner would also reduce the 
ability of arbitrators to taken into account a range of third party interests, 
consideration of which may be required in order to ensure that host state interests 
are optimised.
70
 For example, where a host state measure has been taken to meet 
two or more separate public policy objectives (as was, for example, the case in 
Tecmed), application of a necessity test only would be ineffective in order to 
sufficiently take account of both such objectives and recourse to the proportionality 
stricto sensu stage of the analysis (or to some form of balancing test) would appear 
to be required.
71
  
In summary therefore, while proportionality analysis offers a transparent and 
methodologically robust structure for decision-making engaging competing public 
and private interests,
72
 it is not appropriate for resolving conflicts between rules. In 
addition, the vagueness of the values underlying the investment treaty arbitration 
system and the ‘asymmetric’ nature of the system makes it difficult for tribunals to 
apply proportionality analysis or, more generally, to balance investor and host state 
interests in making the black-or-white decision as to liability required at the merits 
stage. Modifying proportionality analysis to reduce the role of proportionality 
                                                 
68
Benedikt Pirker, Proportionality Analysis and Models of Judicial Review (Europa Law Publishing 
2013) ch 8. See also Caroline Henckels, ‘Balancing Investment Protection and the Public Interest: 
The Role of the Standard of Review and the Importance of Deference in Investor–State Arbitration’ 
(2013) 4 J Intl Dispute Settlement 197. 
69
Benedikt Pirker, Proportionality Analysis and Models of Judicial Review (Europa Law Publishing 
2013) ch 2. 
70
Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality's New Frontier’ (2010) 4 Law & 
Ethics of Human Rights 47, 60ff on the advantages of balancing in terms of appreciating the entire 
context of a dispute. 
71
Benedikt Pirker, Proportionality Analysis and Models of Judicial Review (Europa Law Publishing 
2013) 29. 
72
Caroline Henckels, ‘Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting Proportionality 
Analysis and the Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitration’ (2012) 15 J Intl Economic L 223, 
228-29. 
90 
 
stricto sensu does not fully address this issue and is not without its own problems. 
Comparable issues arise when attempts are made to rely on the host state’s non-
investment related international obligations as a means of justifying the impugned 
host state action. These issues will now be considered. 
3.3 Reliance on the state’s non-investment related international obligations  
 
Similarly to the cursory manner in which investment treaty arbitration tribunals 
have engaged with proportionality analysis to date, host states and amici curiae 
have met with little success in introducing arguments based on the host state’s non-
investment related treaty obligations and, in particular, their obligations under 
human rights treaties.
73
 Thus, investment treaty arbitration tribunals have generally 
avoided dealing with non-investment related host state obligations or have not 
regarded such obligations as significant to investment disputes,
74
 although this may 
be at least partly attributable to the failure of host states to directly plead arguments 
based on such obligations, in particular human rights obligations, as independent 
defences.
75
 For example, in Siemens v Argentina the tribunal held that the human 
rights-based argument put forward by Argentina had not been fully developed and 
that ‘without the benefit of further elaboration and substantiation by the parties, it is 
not an argument that, prima facie, bears any relationship to the merits of the case’.76 
The tribunal also noted that it failed to identify any contradiction between Siemens’ 
contractual rights and Argentina’s wider human rights obligations and that 
Argentina’s human rights arguments were thus immaterial to the case. The tribunal 
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in CMS v Argentina also held that there was no ‘collision’ between the relevant BIT 
and either the Argentine Constitution or the human rights treaties to which 
Argentina was a party as ‘the Constitution carefully protects the right to property, 
just as the treaties on human rights do, and secondly because there is no question of 
affecting fundamental human rights when considering the issues disputed by the 
parties’.77 These pronouncements (albeit somewhat throwaway in nature) would 
appear to suggest that, unless the host state’s other treaty obligations ‘collide’ (i.e. 
directly conflict) with its obligations under the relevant IIA (which, as noted above, 
leads to a ‘stalemate’ that cannot be resolved through application of either 
proportionality analysis or the customary international law of treaty interpretation), 
its non-investment related treaty obligations are largely irrelevant to tribunals’ 
consideration of whether the IIA was breached or not. 
Thus, the question of whether (and how) host states can rely on their non-
investment related treaty obligations as a defence to IIA claims is far from settled 
and the engagement by arbitral tribunals (and arguably respondent host states) with 
arguments based on such obligations has been perfunctory. However, it has been 
argued that wider regulatory concerns including human rights could potentially be 
taken into account either by means of reliance on the customary international law of 
treaty interpretation or through the application of international law as a whole as the 
applicable law (whether pursuant to Article 42 of the ICSID Convention or 
otherwise).
78
 However, it is questionable whether the issues of applicable law and 
interpretation should be considered separately as, first, international law as 
applicable law must be introduced into the analysis of a claim under an IIA through 
the medium of treaty interpretation in the first place
79
 and, secondly, characterising 
the issue as one of applicable law only does not indicate any particular order for the 
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consideration of the relevant sources of law.
80
 Thus, the question of whether a host 
state’s non-investment related treaty obligations may be considered in investment 
treaty arbitration will be considered primarily by reference to customary 
international law principles of treaty interpretation. However, quite apart from the 
fact that a host state’s duty to fulfil its non-investment related treaty obligations is 
by no means co-extensive with its right to regulate in the public interest, there are a 
number of other reasons why arguments based on customary interpretative 
principles are unlikely to evolve into satisfactory means of taking account of public 
interest considerations. 
First, since the rights conferred on investors by IIAs are generally quite vague and 
lack a well-defined normative content, it is likely to be difficult to determine the 
ordinary meaning of such provisions in their context and in light of their object and 
purpose as required by Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.
81
 In such circumstances, Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention goes onto 
state that, together with the context, there shall be taken into account ‘any 
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty 
or the application of its provisions’ (Article 31(3)(a)), ‘any subsequent practice in 
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation’ (Article 31(3)(b)) and ‘any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ (Article 31(3)(c)). 
Given that subsequent agreements or practices of the nature referred to in Articles 
31(3) (a) and 31(3) (b) are relatively infrequent,
82
 Article 31(3) (c) in particular has 
been focussed upon. This provision embodies a principle of systemic integration
83
 
which, it is argued, raises a presumption that the parties are to refer to general 
principles of international law for all questions which the treaty itself does not 
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resolve in express terms and that, in entering into treaty obligations, the parties
84
 do 
not intend to act inconsistently with generally recognised principles of international 
law or with previous treaty obligations towards third states.
85
  
While, at first glance, this appears promising in terms of the consideration of the 
host state’s non-investment related treaty obligations, the first point to note is that, 
similarly to proportionality analysis, this technique cannot resolve a conflict 
between rule-like provisions.
86
 Secondly, the function and scope of application of 
Article 31(3)(c) rests upon an understanding of the terms ‘relevant rules’ and 
‘applicable to the relations between the parties’. Thus, in the context of investment 
treaty arbitration, the term ‘applicable to the relations between the parties’ gives 
rise to questions as to, inter alia, whether it is necessary for all the parties to the IIA 
to also be parties to the treaty being relied upon as the other source of international 
law for interpretation purposes
87
 and as to whether the application of the IIA should 
be interpreted in light of the law in force at the time the treaty was drawn up or the 
law in force at the time when the treaty is applied.
88
 This distinction could be 
particularly relevant where a host state purports to rely on obligations under 
multilateral environmental treaties since this is an area of law that has developed 
rapidly in recent years. Furthermore, the fact that human rights treaties distinguish 
between those who hold the rights and those who may invoke the responsibility of a 
state for breach of those rights leads to further complication and means that if the 
foreign investor’s home state is not party to the human rights treaty on which the 
host state purports to rely in its defence, the international obligations of the host 
state towards its citizens would not appear to be applicable.
89
 While it has been 
suggested that the concept of obligations erga omnes (obligations that are owed to 
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the entire international community as a whole independent of a treaty) could assist 
in addressing this problem, it is not well established which norms enjoy erga omnes 
status.
90
 The tribunal in RosInvest v the Russian Federation referred to these issues 
in opining that the phrase ‘applicable in relations between the parties’:  
must be taken as a reference to the rules of international law that conditioned 
the performance of the specific rights and obligations stipulated in the Treaty 
– or else it would amount to a general licence to override the Treaty terms 
that would be quite incompatible with the general spirit of the Vienna 
Convention as a whole.
91
  
The RosInvest tribunal went onto note it was ‘open to serious question, whether 
[multilateral human rights treaties and the constituent instruments of international 
organisations] are at all analogous to bilateral engagements regulating a particular 
area of relations between one Party and the other’.92  
Perhaps even more fundamentally, it is by no means self-evident that human rights 
treaties constitute ‘relevant rules’ in the context of international investment law. 
While some commentators have argued that the term ‘relevant’ should not be 
automatically equated to relating to the same subject matter,
93
 it is equally plausible 
to argue that, in order to fall under Article 31(3)(c), rules should run parallel to the 
rule being interpreted, which would mean that only other IIAs or similar 
instruments applicable in the relations between the parties should be considered 
(and then only where the earlier sub–articles of Article 31 do not allow the meaning 
of a treaty provision to be ascertained).
94
  
Finally and crucially, even in circumstances where an investment treaty arbitration 
tribunal determines that a particular rule or source of law is relevant to the 
interpretation of a particular IIA, the extent to which it should be considered is 
problematic.
95
 Indeed, even those who argue that host states’ obligations under 
human rights treaties should be considered ‘relevant rules’ for the purposes of 
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Article 31(3)(c) admit that, while any international rule can potentially be 
considered relevant and thus Article 31(3)(c) can open the door to other non-
investment related regimes, the impact of a rule on the interpretation of the 
investment treaty in dispute should be low in cases where the rule is only relevant at 
a high level of abstraction.
96
 Thus, determining that a particular rule is relevant 
(which, in itself, is not uncontroversial) may be the ‘easiest and least consequential 
among several further steps that must be explored if international human rights law 
is to interact meaningfully with international investment law’97 as the tribunal must 
then go onto decide whether and to what extent these norms affect the arguments 
advanced by the parties to a dispute.
98
 This brings into play similar issues to those 
faced by investment treaty arbitration tribunals in attempting to balance investor 
interests and public interest considerations through proportionality analysis in the 
context of a system that is ‘asymmetric’ in nature. Indeed, albeit dealt with 
separately for analytical purposes, proportionality analysis is not an alternative to 
interpretation but rather informs the exercise of interpreting a treaty with a view to 
resolving conflicts between competing rights and interests when the rules of treaty 
interpretation do not indicate priority of one right or interest over the other.
99
 
However, while in other international fora, the application of proportionality 
analysis subsequent to the use of systemic integration has been employed and can 
be of assistance in determining the extent to which the external norm in question 
should be considered,
100
 as discussed above, the focus of the investment treaty 
arbitration system on a particular set of interests makes it difficult to apply 
proportionality stricto sensu meaningfully in assessing liability. 
Therefore, even if a host state’s non-investment related treaty obligations are 
considered relevant rules for the purpose of interpretation of an IIA (a proposition 
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which is disputed), the extent to which such obligations should be taken into 
account in determining whether an IIA breach has occurred or not remains open to 
question. It is submitted that these factors combined prevent arguments based on 
the customary international law of treaty interpretation from becoming satisfactory 
means of introducing arguments based on the host state’s obligations under other 
non-investment related treaties into investment treaty arbitration.  
3.4 The defence of necessity and NPM clauses 
 
While not co-extensive with a state’s right to regulate in the public interest, one 
particular situation in which a state may be faced with an IIA claim is where the 
state has acted to protect its essential interests in times of exigency. In such 
circumstances, states can potentially avail of a number of customary international 
law defences. Among these secondary rules of customary international law are the 
defences of force majeure, distress and necessity. The defences of force majeure 
and distress are, however, limited in scope. Thus, the defence of force majeure can 
be invoked only where the state is compelled to act in a manner not in conformity 
with the requirements of an international obligation incumbent upon it. 
Accordingly, the act must be brought about by an irresistible force or an unforeseen 
event, which is beyond the control of the state concerned and which makes it 
materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation.
101
 The 
defence of distress is even narrower as a situation of distress is said to occur only 
when a state has no other way to safeguard a life in its care than to violate a legal 
rule.
102
 It is unsurprising therefore that neither defence has yet been successfully 
argued in the investment treaty arbitration context.
103
 However, the defence of 
necessity is potentially of greater utility. The defence of necessity may apply where 
a state acts to safeguard an essential interest of the state, although this act violates a 
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legal obligation.
104
 Thus, in contrast to force majeure, necessity implies an 
intentional failure to conform to the state’s obligations and an awareness of having 
deliberately chosen to act contrary to these, rather than material impossibility to 
comply.
105
 For this reason, it could be suggested that, since the precise purpose of 
IIAs is to protect investors in difficult circumstances, states should not be permitted 
to rely on a general necessity defence in such situations as this would defeat the 
object of IIAs.
106
 However, while investment treaty arbitration tribunals have 
permitted host states to at least invoke the customary international law defence, the 
defence of necessity has by no means proven to be a panacea for host states. The 
problems associated with invoking the defence will now be discussed in the context 
of the cases in which Argentina attempted to rely on it to defend regulatory 
measures taken in times of public emergency during the economic and political 
crisis of 2000 to 2002.
107
  
The measures taken in an attempt to stem the crisis included a significant 
devaluation of the peso through the termination of the currency board which had 
pegged the peso to the US dollar, the ‘pesofication’ of all financial obligations and 
the effective freezing of bank accounts. As regards foreign investors in the utility 
sector, this meant that utility rates and tariffs were redenominated into pesos and 
that the right of licensees in the regulated public sector to link tariffs to US price 
indices was extinguished. Since the peso eventually fell to less than one third of a 
dollar, the income of utility companies fell by more than two thirds. Emergency 
laws also authorised the executive branch of the government to renegotiate all 
public service contracts. Argentina has become subject to at least 46 arbitrations 
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brought by investors alleging loss resulting from these measures.
108
 By way of 
background to these developments, Argentina had, in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, initiated an extensive privatisation programme, offering a range of specific 
incentives to private companies who acquired ownership interests in various utility 
sectors. A Convertibility Law was also enacted in 1991 which pegged the peso to 
the US dollar and which also required the Central Bank to hold an amount of 
dollars, gold or foreign exchange at least equivalent to 100 per cent of Argentina’s 
domestic monetary base, the effect of which was to strictly limit the legal authority 
of the Central Bank to increase the supply of pesos, a limitation intended to reduce 
inflation and foster the stability necessary to attract foreign investment. Utility 
companies were given the right to calculate their tariffs in US dollars before 
converting them to Argentine pesos at the time of billing
 
and also had the right to a 
semi-annual tariff review based on the US Producer Price Index. The government 
could not rescind or modify the licenses without the consent of the licensees and the 
tariff system was not to be subject to further control (and in the event of the 
government exerting such control, it was to compensate the licensees fully for any 
resulting losses).
109
 One of Argentina’s main lines of argument in the cases brought 
against it was that it should be able to avail of the defence of necessity as the 
measures which it took in response to the crisis were necessary to uphold 
Argentina’s constitutional order and the basic rights and liberties of the Argentine 
public. 
From a public interest perspective, the first (and most fundamental) problem 
relating to the defence of necessity is its narrow scope. Thus, the tribunals ruling on 
the claims against Argentina have all regarded Article 25 of the Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (the Draft ILC 
Articles)
110
 as being a final expression of the customary international law defence 
of necessity and have relied extensively on Article 25 in their rulings.
111
 Article 25 
states:  
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1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the 
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation 
of that State unless the act:  
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential 
interest against a grave and imminent peril; and 
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest or States 
towards which the obligation exists, or of the international 
community as a whole. 
2.  In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for 
precluding wrongfulness if:  
(a) the international obligation in question excludes the 
possibility of invoking necessity; or 
(b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity. 
The stringent conditions of this article and the negative language in which the 
defence is articulated suggests that states may only avail of the defence in 
exceptional circumstances and the arbitral decisions on the Argentine measures 
have, on the whole, stressed the exceptional nature of the defence. Thus, the 
tribunals in CMS v Argentina,
112
 Enron v Argentina,
113
 Sempra v Argentina
114
 and 
in Suez and Vivendi v Argentina
115
 relied on the ‘only way’ requirement in Article 
25(1)(a) as excluding the defence of necessity if any other means were available to 
the government and placed the burden of proof on the host state. For example, in 
Sempra v Argentina, the tribunal concluded that, despite the economic and political 
crisis, ‘the constitutional order was not on the verge of collapse’ and that hence 
‘legitimately acquired rights could still have been accommodated by means of 
temporary measures and renegotiation’.116 Therefore, Argentina’s claim that the 
defence of necessity applied was dismissed as it was held that there were other 
means available of dealing with the crisis, even if these measures were more costly 
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or less convenient.
117
 Similarly, in Suez and Vivendi v Argentina the tribunal noted 
that, if Argentina had adopted more flexible means to ensure the continuation of 
water and sewage services to the population, it could have honoured both its human 
rights and treaty obligations.
118
   
This ‘only way’ condition, particularly as it has been applied to date (but also 
generally), is difficult to satisfy as, in practice, decision-makers will have a number 
of options available to them, none of which will provide total certainty that the goal 
pursued will be attained. Indeed, the restrictive approach taken to the ‘only way’ 
requirement by the tribunal in Enron v Argentina was criticised by the Enron 
Annulment Committee and, for that and other reasons, the Committee annulled the 
finding that the defence of necessity was not open to Argentina.
119
 The Enron 
Annulment Committee noted that there are two different possible interpretations of 
this concept – the first being the literal meaning to the effect that there must be no 
other measures that the state possibly could have adopted in order to address the 
economic crisis and the second being that there must not be any alternative 
measures that would not involve a similar or graver breach of international law. The 
Enron Annulment Committee observed that the Enron tribunal did not address these 
two different interpretations but instead relied extensively on an economist’s 
opinion as to whether there were other measures open to Argentina and also failed 
to address other important questions necessary to addressing the concept such as 
whether the relative effectiveness of the alternative measures is to be taken into 
account, who is to make the decision whether there is a relevant alternative and 
what test is to be applied.
120
 This criticism could be equally applied to the decisions 
of some of the other tribunals in the Argentine cases.  
The other components of Article 25(1) (a) have also been narrowly construed. 
Thus, the Argentine decisions have also emphasised that, although measures taken 
to deal with economic crises can theoretically fall within the scope of the necessity 
defence, the circumstances will have to be dire in order to satisfy the ‘grave and 
imminent peril’ requirement. For example, the tribunal in CMS v Argentina 
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presented ‘a major breakdown with all its social and political implications’ and 
‘total economic and social collapse’ as the operative standard121 and the tribunal in 
Sempra v Argentina stated that, in order to meet the required threshold, Argentina’s 
economic crisis would have had to compromise the ‘very existence of the State and 
its independence’.122 Investment treaty arbitration tribunals have also proven 
reluctant to engage with the idea that peremptory norms or human rights should be 
considered as falling within the scope of the ‘essential interests’ of the state.123  
Finally, the requirement in Article 25(2)(b) that the state must not have contributed 
to the situation of necessity in order to be able to invoke the defence has also 
proven to be a stumbling block as the host state must affirmatively demonstrate that 
it did not contribute to the crisis. For example, in National Grid v Argentina the 
tribunal found that Argentina’s own evidence demonstrated that its contribution to 
the crisis was substantial and on that basis dismissed the defence of necessity.
124
 
Similarly, in Suez and Vivendi v Argentina the tribunal observed that ‘if external, 
global factors alone had created Argentina’s crisis, it is surprising that other 
countries did not experience a crisis of equal magnitude at the time’.125 If read 
literally, this statement appears to make invocation of the necessity defence almost 
impossible, unless at least several other countries experience severe economic 
crises simultaneously.
 
 However, even if this requirement were to be interpreted 
more narrowly in future cases, it will continue to be problematic for host states.  
Thus, the Argentine decisions have, in general, interpreted the defence of necessity 
restrictively, apparently leaving little room for its application in economic crisis 
situations. Admittedly, the defence could be applied in a manner that accords 
greater deference to the host state (for example by applying the ‘only way’ 
requirement less restrictively). However, the defence will always have to be quite 
narrowly drawn to prevent its abuse by states and this can be argued to be entirely 
appropriate given that the defence, as a secondary rule of international law, is 
properly invoked to preclude wrongfulness only once breach of a primary rule has 
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been established.
126
 Furthermore, the defence may not be particularly suited to 
addressing sovereign financial crises of the type experienced by Argentina, given 
the origins of the defence in state practice on the use of force and the right to self-
defence, its temporal limitation and the restrictive ‘only way’ and ‘lack of state 
contribution’ requirements.127   
A further issue that has arisen in the context of the Argentine cases is the 
relationship between the customary international law defence of necessity and NPM 
clauses. Thus, Argentina, in a number of cases, attempted to rely on the provisions 
of the NPM clause (Article XI) in the Argentina-US BIT in justifying its actions. 
Article XI of the Argentina-US BIT states as follows:  
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures 
necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfilment of its obligations 
with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or 
security, or the Protection of its own essential security interests. 
Thus, the purpose of NPM clauses generally is to allow states to take measures 
otherwise inconsistent with the relevant treaty when, for example, the actions are 
necessary in order to protect certain fundamental interests. Such clauses can cover 
circumstances such as exceptional threats to internal and external security, 
economic crisis, terrorism, public health emergencies or natural disasters. In 
contrast to the customary international law defence of necessity, such clauses 
comprise a set of primary legal rules that must be adjudicated upon in deciding 
whether a breach occurred rather than a means of excusing such breach.
128
  
Despite this fundamental distinction, a number of the tribunals that have 
adjudicated on Article XI of the Argentina-US BIT effectively conflated it with the 
defence of necessity.
129
 For example, in Sempra v Argentina the tribunal stated:  
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the Treaty provision is inseparable from the customary law standard insofar 
as the definition of necessity and the conditions for its operation are 
concerned, given that it is under customary law that such conditions have 
been defined.
130
  
Thus, these tribunals took the stance that a number of conditions not expressly 
mentioned in Article XI must be supplemented by those set forth in customary 
international law such as the ‘grave and imminent peril’ requirement, the ‘only 
way’ requirement and the requirement that the state did not create or contribute to 
the situation of necessity. This approach is problematic as, while the defence of 
necessity and NPM clauses are broadly similar in intent in that both recognise that 
the need to protect national interests of paramount importance may justify setting 
aside or suspending an obligation or preventing liability for its breach, the 
distinction between the two is significant as combining the requirements of the 
NPM clause with the stringent conditions imposed by the defence of necessity 
deprives NPM clauses of much of their potential to excuse host state action in times 
of crisis.
131
 Furthermore, this conflation would seem to run counter to the desire of 
states in signing IIAs to tailor treaty protections to specific concerns surrounding 
the entry and operation of foreign investors in host states so as to avoid having to 
rely on the provisions of customary international law for such purpose.
132
 While not 
all investment treaty arbitration tribunals have taken this approach and while it has 
been criticised by annulment committees,
133
 even where the defence of necessity 
and the NPM clause have been considered separately, there has been a lack of 
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clarity to the review employed. For example, the tribunal in LG&E v Argentina,
134
 
without explicitly so stating, appeared to take a lex specialis approach, whereby the 
NPM clause was prioritised as an expression of lex specialis, constituting a specific 
elaboration or updating of the general customary norm. However, the question of 
the scope of priority to be accorded to the NPM clause, which can range from 
allowing the customary international law defence to retain a residual role
 
to the 
displacement of the customary defence in its entirety still remains and was not 
addressed by the LG&E tribunal.
135
  
However, while the relationship between the defence of necessity and NPM clauses 
may conceivably be clarified by future investment treaty arbitration tribunals and 
does not constitute an insurmountable problem, NPM clauses, of themselves, are, 
for several reasons, not a wholly satisfactory means of protecting a state’s right to 
act to protect essential national interests in times of crisis. First, NPM clauses are 
by no means a feature of every IIA (indeed one estimate from 2007 states that only 
one in ten of the BITs then in force contained such a clause).
136
 Secondly, their 
utility from a public interest perspective varies as such clauses differ quite 
considerably in the range of permissible objectives covered, in the IIA provisions 
which they apply to and in the requirement as to the nexus between an impugned 
measure and the objective pursued, thus according host states varying degrees of 
freedom of action. For example, Article 2102 of NAFTA contains an exception for 
essential security interests. However, the scope of Article 2102 is quite narrow as it 
is limited to measures relating to arms traffic, measures taken in time of war or 
other emergency in international relations or relating to the implementation of 
national policies or international agreements on the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons.
137
 Some NPM clauses also apply only in respect of certain IIA rights
138
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and there is also variation in the requirement as to the nexus between an impugned 
measure and the objective pursued.
139
 For example, while many NPM clauses 
require the measures in question to be ‘necessary’ (whether this is judged by the 
state itself or is subject to the tribunal’s judgment), others refer to the host state 
measures being ‘directed to’ the promotion of certain interests140 or simply to host 
state measures ‘taken on’, inter alia, security, order, public health and morality 
grounds.
141
 Finally, the degree to which the tribunal in question is permitted to 
scrutinise the host state’s actions varies: while some NPM clauses are explicitly 
self-judging,
142
 others are subject to good faith scrutiny while yet another group are 
subject to the full scrutiny of the tribunal in question.
143
  
To summarise therefore, the customary international law defence of necessity has, 
to date, been interpreted in a restrictive manner by investment treaty arbitration 
tribunals. While elements of these decisions can be criticised, it is submitted that 
the purpose and tenor of the defence is such that it must be narrowly drawn and that 
it may not be suitable for addressing certain types of crisis situation, in particular 
economic crises. If the relevant IIA is one of the minority of IIAs that contains a 
NPM clause, this may assist the state in justifying its actions in exceptional 
circumstances. However, much depends on the range of permissible objectives 
which the clause in question covers, the requirement as to the nexus between an 
impugned measure and the objective pursued and the level of permissible scrutiny 
afforded to the investment treaty arbitration tribunal.  
3.5 Analysis of the effectiveness of methods of taking account of public 
interest considerations at the merits stage 
 
                                                 
139
See generally UNCTAD, The Protection of National Security in IIAs: UNCTAD Series on 
International Investment Policies for Development (UNCTAD 2009); Andrew D Mitchell and 
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140
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See for example Romania and Egypt: Agreement on the promotion and mutual guarantee of 
capital investments (with protocol), signed 10 May 1976, entered into force 3 April 1996, protocol, 
para 1. 
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The foregoing analysis of the application of proportionality analysis, of the taking 
into account of the host state’s non-investment related international obligations 
through customary international law methods of interpretation and, finally, of the 
application of the customary international law of necessary and of NPM clauses has 
outlined a number of the problems and uncertainties associated with each of these 
methods. Turning first to proportionality analysis, this methodology is not suitable 
for resolving conflicts between rules and so, for example, it cannot be used to 
resolve direct treaty conflicts. Secondly, the hybrid nature of investment treaty 
arbitration and the distinctions that can be drawn between it and human rights or 
constitutional adjudication mean that there is continuing uncertainty as to whether 
investment treaty arbitration constitutes an appropriate forum for the use of 
proportionality analysis, even if the application of proportionality analysis could 
potentially have a positive effect. Thirdly, the ‘asymmetric’ nature of IIAs and of 
the investment treaty arbitration system makes it difficult to effectively balance host 
state and investor interests, particularly given the uncertainties surrounding what is 
meant by the public interest in the context of investment treaty arbitration. 
However, removing balancing from the analysis entirely could potentially be 
detrimental both to investor interests and also to the optimisation of host state 
interests. Finally, and on a more practical note, the effect of application of 
proportionality analysis may be limited if it is not applied in respect of all of the 
alleged breaches of the relevant IIA. 
An analogous problem arises where the non-investment related international 
obligations of the host state are introduced into investment treaty arbitration 
through arguments based on customary international law methods of interpretation. 
Thus, even if such obligations are introduced in this manner (which, in itself, is not 
uncontroversial), the tribunal must then determine the weight to be attributed to 
such norms and this is not an easy determination to make, given the focus of the 
investment treaty system on the protection of a particular set of interests. 
Finally, turning to the customary international law defence of necessity, as a 
consequence of both the object of IIAs to protect the rights of foreign investors in 
situations of economic difficulty and of the nature of the defence of necessity as a 
secondary rule of customary international law, the defence of necessity must 
inexorably be narrowly drawn and, therefore, will be of assistance to host states in 
exceptional circumstances only. Similarly, NPM clauses, given their variable scope, 
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are a ‘patchy’ means of protecting states’ right to act to protect essential national 
interests in times of crisis. 
Given these difficulties, it is submitted that the academic literature on taking 
account of public interest considerations at the merits stage of the investment treaty 
arbitration process is likely to continue to outstrip arbitral practice. While the fact 
that there are certain issues associated with taking account of public interest 
considerations at the merits stage of the arbitral process does not necessarily have 
as its corollary the proposition that the remedies stage of the arbitral process should 
constitute a forum for taking account of such considerations, it does at least raise 
this proposition as a legitimate subject of enquiry. In particular, the unifying point 
that underlies the specific issues outlined above is that, fundamentally, taking 
account of public interest considerations at the merits stage can lead only to a 
black-or-white decision as to liability. This ‘all or nothing’ approach requires one 
set of interests (i.e. those of the claimant investor or those of the host state) to be 
prioritised in order to come to that determination and so may lead to either investor 
or host state interests not being optimised, particularly in circumstances where one 
set of interests marginally outweighs the other. Therefore, it is submitted that it is 
worth questioning whether an ‘all or nothing’ approach to liability is appropriate to 
investment treaty arbitration or whether introducing an element of balancing at the 
remedies stage would be beneficial.
144
 Accordingly, the following chapter will 
examine the operation of the remedies stage of the investment treaty arbitration 
process and will consider whether the remedies stage should play a role in taking 
account of public interest considerations.  
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For a similar proposition (in the context of the expropriation clause only) see Ursula Kriebaum, 
‘Regulatory Takings: Balancing the Interests of the Investor and the State’ (2007) 8 J World 
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Chapter 4: The remedies stage as a platform for public interest 
considerations: an assessment 
 
4.1 An overview of the remedies stage 
 
Having outlined in Chapter 3 the problems and uncertainties associated with the 
various methods of taking into account public interest considerations at the merits 
stage of the investment treaty arbitration process, this chapter will consider the 
question of whether public interest considerations should be taken into account in 
formulating the remedy to be awarded to claimant investors. As outlined in Chapter 
1, this analysis will be confined to the issue of pecuniary relief, given the 
difficulties associated with the awarding of non-pecuniary remedies in investment 
treaty arbitration and given that the remedy awarded by the overwhelming majority 
of investment treaty arbitration tribunals to date at the final stage of proceedings has 
been the payment of damages.  
In recent years, a sizeable body of literature has emerged that describes in 
considerable detail the bases for valuation and the relatively complex valuation 
methods that have been applied by investment treaty arbitration tribunals in 
assessing damages.
1
 However, although a basic understanding of the means by 
which damages are quantified is important, the operation of the valuation process 
ranks secondary in importance to the applicable legal standard of compensation 
and, accordingly, should not dictate the legal principles applicable to a particular 
dispute or operate as a means of introducing particular standards or theories of 
compensation through the back door.
2
 Accordingly, the first part of this chapter will 
focus primarily on the legal standards of compensation but will also provide a brief 
                                                 
1
See for example Sergey Ripinsky with Kevin Williams, Damages in International Investment Law 
(British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2008); Mark Kantor, Valuation for 
Arbitration (Kluwer 2008); Andrea K Bjorklund, Ian A Laird and Sergey Ripinsky (eds), Investment 
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international investment law (British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2008) chs 1-7; 
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2009); Borzu Sabahi, Compensation and Restitution in Investor-State Arbitration: Principles and 
Practice (OUP 2011). 
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M Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment (3
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 edn, Cambridge University Press 
2010) 456, 485-86. 
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overview of the valuation methods customarily applied by valuation experts and 
investment treaty arbitration tribunals, in order to give a general sense of the 
valuation process currently undertaken by investment treaty arbitration tribunals.  
In examining the purposes of the remedies stage, a distinction must be drawn 
between lawful expropriations and unlawful acts. This distinction is necessary since 
the purpose behind the monetary payment made in each case differs: for unlawful 
acts the purpose of this payment is that of restitution or full reparation whereas for 
lawful expropriations the purpose is that of compensation as expropriation is not 
prohibited in international law but rather is lawful provided certain requirements are 
met (i.e. that the measure was taken for a public purpose, on a non-discriminatory 
basis, in accordance with due process of law and that compensation is provided).
3
 
Accordingly, the standard of valuation to be applied in each case differs: the 
standards of compensation set out in IIAs usually purport to deal only with the 
valuation of lawfully expropriated assets while customary international law has 
been applied in respect of unlawful acts. Therefore, these two categories of 
compensable acts will be considered separately. 
(a) The full reparation principle 
In the case of unlawful acts, the principle applied in quantifying damages is that of 
full reparation. This principle derives from customary international law
4
 and was 
elaborated on in the Chorzów Factory case.
5
 In that case, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) stated that reparation for an act contrary to international 
law must be equivalent to ‘Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of 
a sum corresponding to the value which restitution in kind would bear.’ As stated 
by the PCIJ, the payment must, as far as possible, ‘wipe out all the consequences of 
the illegal act and re-establish the situation that would, in all probability, have 
existed if that act had not been committed.’6 Thus, in order to apply the full 
                                                 
3Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Regulatory Takings: Balancing the Interests of the Investor and the State’ (2007) 
8 J World Investment & Trade 717, 726.  
4
See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001 (2001) 2 YB Intl L Comm’n, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) arts 31 to 36. It has been widely recognised that the Draft ILC 
Articles codify the customary law of state responsibility and reparation: see for example Noble 
Ventures, Inc. v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/01/11, Award 12 October 2005, para 69. 
5
Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity)(Merits)(Germany v Poland), 
Judgment 13 September 1928, Series A, no 17, 47. 
6
 ibid. 
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reparation principle, the actual financial situation of the victim must be compared 
with the financial situation it most probably would be in without that act and the 
valuation date should generally be the date of the award.
7
  However, where an 
unlawful expropriation occurs, it is necessary to compare the value of the 
expropriated property at the date of expropriation and its value at the date of the 
award and to award to the claimant investor the higher amount, in order to give 
effect to the full reparation principle.
8
  
Causation principles play a key role in establishing the amount of damages due as, 
in order for damages to be recoverable in respect of a particular loss or injury 
suffered by a claimant investor, a causal link between the unlawful acts attributable 
to the host state
9
 and that loss or injury must be established.
10
 Thus, in 
implementing the full reparation principle, investment treaty arbitration tribunals 
have relied extensively on causation principles as, when the issue of causation is 
well-defined, the task of quantifying the damages payable as a result should become 
more straightforward. However, given that there is little precedent, either nationally 
or internationally, on quantifying the damages payable in respect of non-
expropriatory breaches and that the requisite level of causation is rarely defined in 
IIAs, tribunals have had to construct an approach to causation on an incremental 
basis, which makes it difficult to discern a consistent approach.
11
 However, on a 
basic level, as described by the tribunal in Biwater Gauff v Tanzania, the 
requirement of causation comprises a number of different elements, including: ‘(a) 
a sufficient link between the wrongful act and the damage in question, and (b) a 
threshold beyond which damage, albeit linked to the wrongful act, is considered too 
                                                 
7
Irmgard Marboe, Calculation of Compensation and Damages in International Investment Law 
(OUP 2009) 139-41. 
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Substantive Principles (OUP 2007) 334; Sergey Ripinsky with Kevin Williams, Damages in 
International Investment Law (British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2008) 138. 
111 
 
indirect or remote’.12 The application of causation principles is not without its 
problems, however.
13 
 For example, especially in host states where there is 
economic or political volatility, it can be difficult to disaggregate the various causes 
of the injury ultimately suffered by the claimant investor.  
The obligation to make full reparation also includes an obligation to compensate for 
moral damage.
14
 Moral damage includes such items as individual pain and 
suffering, loss of loved ones or personal affront associated with an intrusion on 
one’s home or private life.15 Due to this, legal persons (which constitute the 
majority of claimants under IIAs) will be awarded moral damages in exceptional 
circumstances only. Moral damages were awarded in Desert Line Projects v Yemen 
as a result of stress and anxiety caused to company executives due to threats and 
harassment on the part of state entities and the resulting damage to the company’s 
credit and reputation.
16
 However, the amount awarded was small relative to the 
overall claim and the tribunal noted that corporate entities have the right to obtain 
compensation for moral damage in specific circumstances only.
17
 The tribunal gave 
no information on the method by which it arrived at the $1 million figure, which 
represented around one per cent of the amount claimed by the investor stating that 
‘this amount is at the entire discretion of the Arbitral Tribunal’.18  Several tribunals 
have subsequently rejected claims for moral damages (even in circumstances where 
the host state’s mistreatment of the claimant investor was described by the tribunal 
as ‘severe, intentional, and multi-faceted’).19 These tribunals have placed emphasis 
on the exceptional circumstances of the Desert Line case and some tribunals have 
instead considered that a declaration of liability or the dismissal of the claimant 
                                                 
12
ICSID Case No ARB/05/22, Award 18 July 2008, para 785. 
13See generally Andrea K Bjorklund, ‘Causation, Morality and Quantum’ (2008-2009) 32 Suffolk 
Transnational L Rev 435. 
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investor’s claims along with an order to pay costs constituted, of itself, sufficient 
reparation for the moral damage suffered.
 20
  
(b) The IIA standard of compensation 
Where a lawful expropriation is deemed to have occurred (i.e. where the 
expropriation was implemented in furtherance of a public purpose, in accordance 
with due process of law and in a non-discriminatory manner), it is questionable 
whether the established sources of international law provide support for the 
standard of full compensation.
21
 Nowadays however, this question has become 
somewhat moot as the standard applicable in determining the quantum of 
compensation is usually determined by the provisions of the relevant IIA.
22
 The 
payment of compensation in such cases can be seen as a primary obligation as 
opposed to the secondary obligation to pay damages in accordance with the full 
reparation principle following the breach of an international obligation.
23
 The 
majority of recent IIAs tend towards using the ‘Hull formula’ of ‘prompt, adequate 
and effective’24 compensation, although a minority of IIAs instead describe the 
required compensation as being that which is ‘just’, ‘appropriate’ or ‘fair and 
equitable’,25 albeit that such terms are not necessarily indicative of a different 
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standard of compensation.
26
 In any event, given that it has some objective basis, the 
fair market value as at the time immediately before the time at which the taking 
occurred or the decision to take the asset became publicly known
27
 has, in practice, 
prevailed in the text of IIAs as the decisive criterion for the measurement of 
compensation in respect of lawful expropriations. 
 Fair market value has been defined as: 
the price, expressed in terms of cash equivalents, at which property would 
change hands between a hypothetical willing and able buyer and a 
hypothetical willing and able seller, acting at arm’s length in an open and 
unrestricted market, when neither is under an obligation to buy or sell and 
when both have reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.
28
 
Fair market value thus constitutes an objective or impersonal standard of 
compensation in that it discounts those elements of value that are personal to a 
given owner of property and instead bases the value on the price which a 
hypothetical buyer would have paid for the property. In doing so, it takes into 
account the future prospects (or likely future profitability)
29
 of the expropriated 
property rather than merely reimbursing invested capital or providing compensation 
based on the value of individual assets. On the other hand however, it does not 
necessarily equate to full compensation since the investor may not be reimbursed 
fully for all the financial loss it has suffered as the calculation is based on the 
opinion of a hypothetical third person as to the value of the property. 
Although IIAs generally limit the application of the fair market value standard to 
lawful expropriations only, at times, the fair market value standard has also been 
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See World Bank, Report to the Development Committee on the Legal Framework for the 
Treatment of Foreign Investment introducing the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of 
Foreign Direct Investment, 31 ILM 1363, 1376 (1992), guideline IV. 
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applied in respect of unlawful expropriations. For example, in Kardassopoulos and 
Fuchs v Georgia
30
 the tribunal recognised that usually a distinction should be made 
between lawful and unlawful expropriations as regards the standard of 
compensation to be applied and the chosen valuation date. However, the tribunal 
noted that it is only appropriate to compensate for value gained between the date of 
the expropriation and the date of the award in cases where it is demonstrated that 
the claimants would, but for the taking, have retained their investment. In the 
present case, the evidence was that the claimant investors would not have done so 
and thus damages were calculated based on the fair market value of the investment 
on a date one day prior to the expropriatory decree.
31
 
More controversially however,
32
 the difference in the fair market value of an 
investment resulting from a breach has quite frequently been applied to give effect 
the full reparation principle, particularly where both parties have agreed to such 
application and where an expropriation claim has been advanced in parallel with 
claims of non-expropriatory breaches.
33
 For example, in CMS v Argentina
34
 fair 
market value was applied as the operative valuation standard in determining the 
value of the loss suffered by the claimant investor by comparing the fair market 
value of its investment with and without the impugned host state measures in 
circumstances where the tribunal had determined that a violation of the FET 
standard and of the treaty’s umbrella clause had occurred. The tribunal stated that 
‘the cumulative nature of the breaches…is best dealt with by resorting to the 
standard of fair market value.’35 Similarly, the tribunal in SD Myers v Canada, in 
justifying its use of fair market value as the basis for valuation, took the view that 
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Award 22 May 2007, para 361; Sempra Energy International v Argentina, ICSID Case No 
ARB/02/16, Award September 28 2007, para 404; El Paso Energy International Company v 
Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/15, Award 31 October 2011, para 703. 
115 
 
the silence of the treaty indicated the intention of the drafters ‘to leave it open to 
tribunals to determine a measure of compensation appropriate to the specific 
circumstances of the case’ adding that ‘whatever precise approach is taken, it 
should reflect the general principle of international law that compensation should 
undo the material harm inflicted by a breach of an international obligation.’36 
(c) Bases of valuation and customary valuation methods 
Once a standard of valuation, such as that of fair market value, is identified, the 
valuation date and other principles important to the valuation must be identified as 
IIAs generally do not prescribe or mandate a particular valuation basis. This basis 
of valuation then provides the framework within which valuation experts apply 
various valuation methods. The first and most commonly used basis of valuation is 
the market value basis. This represents an objective or impersonal approach to 
valuation and can be considered synonymous with fair market value for the 
purposes of investment treaty arbitration. Other bases of value focus on the damage 
actually incurred by the injured party and are subjective concepts and include bases 
of value such as investment value (the value of the property to the particular 
investor which may not necessarily be the same as the market value of the property) 
and the contractual value (the value as determined in accordance with a definition 
set out in a statute or a contract). 
After the establishment of the basis of value, one or more appropriate valuation 
methods must be selected. In contrast to the basis for valuation, which sets out what 
is to be measured, the term ‘valuation method’ refers to generally accepted 
alternative methodologies of application.
37
 According to the International Valuation 
Standards, the most common valuation methods used in practice are the market 
approach, the income capitalisation approach and the asset-based approach.
38
 While 
the use of the term ‘market approach’ may lead one to believe that this is 
synonymous with fair market value, in fact the market approach, along with the 
income capitalisation approach and the asset-based approach are all potentially 
applicable to both market-based valuations (such as the determination of fair market 
value) and to valuations under the other bases of value.  
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(i) Market Approach 
The market or sales comparison approach considers the sale of similar or 
comparable properties and related market data, and estimates a value estimate by 
comparison with these sales. For the comparison to be reasonable, the businesses 
being compared should be in the same industry or in an industry that responds to 
the same economic variables. The three most common sources of data used in order 
to implement the market approach are public stock markets in which ownership 
interests of similar businesses are traded, the acquisition market in which entire 
businesses are bought and sold, and prior transactions in shares or offers for the 
ownership of the subject business.
39
 A variant of the market approach is the use of 
multiples. Thus, one takes a particular variable of the company’s performance such 
as cash flow, earnings or EBITDA and multiplies this figure by a certain factor 
which is specific to the particular enterprise or industry. This approach to valuation 
has been applied by investment treaty arbitration tribunals in circumstances where a 
comparison can reasonably be drawn such as where the company is publicly traded 
and thus a stock price is available,
40
 where an actual willing buyer has made an 
offer for the business or where real property is concerned.
41
  
(ii) Income Capitalisation Approach 
This approach considers income and expense data relating to the property being 
valued and estimates value through a capitalisation process. The process essentially 
is aimed at ascertaining the present value of future benefits.  This approach is most 
commonly used in relation to objective valuation standards (such as the calculation 
of fair market value). However, the income approach can also be used to determine 
the subjective value of the property to a particular investor, although in such 
circumstances, a rate of return may be applied that is non-market and particular 
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only to that investor.
42
 While the World Bank Guidelines advise using the income 
approach only in relation to going concerns,
43
 this does not necessarily have to be 
the case under international valuation standards. Nevertheless, the absence of 
record of past performance is frequently relied on as a reason for rejecting this 
approach.
44
  
Different methodologies are used to capitalise income and estimate value, the most 
important being the capitalisation of earnings method (also known as the capitalised 
cash flow (CCF) method) and the discounted cash flow (DCF) method. These 
methodologies are based on the same premises but on different income bases and 
discount rates. ‘Cash flow’ is more often used as the basis for measuring future 
income stream than net earnings or future profit as it is seen to be a better indicator 
of value. Therefore, the DCF method is the most commonly used methodology 
within the income capitalisation approach.
45
  
The DCF method values the asset lost according to its income-producing 
capabilities and so, in theory, the method fully compensates the claimant investor 
by awarding an amount that reflects both the loss incurred and the gain of which the 
claimant was deprived.
46
 The method involves first calculating the future cash 
flows of the enterprise being valued during a specific projected period, then 
ascertaining the present value of those cash flows. Future cash flows are not as 
valuable as current cash flows because of the time value of money and the risk that 
future circumstances might change in a way that would reduce or eliminate the 
anticipated future cash flows. The terminal or residual value of the cash flows 
arising at the end of the projected period may, if appropriate be ascertained and 
aggregated with the present value of cash flows within the projection period. This 
terminal or residual value represents ‘the amount the business would be worth if it 
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was sold at market value at the end of the specific projection period, discounted 
back to the present value as of the valuation date.’47 Finally, the fair market value of 
the enterprise’s debt must be deducted to arrive at a net cash flow figure.48 Given 
these variables, there remains a certain degree of scepticism as to this approach to 
valuation and tribunals have declined to apply it in certain circumstances, most 
notably where the company was not an ongoing business with a proven record of 
profitability or where there is a striking divergence between the amount invested in 
the host state and the present value of future income.
49
 It has also been suggested 
that investment treaty arbitration tribunals may be reluctant to apply the DCF 
method as it may be seen as putting too much of a burden on the respondent state.
50
 
(iii) Asset-Based Approach 
This approach involves estimating the value of a business using methods based on 
the value of individual business assets less liabilities. This traditional approach 
avoids the uncertainty associated with the income capitalisation approach since it 
looks into the past performance of the business. However, this approach does not 
consider the value of the entity as a whole and fails to measure with certainty 
important factors such as the enterprise’s contractual rights, know-how, goodwill 
and management skills.
51
 Furthermore, this method measures value as recorded on a 
balance sheet rather than the ability of the business to generate profit in the future.
52
 
Thus, valuation experts generally advise against using the asset-based approach 
except in certain circumstances such as where the business is valued on a basis 
other than as a going concern, where it is a start-up business with no proven record 
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of profitability, where its value lies in tangible, easily saleable assets (such as 
shipping or real estate companies) or where no alternative value can be obtained 
from the market.
53
 Three common methods used to implement this approach and 
establish the present value of the assets of a business are book value,
54
 replacement 
value
55
 and liquidation value.
56
 In addition, on occasion, investment treaty 
arbitration tribunals have granted recovery for actual losses (i.e. the costs of the 
investment),
57
 which has sometimes been referred to as a variant of the book value 
method (albeit that this is not entirely accurate given that the book value by 
definition is reduced by depreciation).
58
   
(iv) Other Approaches  
Apart from these three principal valuation methods, other approaches have been 
raised in valuation practice and by investment treaty arbitration tribunals. Thus, 
some tribunals have attempted to avoid the speculative nature of income-based 
valuation approaches by applying an asset or cost-based valuation and then 
increasing the resulting figure by an extra amount to allow for the loss of income 
opportunity. Application of this ‘mixed approach’ often makes it difficult to discern 
                                                 
53
Irmgard Marboe, Calculation of Compensation and Damages in International Investment Law 
(OUP 2009) 268. See also Mark Kantor, ‘Valuation for Arbitrators: Uses and Limits of the Adjusted 
Book Value Method in Energy-Related Disputes’ (2007) 4Transnational Dispute Management 14. 
54
Book value refers to the difference between the enterprise’s assets and liabilities as recorded on its 
financial statements or the amount at which the expropriated tangible assets appear on the balance 
sheet of the enterprise in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles: International 
Valuation Standards Council, International Valuation Standards 2013. If book value is adjusted to 
take into account factors such as inflation and/or by disregarding the accounting conventions 
regarding depreciation of assets and instead measuring the real devaluation of the asset in question, 
it can be useful as at least a reference point for the purposes of valuation, particularly in relation to 
recently established businesses: Mark Kantor, Valuation for Arbitration (Kluwer 2008) ch 7. See 
also Thomas Stauffer, ‘Valuation of Assets in International Takings’ (1996) 17 Energy L J 459, 485-
86. 
55
Replacement value refers to the current cost of a similar item having the nearest equivalent utility 
as the item being valued. This method may be appropriate where the business being valued is not a 
going concern: Irmgard Marboe, Calculation of Compensation and Damages in International 
Investment Law (OUP 2009) 283-84. 
56
Liquidation value means the amounts at which individual assets comprised in the enterprise or the 
entire assets of the enterprise could be sold under conditions of liquidation to a willing buyer, less 
any liabilities which the enterprise has to meet. It is most appropriate to apply this method when the 
valuation object demonstrates a lack of profitability and/or a lack of future prospects such that the 
best use of the asset would be its sale: Sergey Ripinsky with Kevin Williams, Damages in 
International Investment Law (British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2008) 224-26. 
57
Indeed, one quantitative study of ISCID awards has found that valuations based on the cost of the 
investment is the most common valuation methodology used by tribunals in ICSID arbitrations: see 
Credibility International, ‘Study of Damages in International Center for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Cases’ (1st edn, June 2014) 12. 
58
Irmgard Marboe, Calculation of Compensation and Damages in International Investment Law 
(OUP 2009) 278-79; David Collins, ‘Reliance Remedies at the International Center for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes’ (2009) 29 Nw J Intl L & Business 195. 
120 
 
how the tribunal arrives at the final figure but it is nevertheless quite commonly 
applied by tribunals and often features in submissions.
59
 Other tribunals have relied 
on the ‘insurance value’ or ‘tax value’ of a particular asset when carrying out their 
valuations, despite the fact that the amount insured depends on many factors other 
than the value of the asset and similarly the valuation of companies and assets for 
tax purposes serves specific purposes, which are not necessarily related to the true 
value of the asset.
60
 Yet another approach which has been mentioned but not 
applied in investment arbitration practice is the ‘real option’ approach. Thus, in 
CMS v Argentina the tribunal mentioned (but did not apply) a ‘comparable 
transaction’ approach which reviews comparable transactions in similar 
circumstances (though this has similarities to the market approach) and a ‘real 
option’ approach which studies the alternative uses that could be made of the assets 
in question and the costs and benefits associated with such uses.
61
 
Finally, where an investor-state contract is also in place with the claimant investor, 
contractual provisions may be relied on for valuation purposes.
62
  This can render 
the valuation process more straightforward if, for example, the contract includes 
provisions on ‘redemption prices’ or similar mechanisms that allow for prior 
estimation of the ‘cost’ of a breach.  However, it is not uncommon for investor-state 
contracts to leave open the nature of damages that will be available for breach or at 
least not to adequately provide for the situation at issue, particularly if the contract 
is subject to adjustment mechanisms and other possible variations with the passing 
of time.
63
 For example, in PSEG v Turkey the tribunal acknowledged that binding 
contractual revenue obligations could, in certain cases, overcome the absence of an 
operating history for the investment.
64
 However, in PSEG the contract was not 
sufficiently detailed as the parties had never finalised the essential commercial 
terms of the contract.
65
 Accordingly, the tribunal chose to award to the claimant 
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investor only the investment expenses, subject to some downward adjustments.
66
 
Thus, while, for example, a liquidated damages clause in an investor-state contact 
may be a permissible method of placing a cap on the amount of damages to be 
awarded, a clause stipulating a general approach to the determination of the 
quantum of damages would be insufficient.
67
   
(d) Analysis of the approach taken by investment treaty arbitration 
tribunals to date at the remedies stage 
In summary, investment treaty arbitration tribunals have generally awarded the fair 
market value of the expropriated asset in cases of lawful expropriation and, in 
respect of unlawful acts, have applied the full reparation principle (albeit quite 
frequently relying on the difference in the fair market value of an investment 
resulting from the breach in question to achieve this). In giving effect to these 
principles, investment treaty arbitration tribunals apply one or more valuation 
methods, which, although useful tools, are based on assumptions of what would 
have transpired in the absence of the breach, and so are necessarily based on 
subjective judgment and speculation. Thus, the tribunal in Amco v Indonesia (II) 
observed as follows in relation to the DCF method: 
it is not a mechanistic device. The method itself relies upon the application of 
assumptions which are necessarily judgmental. The DCF method is at once a 
flexible tool that allows for an application of factors and elements judged as 
relevant. At the same time, it allows for the application of these judgmental 
elements to be articulated.
68
   
Accordingly, even if the parties’ valuation experts apply the same valuation 
method, they are likely to come to differing (and often widely disparate) results in 
applying differing assumptions. For example, in Tecmed v Mexico the tribunal 
noted the ‘remarkable disparity’ between the estimates of the parties’ valuation 
experts, both of whom applied the DCF valuation method – the claimant’s expert 
valued damages at $52 million plus interest while the respondent’s expert valued 
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the loss at between $1.8 and $2.1 million.
69
  By necessity therefore, a considerable 
degree of discretion is required to be exercised by investment treaty arbitration 
tribunals in quantifying damages and the remedies stage of the arbitral process is 
subject to a much larger degree of arbitrator discretion than is considered 
acceptable at either the jurisdiction or merits stage.
70
 As was noted by the tribunal 
in Lemire v Ukraine: 
Valuation is not an exact science. The Tribunal has no crystal ball and cannot 
claim to know what would have happened under a hypothesis of no breach; 
the best any tribunal can do is to make an informed and conscientious 
evaluation, taking into account all the relevant circumstances of the case…in 
the end there is no denying that the calculation of damages…inevitably 
requires a certain amount of conjecture as to how things would have evolved 
“but for” the actual behaviour of the parties. This difficulty in calculation 
cannot, however, deprive an investor, who has suffered injury, from his 
fundamental right to see his losses redressed.
71
 
Therefore, the discretion exercised by tribunals in quantifying damages is exercised 
‘pursuant to customary international law, and not…instead of customary 
international law’.72 However, the exercise of discretion by tribunals has, on 
occasion, led to awards in which the tribunal in question, when faced with divergent 
party valuations, has simply ‘split the baby’ (i.e. awarded a figure somewhere in 
between the figures proffered by the parties). For example, in Santa Elena v Costa 
Rica
73
 the tribunal noted that there was little evidence of what the property was 
worth at the date of the expropriation (apart from the valuations provided by the 
claimant and respondent). The tribunal then went onto state that, because of this, it 
had ‘proceeded by means of a process of approximation’ based on the parties’ 
appraisals. The tribunal then arrived at a figure lying between those two valuations, 
stating by way of explanation that the assessment was informed by ‘the evidence 
submitted by the parties and the factors relevant to the value of the Santa Elena 
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Property in 1978’.74 However, although the award in Santa Elena can be viewed as 
a form of ‘rough justice’, the tribunal’s focus in exercising its discretion to quantify 
the compensation payable was on ensuring, in the face of uncertainty, that a 
reasonable estimate of the losses of the claimant investor was achieved rather than 
on taking into account interests extraneous to those of the claimant investor. 
Similarly, in the relatively few cases in which the partial defence of contributory 
fault or the related plea of failure to mitigate loss has been accepted,
75
 investment 
treaty arbitration tribunals have exercised considerable discretion in apportioning 
responsibility as between the claimant investor and the host state. Thus, Sabahi and 
Duggal observe that ‘Ultimately, [the apportionment of responsibility] seems to be 
a very subjective exercise, because its nature defies any mathematical precision’.76  
It is of course possible (and perhaps probable) that some investment treaty 
arbitration tribunals may have taken into account public interest considerations into 
account in exercising this considerable discretion without acknowledging that they 
are so doing through a process of ‘reverse engineering’ (i.e. envisaging a fair result 
and then developing reasoning to justify that outcome).
77
  However, investment 
treaty arbitration tribunals have, to date, generally not explicitly referred to public 
interest considerations at the remedies stage or purported to adjust the 
compensation or damages payable by respondent host states on the basis of such 
considerations and, perhaps as a consequence of this, host states have rarely raised 
public-interest based arguments in their submissions relating to the remedies 
stage.
78
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Arguably the only exceptions to this general proposition are, first, the distinction 
drawn between, on the one hand, the compensation payable in respect of a lawful 
expropriation and, on the other, the damages payable in respect of an unlawful 
expropriation and, secondly, the effect on the damages obligation of successful 
invocation of the customary international law defence of necessity. Turning to the 
first exception, in ADC v Hungary
79
 the full reparation principle rather than the 
valuation standard set out in the relevant IIA in respect of lawful expropriations was 
applied in circumstances where an unlawful expropriation has occurred. 
Accordingly, since the value of the investment had increased between the date of 
the taking and the date of the award, that extra amount was awarded to the claimant. 
Since ADC v Hungary, this distinction has increasingly been drawn by other 
investment treaty arbitration tribunals.
80
 Such a distinction is desirable (and takes 
account of public interest considerations to some extent) as a failure to distinguish 
between unlawful and lawful expropriations could be said to give states little 
incentive to comply with due process and the non-discrimination principle in 
exercising their regulatory sovereignty.
81
 However, as was noted by the tribunal in 
ADC v Hungary, since an increase in value between the date of the taking and the 
date of the award (as occurred in ADC) is unusual, if not unique,
82
 the real effect of 
this distinction is quite limited.
83
  
Similarly, while adjusting the damages payable to take account of successful 
invocation of the defence of necessity could potentially constitute a means of taking 
account of public interest considerations,
84
 the effect of successful invocation of the 
                                                 
79
ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Ltd v Hungary, ICSID Case No 
ARB/03/16, Award 2 October 2006, paras 480-96. 
80
 Siag and Vecchi v Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/05/15, Award 1 June 2009, paras 539-41; Saipem 
SpA v Bangladesh, ICSID Case No ARB/05/7, Award 20 June 2009, para 201; Yukos Universal 
Limited (Isle of Man) v the Russian Federation, PCA Case No AA 27, Award 18 July 2014, paras 
1763-69. See also Borzu Sabahi and Nicholas J Birch, ‘Comparative Compensation for 
Compensation’ in Stephan W Schill (ed), International Investment Law and Comparative Public 
Law (OUP 2010). 
81
Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger, Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Substantive Principles (OUP 2007) 331-32. 
82
ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Ltd v Hungary, ICSID Case No 
ARB/03/16, Award 2 October 2006, para 496. 
83
See also JH Dalhuisen and AT Guzman, ‘Expropriatory and Non-Expropriatory Takings under 
International Investment Law’ (2013) 10 Transnational Dispute Management 19 arguing that fair 
market value and full reparation are both compatible with the notion of full compensation and that 
the real difference is the possibility of physical re-instatement or specific performance. 
84
The effect of successful reliance on a NPM clause is not dealt with here. Since NPM clauses 
comprise a set of primary legal rules that must be adjudicated upon in deciding whether a breach 
occurred rather than a means of excusing such breach, this would seem to require that the obligation 
125 
 
defence remains unsettled.
85
 In this regard, Article 27 of the Draft ILC Articles 
provides that the invocation of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness (such as the 
defence of necessity) is without prejudice to ‘the question of compensation for any 
material loss caused by the act in question’.86 While the reference to ‘material loss’ 
in Article 27 of the Draft ILC Articles is narrower than the concept of full 
reparation and it is explicitly stated in the commentaries to the Draft ILC Articles 
that Article 27 is not concerned with compensation within the framework of full 
reparation for wrongful conduct,
87
 Article 27 does not attempt to specify in what 
circumstances (or to what extent) compensation should be payable.
88
 Indeed, even 
if it did so, the applicability of such a conclusion in the sphere of investment treaty 
arbitration would be questionable, given the difference between invoking such 
defence in the context of an inter-state relationship and in the context of an 
investor-state relationship.
89
 Thus, while the potential for public interest 
considerations to be taken into account at the remedies stage when the defence of 
necessity is invoked exists, this potential has not yet crystallised. Overall therefore, 
it is fair to say that reference to, or explicit consideration of, the host state’s right to 
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regulate or the legitimate purposes behind such regulation has been scant at the 
remedies stage. In fact, the Separate Opinion of Professor Ian Brownlie in CME v 
Czech Republic, in which he argued that the award of damages in investment treaty 
disputes should take into account the fact that such disputes are not purely 
‘commercial’ in nature, as they concern sovereign states responsible for the well-
being of their people, remains the only substantial exposition of the general 
proposition that host state interests should influence the computation of damages in 
investment treaty arbitration.
90
  
Having, in the first part of this chapter, provided a general overview of the 
valuation process undertaken by investment treaty arbitration tribunals, the second 
part of this chapter will assess whether, despite the scant recognition of public 
interest considerations in assessing damages to date, the remedies stage of the 
investment treaty arbitration process in fact constitutes an appropriate platform for 
such considerations.  
4.2 An assessment of the remedies stage as a platform for public interest 
considerations 
 
As was demonstrated in Chapter 3, the various methods of taking account of public 
interest considerations at the merits stage are not entirely satisfactory. One of the 
primary reasons for this is that, given the ‘asymmetric’ nature of IIAs and of the 
investment treaty arbitration process, it is difficult to determine the weight to be 
attributed to public interest considerations vis-à-vis investor interests (and 
accordingly to balance investor interests and public interest considerations). On a 
related note, the extent to which the non-investment related international 
obligations of the host state should be considered in informing the interpretation of 
IIA rights is unclear. Finally, the black-or-white decision as to liability required at 
the merits stage ultimately means that one particular set of interests must be 
prioritised, which may lead to either investor or host state interests not being 
optimised. These factors combined give rise to the question of whether the 
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introduction of an element of flexibility or balancing of interests would be 
beneficial in determining the quantum of damages payable to claimant investors.
91
  
In addressing this question, a distinction can be drawn between, on the one hand, 
taking into account countervailing interests in order to promote or take account of 
such interests and, on the other, taking into account those interests indirectly for 
pragmatic reasons (such as the difficulty of enforcing the ‘ideal’ remedy), albeit 
that there may be a significant overlap between the two categories in certain 
circumstances. Thus, the latter tendency arises due to the fact that the remedies 
stage constitutes the point of the legal process at which principle meets reality as it 
must lead to a ‘real’ and enforceable remedy.92 In order to attain this goal, it is 
perhaps inevitable (and arguably desirable) that factors such as the cost of a remedy 
awarded to the tax-payer or public resistance to a particular remedy are considered. 
While not acknowledging that they are so doing, it is likely that investment treaty 
arbitration tribunals already consider the practicalities of enforcing their awards 
(such as the host state’s payment capacity) in formulating remedies and in 
exercising their inherent discretion in assessing claimant investors’ losses.93 
However, this pragmatic impulse, which is driven by the desire to ensure that the 
claimant is granted an enforceable remedy, differs qualitatively from the deliberate 
and acknowledged consideration of third party or public interests in formulating 
remedies and it is this latter category with which this thesis is concerned.
94
   
The deliberate and acknowledged consideration of third party or public interests is 
not unprecedented in the law of remedies, particularly in the sphere of state liability 
law in domestic legal systems. Thus, where on the domestic level, wrongful state 
action causing harm to private law subjects occurs, this is addressed as a matter of 
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state liability law.
95
 The rules applicable in determining the liability of public 
authorities and the remedies available to individuals harmed by wrongful state 
conduct are, depending on the legal system in question, incorporated either in 
public law or in the private law of torts (or delict) or, more frequently, in both.
96
 In 
recognition of the rights and duties of the state to act for the public benefit, the rules 
of state liability generally differ from the law applicable in determining liability as 
between private individuals and aim at achieving a balance as between the interests 
of the harmed individuals and those rights and duties of the state.
97
 Thus, for 
example, state liability in respect of legislative and judicial acts is generally limited 
and references to state interests, to the state’s margin of discretion and to the effect 
which the liability regime has on the discretion accorded to certain regulatory and 
supervisory authorities are common in assessing state liability and in formulating 
remedies.
98
 
However, although there are certain similarities in function between domestic state 
liability law and investment treaty arbitration (including controlling state power, 
upholding the rule of law and providing remedies to private law subjects for state 
misconduct),
99
 it is clear that the extent to which, and manner in which, public 
interest considerations are taken into account within a particular legal regime must 
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reflect the nature and purpose of the legal regime in question.
100
 Therefore, quite 
apart from doctrinal-related difficulties,
101
 it is submitted that, from a policy 
perspective, it is not necessarily desirable that the approach taken to remedies under 
domestic state liability systems be automatically transplanted into the sphere of 
investment treaty arbitration. This is the case not least because the overall structure 
of IIAs and their dispute settlement provisions encourage (and arguably mandate) 
application of the bilateral notion of corrective justice (which focusses on fairness 
to the victim of wrongdoing and on ensuring that any harm done to the victim is 
rectified)
102
 while state liability regimes can be conceptualised as falling closer to 
the distributive justice end of the remedial spectrum (which focusses on multilateral 
considerations and on the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens that are 
held in common by all that belong to a community).
103
 This disparity, of itself, 
should not preclude public interest considerations from being taken into account to 
temper the ‘pure’ notion of corrective justice in order to accommodate government 
discretion in appropriate cases.
104
 However, it does point towards the conclusion 
that justification which reflects the distinctive features of the investment treaty 
arbitration system is necessary to support the proposition that public interest 
considerations should be taken into account in quantifying the damages payable to 
investors under IIAs.  The remainder of this section will focus on providing such 
normative justification. 
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(a) Normative arguments in favour of taking account of public interest 
considerations at the remedies stage 
In Chapter 2, the need to ensure that states continue to participate in, and co-operate 
in achieving the goals of, the investment treaty arbitration system was cited as one 
of the principal reasons why a balancing of investor and host state interests is 
required in the field of investment treaty arbitration.
105
 Naturally, the introduction 
of an element of balancing or reciprocity is likely to require certain trade-offs to be 
made in terms of achieving the other goals of the investment treaty arbitration 
system (such as that of protecting foreign investors against the effects of host state 
regulation and providing investors with full compensation).
106
 However, these 
trade-offs are required in order to ensure the continuing viability of the system as a 
whole.
107
 The need for an element of reciprocity in order to ensure that the 
underlying purposes of IIAs are fostered and that states continue to participate in 
the investment treaty arbitration system was alluded to by the tribunal in Saluka v 
Czech Republic in stating as follows: 
The protection of foreign investments is not the sole aim of the Treaty, but 
rather a necessary element alongside the overall aim of encouraging foreign 
investment and extending and intensifying the parties’ economic relations. 
That in turn calls for a balanced approach to the interpretation of the Treaty’s 
substantive provisions for the protection of investments, since an 
interpretation which exaggerates the protection to be accorded to foreign 
investments may serve to dissuade host States from admitting foreign 
investments and so undermine the overall aim of extending and intensifying 
the parties’ mutual economic relations.108 
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This passage also points to a further reason why an element of reciprocity or 
balancing of interests is required in investment treaty arbitration, namely that, while 
the protection of foreign investors is the primary object of IIAs, the rights accorded 
to investors under IIAs are not directed at protecting the fundamental interests of 
investors as an end in and of itself.
109 
The resistance of tribunals to investor claims 
which characterise rights under IIAs as human rights can be seen as indicative of 
this.
110
 Rather IIAs reflect a policy choice to protect foreign direct investment 
generally on the assumption that this will assist in promoting future investment and 
economic development, which can itself be considered to be in the public 
interest.
111
 Therefore, the promotion of investment or of further economic co-
operation can be described as an intermediary purpose of IIAs with the promotion 
of development being the ultimate purpose.
112
 These purposes are explicitly 
recognised in the preambles to some IIAs and have been referred to by some 
investment treaty arbitration tribunals
113
 but, it is submitted, such purposes 
undergird the entire investment treaty arbitration system.
114
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Therefore, a question arises as to the stage of the arbitral process at which an 
element of reciprocity or balancing of interests should be incorporated, while 
simultaneously recognising the fact that (rightly or wrongly) states have, as an 
exercise of sovereignty, entered into IIAs and in doing so agreed to limit the 
exercise of some of their sovereign rights for the benefit of foreign investors. Given 
that the primary object of the investment treaty system is the protection of foreign 
investors and given the ‘gateway’ function of the jurisdiction stage of the arbitral 
process,
115
 placing severe restrictions on the ability of investors to bring claims for 
the purpose of achieving such reciprocity would not seem appropriate. Turning to 
the merits stage, although there are certain difficulties associated with taking into 
account public interest considerations at the merits stage, to completely disregard 
public interest considerations in determining liability would limit host state 
sovereignty to an unacceptable extent as it would preclude examination of the 
context and purpose of host state measures and would therefore likely increase the 
number of IIA violations found by investment treaty arbitration tribunals. This 
would be undesirable from a public interest perspective as a tribunal’s conclusion 
that a state has breached investor rights under an IIA can cause country risk to 
increase significantly which can lead to a decline in foreign investment, higher 
political risk rating (and thus insurance premiums) and a higher threshold hurdle 
rate of return to compensate for such risk.
116
 Thus, the tribunal’s evaluation of the 
host state’s action at the merits stage must balance investor interests with other 
legally relevant interests, and take into consideration a number of countervailing 
factors, before it can establish that a violation of an investor right, that warrants 
compensation, has actually occurred.
117
  
However, it is submitted that, to complement this recognition of public interest 
considerations at the merits stage and to allow for a more nuanced reflection of 
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such considerations than the ‘all or nothing’ decision as to liability required in 
determining whether an IIA breach has occurred or not, balancing of interests at the 
remedies stage may be appropriate in certain circumstances. This would assist 
arbitrators in reconciling the ‘asymmetric’ nature of IIAs and the need to ensure 
effective protection of investor interests with the need to introduce an element of 
reciprocity into the investment treaty arbitration process. Furthermore, it should 
ensure that the approach taken at the remedies stage advances, rather than interferes 
with, the substantive values at stake in a particular dispute. Thus, although the 
process of quantifying damages may appear to be a neutral process that exists in 
isolation from those substantive issues, this is by no means the case. To the 
contrary, rights and remedies are inextricably connected and, accordingly, the 
parameters of a particular remedy are crucial to the strength of the right being 
protected by that remedy and to how that right is balanced with public policy goals. 
Accordingly, as a general principle, the normative propositions that underpin the 
evaluation of rights at the merits stage should carry through to the remedies stage so 
as to ensure that the two stages of the adjudicative process work in tandem with 
each other in promoting those norms.
118
 
The fact that investment treaty arbitration tribunals are already well-accustomed to 
exercising discretion in formulating remedies (albeit, to date, primarily to overcome 
the uncertainties associated with quantifying claimant investors’ losses) and that the 
exercise of such discretion has been widely accepted as necessary
119
 makes this 
proposition a less radical proposal than may, at first blush, appear to be the case.  
Indeed, while arguments in favour of the granting of non-pecuniary remedies in 
investment treaty arbitration have become more frequent amongst academic 
commentators, it is submitted that the remedy of damages may, in fact, afford 
investment treaty arbitration tribunals greater scope than certain other remedies in 
terms of taking account of countervailing interests.
120
 However, in considering 
                                                 
118
See Christopher Serkin, ‘The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory 
Takings’ (2004-2005) 99 Nw U L Rev 677, 742 making this point in the context of the 
compensation payable in respect of takings under US law. 
119
See Lemire v Ukraine, ICSID Case No ARB/06/18, Award 28 March 2011, paras 248-49; Irmgard 
Marboe, Calculation of Compensation and Damages in International Investment Law (OUP 2009) 
145.  
120
See Julie A Maupin, ‘Public and Private in International Investment Law: An Integrated Systems 
Approach’ (2013-2014) 54 Va J Intl L 367, 424 arguing that moderating the amount of damages 
payable in appropriate circumstances could well lead to a decrease in the percentage of annulment 
and set-aside requests lodged by states under the applicable enforcement conventions, an 
134 
 
when balancing of interests at the remedies stage is appropriate, it must be kept in 
mind that there is a danger that, if host states are granted a ‘second bite of the 
cherry’ at the remedies stage, the importance of vindicating investor rights could be 
undermined and the granting of inappropriately narrow remedies could result in 
rights dilution.
121
 In addition, there is a danger that reopening the case to determine 
whether the facts justify reducing the quantum of damages in light of important host 
state interests could result in a difficult, long and expensive procedure, which, in 
turn, impacts on host state resources that might otherwise be available to fulfil 
important social functions.
122
  
It is submitted, however, that these dangers are more likely to manifest themselves 
in circumstances where interests that are considered insufficient to override investor 
rights at the merits stage are considered de novo at the remedies stage. This 
contrasts with an approach whereby only those interests that are not capable of 
being considered (or considered sufficiently) at the merits stage in defining the 
scope of the right in question are considered at the remedies stage. Thus, under the 
latter approach, the extent to which such interests were taken into account at the 
merits stage is assessed and the question of whether, in order to ensure an optimal 
balance between investor protection and host state regulatory sovereignty, such 
interests need to be taken into account at the remedies stage is thereby evaluated. 
While in practice there is unlikely to be a bright-line distinction between these two 
approaches, it is submitted that the latter approach is more appropriate to counter 
the potential danger of rights dilution and to ensure that the principal focus of the 
system on the protection of investor rights is maintained. Accordingly, this analysis 
focusses on identifying factors that are not capable of being considered sufficiently 
(or at all) at the merits stage and in identifying why the remedies stage is an 
appropriate alternative forum for such considerations.   
Thus, perhaps the principal reason why public interest considerations may need to 
be taken into account at the remedies stage is in circumstances where the host state 
was acting in furtherance of a bona fide public purpose in introducing the impugned 
measure and this is not capable of being taken into account sufficiently at the merits 
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stage. One situation in which this circumstance arises is where a direct treaty 
conflict occurs (i.e. where a host state can either only comply with its obligations 
under another non-investment related treaty (such as a human rights treaty) by 
failing to comply with an IIA (or vice versa) or where the goals of one of these 
treaties frustrates the goals of another treaty without strict incompatibility between 
their provisions).
123
  In such a situation, the fact that the host state had an obligation 
to, for example, regulate to protect certain human rights and that the impugned 
measures were implemented to achieve such public purpose should first be 
considered at the merits stage of the arbitral process in assessing the circumstances 
surrounding the host state measures and in determining the extent to which the 
investor’s expectations can be considered legitimate. Thus, as noted by the tribunal 
in Suez and Vivendi v Argentina:  
in interpreting the meaning of fair and equitable treatment to be accorded to 
investors, the Tribunal must balance the legitimate and reasonable 
expectations of the Claimants with Argentina’s right to regulate the provision 
of a vital public service.
124
  
However, as was noted in Chapter 3, a direct treaty conflict is fundamentally not 
capable of being resolved at the merits stage as the fact that there is a direct 
collision of obligations leads to application of proportionality analysis or of 
interpretative techniques such as systemic integration being of no avail.
125
 Thus, for 
example, a direct treaty conflict could occur where a host state is simultaneously 
confronted with the duty to comply with its minimum core obligations under the 
ICESCR as well as the duty to compensate investors for breaches of substantive IIA 
rights.
126
 For example, the ICESCR requires states to ensure access to water to the 
population (including physical and economic access) and has described the right to 
water as falling ‘within the category of guarantees essential for securing an 
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adequate standard of living’.127 Accordingly, state parties to the ICESCR are 
obliged, even in circumstances of economic crisis, to ensure the satisfaction of, at 
the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the ICESCR rights and to 
demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its 
disposition in an effort to satisfy those minimum obligations as a matter of 
priority.
128
 The liberalisation and privatisation of essential services in various 
sectors such as the provision of drinking water, electricity and other essential public 
services
129
 increases the likelihood of regulation of this nature conflicting with 
investor rights under IIAs.
130
  
Thus, for example, in an economic crisis, modification of the regulatory regime 
governing privatised companies involved in water distribution and sanitation may 
be necessary in order to ensure that water is affordable to the beleaguered host state 
population. However, such modification may result in the investor’s expectations as 
to its revenues not being met in circumstances where it was previously guaranteed 
that tariffs of a certain level could be charged by that investor.
131
 In such a situation, 
it could be argued that the host state in question ceded a certain degree of regulatory 
freedom in entering into the IIA and had a duty to conduct a due diligence exercise 
to ascertain whether any conflict arises between its obligations under the IIA and its 
other non-investment related domestic and international obligations.
132
 This would 
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lead to the conclusion that the fact that a measure was taken in order to comply with 
a non-investment related treaty obligation (namely the right to water) cannot affect 
the damages payable.
133
 However, there are several reasons why this is too stark a 
conclusion to draw.   
First, while in ‘normal times’ it may be expected that the host state should be able 
to reconcile all of its obligations throughout its engagement with a given investor, 
in times of economic and political turmoil, limited public budgets and highly 
volatile economic environments may necessitate steering and committing resources 
in different directions and, in such circumstances, reconciliation of competing 
obligations may no longer be possible.
134
 Secondly, it should be borne in mind that 
investors are under a parallel obligation to take due notice of the host state’s social, 
economic and political circumstances (and arguably of its human rights obligations) 
and to conduct a risk assessment in this regard.
135
 Thirdly, unlike under the WTO 
regime,
136
 the standards of behaviour required of a particular state under IIAs 
generally do not allow for differentiated or specially tailored obligations for the 
lesser developed of the state parties to a treaty.
137
 The lack of differentiated 
obligations means that in circumstances where a developing host state acts to 
protect ICESCR or other human rights, it may not be given any lenience in terms of 
the scope of its liability under the relevant IIA.  Indeed, such states can be 
considered more likely to be confronted with such situations due to both the 
difficulty posed by compliance with the obligation to ensure the satisfaction of 
minimum essential levels of ICESCR rights
138
 and because such states are likely to 
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lack the administrative and institutional capacity to adopt the regulatory models 
required to develop a framework for dealing with such conflicts of obligations.
139
 
Finally, imposing full liability on the host state when a clash between treaty 
obligations occurs would seem inequitable given that states cannot avoid such 
obligations as corporations have the potential to do by, for example, changing the 
location and organisation of assets. In this regard, Professor Brownlie’s comments 
in his Separate Opinion in CME v Czech Republic are apposite:  
The resources of a corporation entail considerable flexibility in changing the 
location of assets and in changing the organization of assets. The resources of 
a country, its human and natural resources, are a given: they are necessarily 
fixed.
140
 
Thus, where a direct treaty conflict occurs, taking account of the purpose 
underlying the impugned host state measures at the remedies stage
 
would introduce 
a necessary element of differentiation and of reciprocity in that it would recognise 
the host state’s attempt to observe its non-investment related international 
obligations as well as taking into account, to some extent, the capacity of, and 
obligation on, potential investors to conduct due diligence in respect of the host 
state’s social, economic and political circumstances.  
Similar arguments can be made in favour of reducing the damages payable where 
the impugned host state measures were introduced in furtherance of the 
fundamental rights provisions contained in the host state’s highest law (such as its 
constitution).
141
 While, from the point of view of international law, a direct conflict 
between obligations would not exist in such circumstances,
142
 to disregard entirely 
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the purpose for which the measure was introduced would, it is submitted, not lead 
to an optimal balance between investor protection and host state regulatory 
sovereignty and, given the importance of those norms within the host state’s 
domestic legal framework, would fail to introduce a necessary element of 
reciprocity into the investment treaty arbitration process. 
A second, somewhat related, situation in which public interest considerations may 
need to be recognised at the remedies stage is in circumstances where the 
customary international law defence of necessity is successfully invoked by the host 
state. Although, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, the defence of necessity has been 
(and will always have to be) quite narrowly drawn, it is submitted that, where a host 
state fulfils the requirements of the defence, this should be regarded as an 
extenuating circumstance.
143
 This should be the case as, while to require the host 
state to provide full reparation to the investor would deprive the defence of its 
raison d’être (at least in the investment treaty arbitration context),144 invocation of 
the defence nonetheless implies an intentional failure to conform to the state’s 
obligations to foreign investors and an awareness of having deliberately chosen to 
act contrary to such obligations. Thus, two competing imperatives exist: on the one 
hand, the need to introduce an element of reciprocity by recognising that 
reconciliation of competing obligations or interests may not be possible in 
circumstances of economic and political turmoil and that the host state acted to 
safeguard its essential interests (while also satisfying the other stringent conditions 
required to successfully invoke the defence) and, on the other, the fact that IIAs 
exist precisely to protect foreign investors in such difficult situations and, therefore, 
that the defence of necessity cannot act as an ‘escape route’ for the host state from 
its IIA obligations.
145
 These competing imperatives cannot meaningfully be 
reconciled at the merits stage given the black-or-white decision as to liability 
required. Thus, it is submitted that these factors should be taken into account at the 
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remedies stage in determining the quantum of damages payable to the claimant 
investor.
146
  
Thirdly and finally, it is submitted that the question of whether the host state acted 
in furtherance of a bona fide public purpose in introducing the impugned measure 
should also be considered at the remedies stage in the case of breaches of a 
procedural nature (i.e. where the wrongful act relates to the procedure applied by 
the host state authorities or the manner in which a particular measure is introduced 
by the host state). In such circumstances, the host state may be held liable to 
compensate the claimant investor for all of the loss that the claimant investor has 
suffered, even where it is likely or even highly probable that the substantive 
outcome of the host state measures would have been the same in the absence of the 
procedural breach (i.e. had the host state acted lawfully in terms of public 
international law).
147
 Procedural breaches are treated in this manner as, although it 
would seem difficult to establish a causal link between the procedural breach and 
the loss suffered by the claimant investor in such circumstances, it is regarded as 
important as a matter of policy to afford reparation in respect of such breaches, 
even where there is a risk that this may potentially lead to an award of damages 
which exceeds the loss actually caused by the wrongful act.
148
 Thus, one such 
policy justification for awarding damages in such circumstances may be the desire 
to maximise the welfare of foreign investors, on the assumption that such is in the 
interests of the wider public. Perhaps more importantly however, procedural 
guarantees are seen as being valuable in and of themselves for a number of inter-
related reasons. First, procedural guarantees are regarded as central in ensuring that 
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the rule of law is upheld (i.e. they help to ensure that, regardless of what the 
substantive content of the law actually is, the law is open, clear, stable, general and 
applied by an impartial judiciary so that an individual can plan ahead and foresee 
with some degree of certainty the consequences of his or her actions).
149
 Secondly, 
procedural guarantees assist in protecting individual rights and interests against 
undue encroachment in the name of public or societal interests and, where such 
individual rights have to be sacrificed in favour of public interests, in making that 
sacrifice acceptable.
150
 Finally, the existence of certain procedural guarantees can 
be said to confer greater assurance that a substantive decision reached in 
compliance with those guarantees is just.
151
   
Crucially however, it is submitted that these justifications do not apply to the same 
extent in respect of all procedural breaches.
152
 Thus, at the one hand, if a denial of 
justice has been deemed to occur due to the extent and nature of the procedural 
irregularities at issue, a strong rationale exists for requiring the host state to 
compensate the claimant investor for the full extent of losses suffered by that 
investor in order to ensure that the rule of law is upheld in the host state and given 
that, where such serious procedural irregularities are at issue, there can be assumed 
to be a higher likelihood that the substantive decision reached by the host state 
authorities is also unjust. On the other hand however, where the procedural 
irregularities at issue do not meet the high threshold of denial of justice, these rule 
of law-based justifications for awarding damages in respect of procedural breaches 
do not apply to the same extent and, accordingly, the rationale for compensating the 
investor for all of its losses is not as compelling. Furthermore, compensating the 
investor for all of its losses in such circumstances may not lead to an optimal 
balance between investor protection and host state regulatory sovereignty, where 
the host state acted in furtherance of a bona fide public purpose and where the same 
(or substantial) losses would likely to have been incurred by the claimant investor 
in any event had the state organ in question acted lawfully. It is therefore submitted 
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that, in respect of procedural breaches, a balancing of interests should occur at the 
remedies stage which would consider, in quantifying the damages payable, not only 
the loss suffered by the claimant investor but also the nature and intensity of the 
procedural breach and the public purpose being pursued (which would include 
consideration of whether the substantive outcome would likely have been the same 
in the absence of the breach). It is submitted that this ‘sliding scale’ approach would 
allow for the policy-based justifications for awarding damages for procedural 
breaches to be upheld while also accommodating the public purpose underlying the 
host state actions and potentially the development status of the host state.  
Indeed, it is submitted that this approach could prove to be particularly suitable in 
addressing a breach of a claimant investor’s legitimate expectations. In this regard, 
four situations in which legitimate expectations are liable to be disappointed by 
administrative decision-making have been identified by Schønberg: the first 
situation arises when a public authority makes a formal decision about a person, or 
a limited group, which it subsequently seeks to revoke; the second situation arises 
when a public authority explicitly or implicitly represents that it will follow a 
certain procedure or policy in relation to a specific individual or group and 
subsequently makes a decision which differs from the representation; the third 
situation arises when a public authority makes a general representation about the 
procedure or policy it will follow in relation to certain types of decisions, but 
subsequently departs from the procedure or policy in the particular case and the 
fourth situation arise when the authority departs from its general representation in 
the light of a shift in general procedure or policy which has occurred between the 
initial representation and the decision.
153
 It is clear from this classification that the 
concept of legitimate expectations potentially covers a broad range of host state 
conduct and that the rule of law-based justifications for protecting legitimate 
expectations are stronger in certain circumstances than in others. Thus, Schønberg 
notes that the rule of law-based justification for protecting legitimate expectations 
would appear stronger in respect of the first and third situations identified above 
than it is in the second and fourth situations.
154
 Accordingly, while the protection to 
be afforded to investor expectations should, in certain circumstances, be considered 
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akin to that afforded in respect of legally enforceable rights, in others, the rationale 
for protecting investor expectations is less compelling and must be balanced against 
other important considerations (such as the right of the host state to regulate in the 
public interest). In recognition of this, it has been suggested that the damages 
payable to claimant investors for frustration of their (legitimate) expectations 
should be limited in some manner.
155
 One suggestion in this regard is that only the 
‘negative interest’ (i.e. the expenditure the investor has undertaken in reliance on 
the reliability of the government position communicated) should be awarded where 
legitimate expectations are breached.
156
 However, given the broad range of conduct 
covered by the concept, it is submitted that this distinction would not always give 
adequate expression to a fair balance between compensating for harm caused to an 
individual and the public interest.
157
 Therefore, rather than applying this proposition 
rigidly, it is submitted that a ‘sliding scale’ approach which would consider the 
nature of the interest or expectation being protected, the degree of interference with 
such interest or expectation and the legitimacy (or otherwise) of the interests 
underlying the host state’s conduct (including the likelihood that the substantive 
outcome would have been the same in the absence of the breach) is more 
appropriate.
158
   
To give an example, consider a situation in which a statutory body tasked with 
protecting the environment and monitoring compliance with environmental 
regulations imposes certain restrictions on the operation of a chemical plant 
including a requirement to put in place a substantial ring-fenced fund in respect of 
decommissioning of the facility and reinstatement of the site and a requirement to 
monitor emissions from the plant to an extent which exceeds international best 
practice in that particular industry.  These requirements lead to the stagnation of a 
previously expanding business and have led to payments under some of the 
investor’s loan facilities being accelerated due to breach of certain financial 
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covenants in those facilities. The regulatory requirements introduced by the host 
state run contrary to undertakings given by a number of government officials (of 
varying levels of specificity and formality) and statements in the publicly available 
literature circulated by the statutory body in question to the effect that the 
government would follow international best practice in regulating the industry in 
question and contrary also to a requirement under the relevant regulatory regime to 
notify and consult with affected persons prior to introducing such requirements. 
However, in requiring the claimant investor to take these measures, the statutory 
body in question was motivated (at least in part) by a desire to protect the 
environment and public health, as the measures were introduced after a preliminary 
soil and water study (commissioned following reports of unexplained illness in 
humans and animals in the area) identified the presence of contaminants in the area 
surrounding the facility.
159
 In this case, although there is little consensus as to the 
point at which government representations become so significant that a failure to 
honour them amounts to a violation of that obligation
 
and it is questionable whether 
government representations of themselves should amount to an IIA breach,
160
 
combined with the failure to consult as required under the relevant regulatory 
regime, a tribunal could reasonably determine that the FET standard was breached 
on the basis of frustration of the claimant investor’s legitimate expectations.161 
However, this determination, of itself, would not pay due regard to the host state’s 
duty to regulate to protect the public welfare, given the nature of the procedural 
breaches at issue and given the likelihood that substantial losses would in any event 
have been incurred by the claimant investor had the host state acted in conformity 
with the law. Thus, it is submitted that a ‘sliding scale’ approach, which would 
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potentially permit a downward adjustment of the damages payable to the claimant 
investor, would be appropriate in such circumstances.
162
 
In summary therefore, having discussed, and gleaned guidance from, some general 
normative arguments as to why public interest considerations should be taken into 
account at the remedies stage of the arbitral process (including the need to introduce 
an element of reciprocity into the investment treaty arbitration process), a number 
of specific circumstances in which it may be appropriate to recognise public interest 
considerations at the remedies stage have been identified. These circumstances do 
not, it is submitted, constitute an exhaustive list of situations in which public 
interest considerations may fall to be considered at the remedies stage. However, 
they are all based on a common premise: namely that, in some cases, the fact that 
the host state acted in pursuance of a bona fide public purpose in introducing the 
measures challenged under an IIA may need to be considered at the remedies stage 
as, for a variety of reasons (some related to doctrine and some more to policy), this 
fact may not be capable of being considered sufficiently at the merits stage so as to 
ensure an optimal balance between investor protection and host state regulatory 
sovereignty. 
4.3  The ‘special case’ of lawful expropriations 
 
The analysis of the remedies stage as a platform for public interest considerations 
has thus far focussed on unlawful (primarily non-expropriatory) acts. This is 
reflective of the fact that the vast majority of investment treaty arbitrations to date 
have concerned unlawful acts.
163
 Indeed, the expropriation clause can be considered 
as an outlier in the context of international investment law as a whole since, unlike 
the non-expropriatory standards typically contained in IIAs, the expropriation 
enquiry focusses primarily on the loss caused by government conduct rather than on 
the character of such conduct. This has the consequence that, even where an 
expropriation may have been undertaken for a public purpose, in accordance with 
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due process and in a non-discriminatory manner, compensation is still payable. The 
tribunal in Santa Elena v Costa Rica put this in stark terms in stating that the fact 
that the property in question was taken for a legitimate public purpose such as the 
protection of the environment did not alter the level of compensation to be paid nor 
did the international source of the obligation to protect the environment make any 
difference to the level of compensation payable.
164
 However, although the focus 
and structure of the expropriation enquiry differs from that in respect of other IIA 
rights, the need to introduce an element of reciprocity and to recognise public 
interest considerations at the remedies stage still applies. Indeed, the need to 
acknowledge host state regulatory sovereignty at the remedies stage is amplified 
where lawful expropriations are concerned as, currently, the pronouncement that an 
expropriation is lawful does not have any meaningful consequence.
165
 Thus, in 
many cases, the quantum of compensation may de facto equate to that payable in 
respect of an unlawful expropriation, particularly where (as is often the case) the 
lost future profits that the enterprise would have earned are used in estimating the 
fair market value of an expropriated asset.
166
 This effectively means that due regard 
is not paid to the public function that the state is performing
 
and that the elements of 
public purpose, non-discrimination and due process are relevant to a deprivation 
only insofar as their absence may add ‘an additional sense of grievance in cases 
where the host state has, in the first instance, failed to pay the investor “prompt, 
adequate, and effective compensation”’.167 Furthermore, where the expropriation in 
question is indirect in nature, the rationale for affording recognition to public 
interest considerations in quantifying the compensation payable can be said to be 
more compelling as, while awarding fair market value in respect of a direct 
expropriation of property can be said to encourage efficient government and 
investor decisions by forcing governments to consider the costs that the measure 
could impose on individuals and factoring those costs into its overall cost-benefit 
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analysis of the measure,
168
 it is difficult to assess the extent (if any) to which such 
efficiency-based arguments apply to general regulatory measures which may 
adversely affect an investor.
169
 Thus, it is submitted that, from a normative 
perspective, there are strong grounds for taking into account public interest 
considerations in quantifying the compensation payable in respect of lawful 
expropriations (particularly those of a regulatory nature). Admittedly, the 
prescription of fair market value as the applicable standard of valuation in the 
majority of IIAs in respect of lawful expropriations may create some doctrinal 
difficulties in terms of applying such an approach, which will be considered in the 
following chapter. However, this should not detract from the normative arguments 
supporting such an approach.  
4.4  Conclusion 
 
To date, the question of whether public interest considerations should influence the 
assessment of damages in investment treaty arbitration has not been explored to any 
significant extent in arbitral practice. This chapter has argued that the remedies 
stage of the investment treaty arbitration process constitutes an appropriate platform 
for public interest considerations, given the need to introduce an element of 
reciprocity into the process while simultaneously giving due recognition to the 
primary focus of the system on investment protection. Accordingly, affording 
recognition to public interest considerations at the remedies stage would allow for a 
more nuanced reflection of such considerations than the ‘all or nothing’ decision as 
to liability required in determining whether an IIA breach has occurred or not. That 
is not to say however that public interest considerations can be disregarded at the 
merits stage: rather the remedies stage should play a complementary role to the 
merits stage in taking account of public interest considerations and only those 
interests that are not capable of being considered (or considered sufficiently) at the 
                                                 
168
Frank Michelman, ‘Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 
‘‘Just’’ Compensation Law’ (1967) 80 Harv L Rev 1165; Lawrence E Blume and Daniel L 
Rubinfeld, ‘Compensation for takings: an economic analysis’ (1984) 72 California L Rev 569; Ed 
Nosal, ‘The Taking of Land: Market Value Compensation should be Paid’ (2001) 82 J Public 
Economics 431; Emma Aisbett, Larry Karp and Carol McAusland, ‘Police Powers, Regulatory 
Takings and the Efficient Compensation of Domestic and Foreign Investors’ (2010) 86 The 
Economic Record 367. 
169
Jonathan Bonnitcha, ‘Outline of a normative framework for evaluating interpretations of 
investment treaty protections’ in Chester Brown and Kate Miles (eds), Evolution in Investment 
Treaty Law and Arbitration (Cambridge University Press 2011) 124. 
148 
 
merits stage in defining the scope of the right in question should be considered at 
the remedies stage. 
However, while the normative arguments in favour of such an approach have been 
outlined and stand apart from the issue of the doctrinal basis for such an approach, 
the question of whether this approach can be implemented doctrinally is a question 
that is also important to consider and this will be the focus of the following chapter. 
In particular, the following chapter will consider whether there is a doctrinal basis 
for taking account of public interest considerations at the remedies stage under 
existing IIAs or whether treaty reform would be required in order to do so.  The 
relationship between remedies-related reforms and proposed reforms affecting 
earlier stages of the arbitral process will also be considered.  
149 
 
Chapter 5: From policy to implementation: taking account of 
public interest considerations at the remedies stage 
 
In fairness discourse, the most restrained justice-based claims may be 
advanced in the form of equity, which embodies a set of principles designed 
to analyse the law critically without seeming to depart too radically from the 
traditional preference for normativity in the exercise of authority, nor to 
present too bold a challenge to the community's expectations of legitimacy in 
legal rules and processes.
1
 
 
Having discussed in the preceding chapter a number of normative arguments why 
recognition of public interest considerations at the remedies stage of the arbitral 
process would be appropriate, this chapter will explore possible means by which 
such an approach may be implemented. Addressing this question is important for a 
number of reasons: first, there are significant practical difficulties associated with 
terminating or renegotiating IIAs (such as the costs associated with termination or 
renegotiation and the fact that IIAs generally maintain the state’s obligations for an 
extended period for foreign investors whose investments existed at the time of 
termination)
2
 and, secondly, the fact that, notwithstanding the existence of 
normative arguments that support the taking into account of public interest 
considerations at the remedies stage, practically speaking, such an approach is 
unlikely to gain traction if it requires a complete schism between the approach 
taken to quantifying damages in investment treaty arbitration and the requirements 
of the customary international law of state responsibility.  
This issue will be considered in the context of both existing IIAs and new or 
renegotiated IIAs. In the context of existing IIAs, this gives rise to the question of 
whether any doctrinal basis exists for application of such an approach, which will 
be addressed in the first part of this chapter. The expropriation clause will, for this 
purpose, be considered separately from the other rights conferred on investors by 
IIAs. Following on from this, an evaluation of a number of possible provisions 
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which could potentially be included in new or renegotiated IIAs and which broadly 
provide for some degree of balancing of investor and host state interests at the 
remedies stage will be conducted. Finally, this chapter will consider the relationship 
between the recognition of public interest considerations at the remedies stage and 
reforms that have been proposed as means of facilitating the consideration of 
certain public interests in investment treaty arbitration and which primarily affect 
the earlier stages of the arbitral process. 
5.1  The doctrinal basis for taking account of public interest considerations 
under existing IIAs: the role of equity 
Public interest considerations may only be taken into account in the context of 
existing IIAs to the extent that the means of introducing such considerations does 
not conflict with the valuation standards applied by tribunals under those IIAs (i.e. 
the customary international law principle of full reparation in respect of unlawful 
acts and (generally) the fair market value standard in the case of lawful 
expropriations).
3
 This restraint would, at first glance, seem to substantially narrow 
the possibilities for taking into account public interest considerations at the 
remedies stage. However, in analysing the extent to which public interest 
considerations can be taken into account under existing IIAs, it is worth noting that, 
as described in Chapter 4, investment treaty tribunals, of necessity, exercise a 
considerable degree of discretion in quantifying damages and, secondly, while this 
‘normal’ exercise of discretion is separate to the application of equity,4 equity can 
also play a role in the damages quantification process, without the need for an 
explicit reference to equity or equitable principles in the relevant IIA.
5
  
Indeed, given that equity has, in the domestic law context, been described as an 
‘instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and 
                                                 
3
The customary international law principle of full reparation has been applied by tribunals as IIAs 
have, to date, generally not specified the valuation standard applicable to remedying IIA violations: 
one survey found that only 9% of the IIAs in the sample which had provisions dealing with investor-
state dispute settlement included, in those provisions, some language on remedies and about 3% of 
the IIAs in the sample expressly mentioned pecuniary remedies: David Gaukrodger and Kathryn 
Gordon, Investor-state dispute settlement: A scoping paper for the investment policy community, 
OECD Working Papers on International Investment No 2012/3 (OECD 2012) 29. 
4
Irmgard Marboe, Calculation of Compensation and Damages in International Investment Law 
(OUP 2009) 145. 
5
See generally North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands), Judgment 20 February 1969 (1969) ICJ Rep 3. See 
also Christian Tietje and Emily Sipiorski, ‘Offset of Benefits in Damages Calculation in 
International Investment Arbitration’ 29 J Intl Arbitration 545, 551. 
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private needs’,6 a question worth exploring is the extent to which equity and 
equitable principles have been applied by investment treaty arbitration tribunals to 
date and whether equity can provide a basis to take account of public interest 
considerations at the remedies stage under existing IIAs.
7
 Before considering this 
question however, an examination of the meaning of equity, including an analysis 
of the role of equity in international law, is required.  
(a) The meaning of equity 
The general concept of equity is one of some antiquity,
8
 featuring prominently in 
the writings of Greek and Roman philosophers.
9
 In particular, Aristotle described 
the universality and completeness of the law which necessarily includes broad 
concepts of justice and equity and, at the same time, recognised the need for 
systemic correction of shortcomings in the law due, in effect, to that very generality 
or universality. He thus described the function of equity as the corrective of law in 
special cases: 
When…the law lays down a general rule, but a particular case occurs which is 
an exception to this rule, it is right…to make good this deficiency, just as the 
lawgiver himself would do if he were present, and as he would have provided 
in the law itself if the case had occurred to him…And the essence of what is 
equitable is that it is an amendment of the law, in those points where it fails 
through the generality of its language.
10
 
This conception of equity influenced Roman law (at least from the time of 
establishment of the Roman Republic).
11
 Thus, Justinian’s Digest (which, as part of 
                                                 
6
Lemon v Kurtzman (1972) 411 US 192, 200-201 (quoting Hecht Co. v Bowles (1944) 321 US 321, 
329-330). 
7See Sonja Starr, ‘Rethinking “Effective Remedies”: Remedial Deterrence in International Courts’, 
University of Maryland School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper, No 2008-33, 73 noting, in a 
different context, that international courts could potentially find doctrinal support for a balancing of 
interests at the remedies stage in the tradition of equity. 
8See generally Howard L Oleck, ‘Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence’ (1951) 20 Fordham L 
Rev 23.  
9
ibid. See also Mauro Bussani and Francesca Fiorentini, ‘The Many Faces of Equity: A Comparative 
Survey of the European Civil Law Tradition’ in Daniela Carpi (ed), The Concept of Equity: An 
Interdisciplinary Assessment (Winter Verlag 2007). 
10
The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (F Peters, tr Kegan Paul, Trench 1893) Book V, Chapter X, 
175–76. 
11Hessel E Yntema, ‘Equity in the Civil Law and the Common Law’ (1966-1967) 15 Am J Comp L 
60, 66-73 noting however that, while it is clear that, through the schools of rhetoric, the teachings of 
Greek philosophy had been imported into aristocratic circles in Rome at least before the last century 
of the Republic, the nature and extent of the influence of the concept of equity as formulated by 
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Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis, forms the bedrock of today’s Continental legal 
systems as well as the indirect basis of much common law) begins with Celsus’ 
statement that ius est ars boni et aequi (law is the art of the good and the 
equitable).
12
 Concepts analogous to equity can also be found in ancient Chinese 
law, in Hindu philosophy and in the teachings of some Islamic schools.
13
 
Throughout history therefore, there has been widespread recognition of the need to 
correct or supplement the law in certain circumstances in order to attain justice. 
Inevitably however, ideas of equity vary according to the interests and culture of 
different societies and states.
14
 In particular, the manner in which the concept of 
equity manifests itself in common law systems differs from its manifestation in 
civil law systems. Fundamentally however, although common law and civil law 
systems differ in terms of their organisation and the techniques used by each system 
to apply the concept of equity, ‘below the surface the two systems are nourished by 
the same sources and ideals’.15 Despite this shared foundation however, the 
dichotomy between the common law and civil law traditions has had a significant 
influence on the manner in which equity has been accepted into international law 
and so merits further examination.
16
 
Turning first to the common law systems, within such systems, it is possible to 
identify a law of equity and (at least historically) separate courts of equity through 
which that law was administered. Thus, from approximately the mid fourteenth 
century onwards in England, extraordinary justice remedying the defects of the 
common law on grounds of conscience and natural justice was administered 
through a separate court to the common law courts (the Court of Chancery) and 
Courts of Chancery subsequently became a feature of other common law systems.
17
  
While this separation of common law and equitable jurisdictions is, at times, 
                                                                                                                                        
Greek philosophy upon the Roman legal system is controversial. See also Howard L Oleck, 
‘Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence’ (1951) 20 Fordham L Rev 23, 27-29. 
12James Edelman, ‘Equity’, University of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series Paper No 69/2010, 
October 2010, 2. 
13
 Margaret White, ‘Equity – A General Principle of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations?’ (2004) 
4 Queensland University of Technology L J 103, 104. 
14
ibid, 103. 
15G M Razi, ‘Reflections on Equity in the Civil Law Systems’ (1963) 13 Am University L Rev 24, 
44. 
16
See Christopher R Rossi, Equity and International Law: A Legal Realist Approach to International 
Decisionmaking (Transnational Publishers 1993) 21-22 noting the importance of understanding how 
equity has been applied municipally in order to understand the influences contributing to the 
formation of the concept of equity in international law. 
17Howard L Oleck, ‘The Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence’ (1951) 20 Fordham L Rev 23, 
24-26. 
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conceptualised as a unique feature of the common law tradition (and is often used 
in the common law tradition to delineate what is meant by equity),
18
 such a 
separation of equity from law is not in fact unique to the common law and was, for 
example, also a feature of Roman law up to the second century AD.
19
 Initially the 
Court of Chancery operated according to the dictates of ‘conscience’, a notion 
which was influenced by the Church’s moral teaching.20 Over time however (and as 
common lawyers rather than ecclesiastics began to be appointed as Chancellors),
21
 
although the Court of Chancery remained a ‘court of conscience’, a system of 
precedent began to develop and the Court of Chancery began to grant relief on the 
basis of certain identifiable principles, which operated as ‘glosses on the common 
law’.22  This ‘systemisation’ of the law of equity arose in recognition of the need to 
ensure a degree of certainty and consistency in the law so as to ensure the fair 
administration of justice and to protect against arbitrary and capricious decisions.
23
 
Thus, as the law of equity developed within the Courts of Chancery: 
Equity [became] less a principle or a set of principles which assisted, or 
supplemented, or even set aside the law in order that justice might be done in 
individual cases, and more a settled system of rules which supplemented the 
law in certain cases and in certain defined ways.
24
 
Despite this ‘systemisation’ of equity however, fundamentally the concept of equity 
remains flexible enough to have the capacity to correct or supplement the common 
                                                 
18
See for example Hilary Delany, Equity and the Law and Trusts in Ireland (4
th
 edn, Round Hall 
Publishing 2007) 1 describing equity as ‘the branch of the law administered by the Court of 
Chancery prior to the enactment of the Judicature (Ireland) Act 1877’. 
19Ralph A Newman, ‘Equity in Comparative Law’ (1968) 17 Int'l & Comp L Q 807, 809. See also 
Mauro Bussani and Francesca Fiorentini, ‘The Many Faces of Equity: A Comparative Survey of the 
European Civil Law Tradition’ in Daniela Carpi (ed), The Concept of Equity: An Interdisciplinary 
Assessment (Winter Verlag 2007) 106-107 describing the role of the Praetor as a source of equity. 
20Joseph Charles Campbell, ‘The Development of Principles in Equity in the Seventeenth Century: 
An Introduction for Non-Lawyers’ (31 March 2015) Sydney Law School Research Paper No 15/25. 
21
Hilary Delany, Equity and the Law and Trusts in Ireland (4
th
 edn, Round Hall Publishing 2007) 5. 
22Hessel E Yntema, ‘Equity in the Civil Law and the Common Law’ (1966-1967) 15 Am J Comp L 
60, 84.  
23See for example Sir John Selden’s often-cited criticism of the Chancery: ‘Equity is a roguish thing: 
for law we have a measure, [and] know what to trust to. Equity is according to the conscience of him 
that is Chancellor; and as that is larger, or narrower, so is Equity. 'Tis all one, as if they should make 
the standard for the measure we call a Foot, the Chancellor's foot. What an uncertain measure would 
this be? One Chancellor has a long foot; another a short foot; a third an indifferent foot. ‘Tis the 
same thing in the Chancellor's conscience’: see John Selden, The Table Talk of John Selden 
(Federick Pollock ed, 1927) 43. 
24
William Holdsworth, A History of English Law Vol V (3rd edn, Methuen & Co London 1945) 217-
18. See also Hilary Delany, Equity and the Law and Trusts in Ireland (4
th
 edn, Round Hall 
Publishing 2007) 5 noting that much of the ‘systemisation’ of the principles of equity took place 
from the time of the chancellorship of Lord Nottingham (1673-1682) until the time of Lord Eldon 
(1801-1806 and 1807-1827). 
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law in a particular case and there is potential for the scope of equitable doctrines to 
be extended if the justice of a particular case so requires (albeit that the judicial 
willingness to do so may vary).
25
 However, although, in most common law 
jurisdictions,
26
 the courts of law and courts of equity have now ‘fused’ such that 
responsibility for the administration of both law and equity is now vested in one 
court,
27
 the intrinsic difference between legal and equitable rights and remedies 
remains unaffected.
28
 Thus, as noted by Ashburner, ‘the two streams of jurisdiction, 
though they run in the same channel, run side by side and do not mingle their 
waters.’29 A significant example of the continuing distinction between legal and 
equitable rights is that, whereas in order to obtain an equitable remedy, a litigant 
must rely on the court’s discretion, if he seeks a common law remedy, once he has 
established that a right existing at common law has been breached, a remedy will be 
granted. Given this continuing distinction between the two ‘streams of jurisdiction’, 
the challenge in seeking to ensure that equitable principles are applied in common 
law systems is ‘the…need to receive the principles of equity into the general 
[common law] norms’.30  
In contrast, in civil law systems, there is no identifiable law of equity nor were 
separate courts of equity a feature of such systems. In addition, the courts in such 
systems are extremely reluctant to be seen to base their decisions on equity or on 
equitable principles.
31
 This reluctance is attributable, at least in part, to the 
influence of legal positivism on Continental legal systems together with the 
phenomenon of codification, both of which place emphasis on the supremacy and 
                                                 
25
ibid, 3; Raymond Evershed, ‘Equity is not presumed to be past the age of child-bearing’ (1953-
1955) 1 Sydney L Rev 1. See also Campbell Discount Co Ltd v Bridge [1961] 1 QB 445, 459, per 
Harman LJ noting that ‘since the time of Lord Eldon the system of equity for good or evil has been a 
very precise one, and equitable jurisdiction is exercised only on well-known principles’. 
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27
In England, see, in particular, the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict c. 66) and 
the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict c. 77).  
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See generally Hilary Delany, Equity and the Law and Trusts in Ireland (4
th
 edn, Round Hall 
Publishing 2007) 7-12 for a discussion of whether the ‘fusion’ of law and equity is of a procedural 
nature only. 
29
Walter Ashburner, Principles of Equity (2
nd
 edn, Butterworth 1933) 18. 
30Ralph A Newman, ‘Equity in Comparative Law’ (1968) 17 Int'l & Comp L Q 807, 830. 
31
See G M Razi, ‘Reflections on Equity in the Civil Law Systems’ (1963) 13 Am University L Rev 
24, 40 observing that ‘civilian courts, of any rank, would never base a decision on equity.’  
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autonomous nature of positive rules and downplay the role of the jurist as a law-
maker.
32
 This fosters the view that recourse to equity is only permitted when 
positive law expressly admits such recourse.
33
 However, despite these apparent 
restrictions on the extent to which courts in civil law jurisdictions can rely on 
equity, such courts will nonetheless ‘do what they can to do equity.’34  
Thus, the introduction of the principles of equity has been facilitated in many civil 
systems by either provisions in the relevant civil codes to the effect that when the 
written law is silent, the judge may determine the law or through references to 
underlying moral standards (such as doctrines of natural law, natural equity, general 
principles of law or doctrines of equity).
35
 An example of this is the 
Generalklauseln in the German Civil Code (the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch or BGB) 
which, for example, require judgments to be based upon good morals (gute Sitte) or 
necessary care (erforderliche Sorgfalt), thereby obliging the judge to seek the legal 
grounds for the decision outside of positive law.
36
 On a related note, the concept of 
good faith, which is a feature of many civil codes,
37
 has also played an important 
role in facilitating civil law courts in doing equity. Indeed, the content of good faith 
is analogous to that of equity in English law and can be regarded as civil law’s 
equity as it is used by judges to create new rules, which are concretisations, 
supplements or corrections to positive law.
38
 For example, § 242 BGB, in requiring 
debtors to perform their duties according to the requirements of good faith taking 
customary practice into consideration, has been used by the German courts to create 
several duties additional to those expressly stated by contract clauses or by positive 
                                                 
32
The advent of positivism was, of course, not unique to Continental legal systems but, when 
combined with the phenomenon of private law codification in those systems, it can be said to have 
acquired a ‘centripetal force that it previously did not possess’: Mauro Bussani and Francesca 
Fiorentini, ‘The Many Faces of Equity: A Comparative Survey of the European Civil Law Tradition’ 
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E du Perron and M Veldman (eds), Towards a European Civil Code (3rd edn, Kluwer Law 
International 2004) 217-20. 
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law, to guard against the abusive exercise of rights and as a basis to grant 
extraordinary remedies.
39
 Finally, it has been observed that, even outside of the 
discretion afforded to judges by the good faith principle and other ‘equitable’ 
concepts, it is likely that judges covertly take account of equitable principles in 
other ways through, for example, determining the ‘equitable’ solution to a case and 
then developing reasoning based on the positive law as to why that solution should 
be reached.
40
 Despite the various devices used by judges to ‘do equity’ however, 
the official discourse in civil law systems is to the effect that equity is irrelevant 
except to the extent permitted by the positive law and, thus, it can be stated that, in 
such systems, ‘the conflict between the clashing objectives of certainty and of ideal 
justice, has prevented a complete integration of law and equity’.41 Nonetheless, 
despite this lack of integration (which is a feature shared with the common law 
albeit for different reasons), there is a striking similarity in the equitable content of 
common law systems and civil law systems. For example, the common law maxims 
of equity, which act as guiding principles for the application of rules of law, have 
also been accepted as principles of law in civil law jurisdictions.
42
 
Accordingly, while the differing role afforded to equity by different legal systems 
was one of the primary reasons why equity was not expressly included as a source 
of law in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute,
43
 there is a broad consensus that transcends 
legal traditions as to what it means to ‘do equity’, which is linked to the origins of 
equity in a sense of justice that is innate to human nature.
44
 Thus, it is now widely 
(if not universally) recognised that equity constitutes either a ‘general principle of 
law recognised by civilised nations’ or, alternatively, forms part of customary 
international law
45
 and can therefore play a role in international law disputes 
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in International Law’ (2013) 2 UCL J L and Jurisprudence 40, 42-43. 
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42G M Razi, ‘Reflections on Equity in the Civil Law Systems’ (1963) 13 Am University L Rev 24, 
41. See also Roscoe Pound, ‘The Maxims of Equity. I of Maxims Generally’ (1921) 34 Harv L Rev 
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without the express authorisation of the parties.
46
 However, neither the concept nor 
the role of equity in international law is coterminous with equity’s characteristics in 
domestic law.
47
 Therefore, the role of equity in international law generally and, in 
particular, in the formulation of remedies merits further examination. 
(b) The role of equity in international law 
While, even within the parameters of a particular domestic legal system, the 
concept and role of equity is difficult to concretise, that problem becomes even 
more acute in an international context given the lack of homogeneity of values. 
Therefore, although it can be stated that equity as it has been recognised and 
developed in international law is most closely related to Western legal traditions,
48
 
the role of equity in international law is even more uncertain than is the case in 
domestic legal systems,
49
 albeit that its influence on legal rules and principles can 
be regarded as being at least as strong as in other legal systems.
50
  
Perhaps due to this uncertainty as to what is meant by equity in an abstract sense or 
to the specific connotations that the term equity has in the common law tradition, 
international courts and tribunals have, with the notable exception of international 
maritime boundary delimitation cases,
51
 proven reluctant to cite equity as the basis 
for, or the guiding principle underlying, their decisions.
52
 Instead, there has been a 
tendency on the part of international courts and tribunals to have recourse to 
specific rules and principles of an equitable nature which enjoy acceptance across a 
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Diversion of Waters from the River Meuse (Netherlands v Belgium), Individual Opinion of Judge 
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 edn, OUP 2003) 173-222. 
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broad range of municipal legal systems and which are (or at least seem to be) 
capable of being defined and stated in a ‘pure’ form.53  
For example, in the Diversion of Water from the River Meuse
54
 case, Judge Hudson, 
although concurring in the Court’s decision, confirmed in his separate opinion that 
two maxims of equity - namely that equality exists between parties and a party who 
seeks equity must do equity - constituted general principles of international law.
55
 
In referring to the latter principle, he noted as follows:  
in a proper case, and with scrupulous regard for the limitations which are 
necessary, a tribunal bound by international law ought not to shrink from 
applying a principle of such obvious fairness.
56
 
Similarly, the principle of estoppel has been accepted into international law as a 
general principle of law, resting on principles of good faith and consistency.
57
 
Fundamentally, the concept of estoppel obliges a state ‘to be consistent in its 
attitude to a given factual or legal situation’.58 This same notion underlies both the 
various types of estoppel in common law jurisprudence (including promissory 
estoppel, proprietary estoppel and estoppel by silence) and the civil law concepts of 
preclusion, debarment and foreclusion.
59
 However, while estoppel-like concepts in 
municipal law are quite precisely formulated, international law has not adopted the 
‘manifold refinements grafted onto [the concept of estoppel] by domestic legal 
systems’60 and has instead generally61 favoured a more basic conception of estoppel 
which requires only that a state makes an unconditional representation to another 
state with proper authority on which the state invoking estoppel must rely.
62
 Thus, 
as noted by Judge Alfaro in the Temple of Preah Vihear case: 
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there is a very substantial difference between the simple and clear‐cut rule 
adopted and applied in the international field and the complicated 
classifications, modalities, species, sub‐species and procedural features of the 
municipal system.
63
 
Thus, it is questionable whether the principle of estoppel as it has been developed in 
international law possesses any greater specificity than equity as a general 
concept.
64
 Indeed, in a description which could equally be used to describe the role 
of equity, it has been observed that ‘estoppel is often employed as a catch all term 
to create a legal effect which the regime should otherwise provide’.65  
This example (which is quite representative of the manner in which equitable 
principles have been translated into international law)
66
 suggests that, 
notwithstanding a certain reluctance on the part of international courts and tribunals 
to use the term equity, such courts and tribunals endeavour to ‘do equity’ through 
reliance on a variety of principles of an equitable nature,
67
 which are regarded as 
being of a corrective nature.
68
 Thus, equity does not confer unlimited discretion on 
the decision maker to override the law but rather allows for the correction of a lack 
of subtlety and flexibility in the strict law, where ‘the letter of the rule would kill its 
spirit’.69 This facilitates a weighing up of what is right in all the circumstances in 
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order to correct or supplement the law and to ameliorate the gross unfairness which 
might occasionally result from the strict application of legal rules.
70
  
Accordingly, the different modes of application of equity within international law 
have been categorised as equity infra legem and equity praeter legem.
71
 Equity 
infra legem refers to ‘that form of equity which constitutes a method of 
interpretation of the law in force, and is one of its attributes’,72 or equity ‘used to 
adapt the law to the facts of individual cases’,73 while equity praeter legem refers to 
equity being used to fill lacunae in the law, without derogating from, or 
undermining, the spirit of the law itself. Thus, as has been emphasised by the ICJ,  
equity praeter legem refers to equity used ‘not…with a view to filling a social gap 
in law, but…in order to remedy the insufficiencies of international law and fill in its 
logical lacunae’.74  
While equity, so conceived, brings with it a considerable degree of flexibility and 
facilitates the adaptation and adjustment of legal principles, rules and concepts to 
the realities and circumstances of a particular case, it does not confer unlimited 
discretion on the decision maker. In particular, while equity could potentially serve 
as a broad synonym for distributive justice (and indeed that meaning has been 
adopted in other contexts),
75
 this use of equity has not been universally accepted in 
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international law.
76
 Thus, the ICJ noted in the Libya/Tunisia Continental Shelf case 
that:  
it is bound to apply equitable principles as part of international law, and to 
balance up the various considerations which it regards as relevant in order to 
produce an equitable result. While it is clear that no rigid rules exist as to the 
exact weight to be attached to each element in the case, this is very far from 
being an exercise of discretion or conciliation; nor is it an operation of 
distributive justice.
77
 
Furthermore, the discretion conferred on an adjudicative body by the concept of 
equity does not permit it to decide purely on the basis of what it considers right or 
just as this would amount to resolving the dispute ex aequo et bono, which requires 
the express authorisation of the parties.
78
 The ancient concept of ex aequo et bono 
holds that adjudicators should decide disputes according to their concept of what is 
fair and just in the circumstances. Thus, while decisions in equity are deemed to 
form part of the law, decisions ex aequo et bono are attributed to a moral, social or 
political realm that is external to (and is sometimes conceptualised as being 
contrary to) the law. The rationale behind this distinction is that, while adjudicators 
may ‘fill gaps’ in the law based on principles of equity, they should not base their 
decisions on subjective notions of fairness or justice that have not been reduced to 
principles and rules of law.
79
 Thus, as the late Justice Lauterpacht of the 
International Court asserted:  
adjudication ex aequo et bono amounts to an avowed creation of new 
relations between the parties…it differs clearly from the application of the 
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rules of equity, which form part of international law as indeed, of any legal 
system.
80
 
However, while it is possible to distinguish the application of the rules of equity 
from adjudication ex aequo et bono on a conceptual level, the distinction between 
the two is by no means a bright-line distinction.
81
 Therefore, some commentators 
have asserted that, instead of insisting on a formal divide between application of the 
rules of equity and adjudication ex aequo et bono, it may be more accurate to 
evaluate adjudicative discretion along a spectrum of decision-making ranging from, 
at one end, decisions that clearly had a basis in law in well-established equitable 
principles to, on the other end, decisions that were clearly made outside the law 
based solely on the adjudicator’s conception of what was fair.82 This less structured 
approach reflects the continuum along which adjudicative discretion is, in reality, 
exercised and also recognises that decisions based on equity and decisions made ex 
aequo et bono share similar substantive ends, principally, arriving at a fair result in 
the circumstances of a particular case.
83
  
Overall therefore, equity in international law can be regarded as a concept that 
operates as a means of considering all the relevant circumstances in a particular 
case and which may temper the rigours of the law in light of those circumstances 
and introduce considerations of fairness, reasonableness and good faith into the 
decision-making process, either as general concepts or through the introduction of 
specific principles of legal reasoning associated with fairness and reasonableness.
84
 
The relevance of equity to the international law of remedies in particular will now 
be considered. 
(c) Equity in the international law of remedies 
Equity has been found to be relevant in a number of ways under the international 
law of remedies. First, as noted by the ICJ in the Ahmadou Sadio Diallo case, 
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damages in respect of non-material injury must, of necessity, be quantified by 
reference to equitable considerations.
85
 As support for this statement, the ICJ cited 
the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Al-Jedda v United 
Kingdom, which noted that, in determining reparation for non-material injury, the 
Court’s ‘guiding principle’ is equity.86 The Court went onto described the role of 
equity as follows:  
[equity] above all involves flexibility and an objective consideration of what 
is just, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case, including not 
only the position of the applicant but the overall context in which the breach 
occurred.
87
  
Secondly, equity and reasonableness have been cited as the grounds for determining 
whether restitution is an appropriate remedy or whether compensation should 
instead be granted.
88
 Thirdly, proportionality, which can be considered a component 
part of (or a legal principle derived from) the tradition of equity,
89
 occupies a 
significant and established position under the international law of remedies. This is 
particularly due to the fact that, while in domestic law, one rarely encounters 
situations where the remedy for a violation of law is a right granted to the affected 
party to also violate the law, in international law, remedies frequently (or even 
usually) take this form and the proportionality of such countermeasures is crucial in 
determining their legality.
90
 Thus, the Draft ILC Articles provide that, in taking 
countermeasures in order to procure the cessation of the wrongful act and to 
achieve reparation for the injury, such measures must be a proportionate response to 
an internationally wrongful act of the state against which they are taken, taking into 
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account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question.
91
 
Furthermore, where the remedy for an internationally wrongful act is to take the 
form of reparation rather than countermeasure, the Draft ILC Articles state that the 
reparation granted to the injured party must be proportionate to the injury caused by 
a wrongful act and that this proportionality requirement is addressed in different 
ways in the context of each form of reparation, taking into account its specific 
character. Thus, restitution is excluded if it would involve a burden out of all 
proportion to the benefit gained by the injured state or other party.
92
 Similarly, 
satisfaction must not be out of proportion to the injury and ‘may not take a form 
humiliating to the responsible state.’93 Turning finally to the remedy of damages, 
the requirement for proportionality between the remedy awarded and the injury 
suffered is stated to be addressed by limiting the recoverable loss to damage 
actually suffered as a result of the internationally wrongful act and in excluding 
damage which is indirect or remote.
94
 However, the Draft ILC Articles would also 
appear to endorse (or require)
95
 consideration of equity in applying the full 
reparation principle in noting, in the context of elaborating on the application of the 
full reparation principle, that:  
the appropriate heads of compensable damage and the principles of 
assessment to be applied in quantification, …will vary depending on the 
content of particular primary obligations, an evaluation of the respective 
behaviour of the parties and, more generally, a concern to reach an equitable 
and acceptable outcome.
96
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Finally, while economics is often regarded as providing a policy basis for the partial 
defences of contributory fault and failure to mitigate loss, those defences, which 
operate to reduce the damages payable, can also be considered to be underpinned 
by fundamental principles of fairness and equity.
97
 Thus, the commentaries to 
Article 39 of the Draft ILC Articles acknowledge that the notion of contributory 
fault  is consistent not only with the principle that full reparation and nothing more 
is due in respect of the injury but also with fairness as between the responsible state 
and the victim of the breach.
98
 Furthermore, the international decisions that have 
recognised the relevance of contributory fault include several cases in which the 
claimant has engaged in an unlawful or otherwise prohibited act at the time the 
claim arose, which suggests that contributory fault is consonant with the equitable 
doctrine of ‘clean hands’.99 Similarly, the partial defence of failure to mitigate loss, 
in requiring the victim of breach to take reasonable steps to limit the damage 
sustained, can also be considered to be consistent with fairness as between the 
responsible state and the victim of the breach and also with the ‘clean hands’ 
principle
100
 and, thus, can be conceptualised as an equitable concept.
101
  
Overall therefore, it is clear that equity plays a significant role under the public 
international law of remedies both in determining the type of remedy to be granted 
and, where damages are to be awarded, in assessing the quantum of such damages. 
In practice however, the role of equity in quantifying damages is not so clear-cut – 
in particular, although the exercise of ‘normal’ discretion in quantifying damages 
can, on a conceptual level, be considered separate to the application of equity, the 
two are often conflated.
102
 Therefore, given the permeable boundary between the 
two concepts (and the somewhat amorphous nature of equity as a general concept), 
before assessing equity’s potential role in taking account of public interest 
considerations at the remedies stage, the extent to which equity has been received 
                                                                                                                                        
 
97See Gary T Schwartz, ‘Contributory and Comparative Negligence: a Reappraisal’ (1977-1978) 87 
Yale L J 697 arguing that economics, standing alone, does not provide a persuasive basis for any 
contributory negligence defence but that such a basis is adequately provided by reasons of fairness. 
98
ibid, para 2 of the commentary on art 39. 
99David J Bederman, ‘Contributory Fault and State Responsibility’ (1989-1990) 30 Va J Intl L 335, 
338-355. 
100
See Ciarán Burke, An Equitable Framework for Humanitarian Intervention (Bloomsbury 2013) 
315 noting that the clean hands principle also applies prospectively, meaning that one who seek’s 
equity’s assistance must be prepared to act in an equitable manner.  
101Ralph A Newman, ‘Equity in Comparative Law’ (1968) 17 Int'l & Comp L Q 807, 813-29. 
102
Irmgard Marboe, Calculation of Compensation and Damages in International Investment Law 
(OUP 2009) 145. 
166 
 
into investment treaty arbitration to date (both generally and at the remedies stage 
in particular) must be analysed. 
(d) The influence of equity in international investment law  
Investment treaty arbitration has not remained immune from the influence of equity 
and equitable principles. For example, the principle of good faith has assumed an 
important role in assessing the initiation of claims under IIAs. Thus, where the 
claimant investor failed to comply with the law in making its investment, 
investment treaty arbitration tribunals have generally either declined jurisdiction 
over the investor’s claims or, alternatively, have held that the investor’s claims 
were inadmissible.
103
 The requirement that only investments made in accordance 
with the law be protected under an investment treaty can either be an explicit 
requirement of the relevant IIA
104
 or it can be considered an implicit obligation 
based on general principles of law.
105
 Where the latter is the case, the principle of 
good faith has played a key role in both providing a basis for such obligation and in 
establishing its limits. Thus, in Plama Consortium Ltd v Bulgaria,
106
 the Energy 
Charter Treaty did not contain an express provision requiring the investment’s 
conformity to a given law and the tribunal based its determination that the 
investor’s claim was inadmissible on breach by the investor of the principle of good 
faith, an element of both Bulgarian and international law, and on the principle that a 
claimant should not be permitted to profit from his own wrongdoing (nemo auditur 
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propiam turpitudinem allegans).
107
 The influence of good faith can also be seen in 
the recognition of exceptions to the general principle that a claimant who has acted 
contrary to law will be denied treaty protection. Thus, it has been recognised that, 
where the violation of law committed by the investor arose due to an error made in 
good faith, the investor shall not be denied the benefits of treaty protection.
108
 
Similarly, where the host state government knowingly overlooked violations of its 
law by an investor, it has been accepted that the host state should be estopped from 
raising such violations as a barrier to jurisdiction/admissibility.
109
  
The good faith principle and the narrower, though related, concepts of abuse of 
rights or abuse of process have also been relied upon to deny a claimant investor 
treaty protection where, for example, a claimant has engaged in corporate 
restructuring purely in order to gain access to investment arbitration.
110
 Thus, in 
Phoenix Action Ltd v Czech Republic,
111
 the shares in two Czech companies had 
been transferred by a Czech national to an Israeli company owned by the wife of 
the Czech national in question essentially in order to elevate a domestic dispute to 
an international level. In finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the claimant’s 
request, the tribunal opined as follows: 
States cannot be deemed to offer access to the ICSID dispute settlement 
mechanism to investments not made in good faith. The protection of 
international investment arbitration cannot be granted if such protection 
would run contrary to the general principles of international law, among 
which the principle of good faith is of utmost importance.
112
 
While, in the examples mentioned above, the principle of good faith has been relied 
on in assessing investor conduct, this principle has also been used in assessing host 
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state conduct, particularly under the FET standard.
113
 These roles range from the 
absence of good faith being held to constitute one of the indicators of breach of the 
FET standard, to good faith being considered the basis for, or as informing the 
content of, more specific rules regarding respect for the investor’s legitimate 
expectations and lack of arbitrariness to good faith forming the basis of the FET 
obligation itself.
114
 Similarly, the application of proportionality analysis at the 
merits stage in order to balance public and private interests can be considered to be 
linked to equity, given that equity can be considered synonymous with a weighing 
up of what is right in all the circumstances.
115
 Thus, it is clear that equitable 
principles have had an influence at both the jurisdiction and merits stages of the 
arbitral process and have, at least in some cases, operated as a means of taking 
account of public interest considerations, either directly (through, for example, the 
application of proportionality analysis) or indirectly (through taking into account 
the conduct of the claimant investor).  
However, at the remedies stage of the investment treaty arbitration process, equity 
and equitable principles have arguably been afforded less prominence.
116
 Thus, 
only a handful of investment treaty arbitration tribunals have made even passing 
reference to ‘equitable considerations’ or ‘equitable principles’ in quantifying 
damages.
117
 Indeed, a review of 86 publicly available awards rendered between 
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1990 and 2014 indicates that only 4 of those awards contained some reference to 
equity or equitable principles in setting out the principles applicable to the 
quantification of damages or compensation.
118
 Furthermore, those passing 
references that have been made have not been linked to public interest 
considerations and many would appear to be intended as a form of justification for 
exercising the ‘normal’ discretion required to be exercised by arbitral tribunals in 
circumstances where the extent of the claimant’s loss was uncertain. For example, 
in AMT v Zaire the tribunal noted that, in choosing between different methods of 
assessment of damages, the method chosen should be ‘equitable in the 
circumstances of the present case’ and also noted that ‘for practical reasons founded 
on equitable principles’ Zaire was under a duty to compensate AMT for certain 
losses.
119
 Similarly, although the tribunal’s reasoning is not entirely clear, in 
Tecmed v Mexico, the context in which the reference to equity was made suggests 
that the tribunal was primarily concerned with remedying the claimant’s loss as the 
tribunal noted that it could consider equitable principles when determining the 
compensation owed to the claimant, without assuming the role of an arbitrator ex 
aequo et bono before concluding, in the same paragraph, that ‘any difficulty in 
determining the compensation does not prevent the assessment of such 
compensation where the existence of damage is certain’.120 Similarly, the partial 
defence of contributory fault has only been accepted in a relatively small number of 
cases, where either, in the case of host state regulatory action, the claimant investor 
should have anticipated the relevant regulatory risk or, alternatively, where the 
investor’s conduct was unreasonable and prompted the host state to act121 and the 
related plea of failure to mitigate loss has not yet been applied in the sphere of 
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investment treaty arbitration (albeit that there has been some indications of its 
acceptance in principle).
122
 
The reluctance on the part of tribunals to rely on equity or equitable principles in 
quantifying damages may be partly attributable to the fear that reference to equity 
could potentially render a tribunal’s award liable to challenge on the basis that the 
tribunal decided ex aequo et bono.
123
 It may also partly stem from a view that, since 
the full reparation principle is, in itself, of a very general and flexible nature, 
specific recourse to equity may not be necessary in order to achieve an ‘equitable’ 
result.
124
 However, it is submitted that the dynamism of equity can open the door to 
what has been referred to as ‘the enlightened exercise of remedial discretion’125 and 
can also reinforce the doctrinal basis for taking account of public interest 
considerations when applying the full reparation principle. The next section of this 
chapter will examine this proposition both generally and by reference to the specific 
examples identified in Chapter 4 of circumstances in which public interest 
considerations should be taken into account at the remedies stage. 
(e) Equity and the full reparation principle 
As the theoretical foundation of, or rationale underlying, reparations remains 
undeveloped in international law,
126
 the full reparation principle is of a very general 
nature and ‘does not offer a conceptual framework for the recovery of damages that 
would be comparable in specificity to the ‘value’ approach generally applicable in 
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expropriation cases.’127 The lack of a conceptual framework for applying the full 
reparation principle means that tribunals are afforded a considerable margin of 
discretion in quantifying damages
128
 and that causation principles operate as the 
primary means by which the quantum of damages payable in a particular case is 
delimited.
129
 However, as the law of state responsibility is largely silent on the 
nature of the causal link leading to reparation (merely requiring that the injury 
should be a consequence of the wrongful act),
130
 and as causation principles are 
themselves informed by equity,
131
 causation principles, in fact, afford tribunals the 
flexibility to take account of a broad range of factors in quantifying damages. 
Indeed, Gray goes so far as to opine that causation principles in international law 
constitute ‘a useful policy instrument for the exclusion of whatever damage the 
arbitrator does not wish to compensate’.132 
Similarly, although the partial defence of contributory fault and the related plea of 
failure to mitigate loss are influenced by notions of equity and fairness, they can be 
applied without necessarily referring to equity and can serve as means of taking 
account of public interest considerations. Admittedly, taking account of investor 
conduct through application of these doctrines does not directly take account of a 
host state’s right to regulate or the legitimate purposes behind such regulation. 
However, these doctrines do introduce a certain public interest dimension into the 
damages quantification process, given that investor conduct and host state 
regulatory sovereignty may be linked (such as where the regulatory measures 
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introduced by the host state were introduced in response to investor conduct)
133
 and 
given that the host state and its citizens have a legitimate interest in ensuring that 
negligent investors are not compensated for damage caused by their own acts or 
omissions.
134
 As both doctrines are dependent on the relevant tribunal’s 
appreciation of the causal factors that underpin liability,
135
 investment treaty 
arbitration tribunals are, in practice, afforded significant discretion in applying 
these doctrines.
136
 Thus, as noted by the ad hoc Annulment Committee in MTD 
Equity v Chile, ‘[a]s is often the case with situations of comparative fault, the role 
of the two parties contributing to the loss was very different and only with difficulty 
commensurable, and the Tribunal had a corresponding margin of estimation.’137  
Therefore, as public interest considerations may already be taken into account at the 
remedies stage to a certain degree through the application of causation principles,
138
 
through the ‘normal’ discretion afforded to tribunals in quantifying damages and, in 
certain cases, through application of contributory fault or of the plea of failure to 
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mitigate loss, the question arises as to whether the concept of equity adds anything 
to tribunals’ ‘toolbox’ in terms of reinforcing the doctrinal basis for the taking into 
account of public interest considerations.
139
   
In this regard, it is worth recalling that equity in international law is regarded as 
having a corrective or supplementary function in that it can be used as a means of 
ensuring that justice is achieved having regard to all of the circumstances of a 
particular case or as a means of filling gaps in the law without derogating from, or 
undermining the law itself. Thus, given the dearth of guidance otherwise afforded 
to tribunals by customary international law as to how the full reparation principle 
should be implemented (and in particular regarding the application of causation 
principles),
140
 it is submitted that equity and equitable principles can be used to 
guide tribunals in exercising their discretion in quantifying damages and in 
applying causation principles and can, at least in some cases, reinforce the doctrinal 
basis for taking account of public interest considerations. 
To give an example, while, as described above, serious misconduct on the part of 
the claimant investor may be addressed at the jurisdiction or merits stages of 
arbitral proceedings by reference to the principle of good faith, circumstances may 
also arise where misconduct on the part of the investor may more appropriately be 
addressed at the remedies stage.
141
 Examples of such circumstances include, first, 
where the claimant investor’s conduct constituted an underlying reason for 
implementation of the host state measure (albeit not constituting a complete 
justification as in such circumstances the case should be disposed of at the 
jurisdiction or merits stage),
142
 secondly, where human rights violations were 
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committed by an investor in the context of another investment project in the country 
that is unrelated to the investment about which the investor has commenced 
arbitration proceedings and, thirdly, where human rights violations committed by 
the investor did not fall within the scope of the dispute resolution clause in the 
relevant IIA.
143
 Even given the inherent flexibility of causation principles, a causal 
connection between the investor misconduct and the loss ultimately suffered by the 
investor as a result of the host state’s action may well be difficult to establish in 
such circumstances. However, given that one of the basic principles of equity is that 
the conduct of disputants may affect their rights and obligations in the context of a 
dispute (and that this principle has, as described above, been put into effect at both 
the jurisdiction and merits stage of the arbitral process), it is submitted that equity 
can strengthen the doctrinal basis for consideration of investor behaviour at the 
remedies stage, either as a supplement to, or in certain cases in substitution for, the 
doctrines of contributory fault and failure to mitigate loss. 
Turning to the specific examples identified in Chapter 4 of circumstances in which 
public interest considerations should be taken into account at the remedies stage, 
while it may not be possible in all cases to point to a particular equitable principle 
to inform the approach taken by tribunals in examining such issues, it is submitted 
that equity nonetheless has a role to play in conditioning the exercise of arbitral 
discretion to allow for recognition of the sovereignty implications underlying a 
particular dispute.
144
 Thus, where a direct treaty conflict occurs or where the 
impugned host state measures were introduced in furtherance of the fundamental 
rights provisions contained in the host state’s highest law, two interrelated issues 
fall to be addressed: first, the question of whether the claimant investor should have 
conducted due diligence in respect of and, accordingly, anticipated and possibly 
mitigated its exposure to, the risk of such a conflict arising
145
 and, secondly, 
whether, in order to achieve an optimal balance between investment protection and 
host state regulatory sovereignty, it is otherwise desirable that public interest 
considerations be taken into account in quantifying the damages payable for the IIA 
breach. It is submitted that, while these issues can arguably be taken into account 
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within the parameters of the valuation methods customarily applied in quantifying 
damages (such as through adjustment of the discount rate used in applying the DCF 
method), as it is not possible to precisely identify, estimate and track a host state’s 
other non-investment related treaty obligations (especially as they relate to, or will 
affect, the investment in question),
146
 in reality this amounts to an equitable 
adjustment of the damages award.
147
 In this regard, Desierto, in discussing the 
effect that a host state’s simultaneous observance of the ICESCR minimum core 
obligation during an economic emergency should have on the damages payable in 
respect of non-expropriatory breaches of IIAs, acknowledges the role of equity in 
quantifying such damages
148
 and observes as follows:  
it would be contrary to the public function and just purposes of reparations to 
require ‘expectancy interest’ compensation levels that beggar, punish, and 
extort from host States pursuing social protection measures under the 
ICESCR in good faith.
149
 
Desierto bases this conclusion at least partially on the premise that, under the law of 
state responsibility, tribunals are tasked with reaching an equitable outcome in 
applying the full reparation principle and that the International Law Commission 
has emphasised the importance of proportionality to the law of reparations.
150
 Thus, 
it is submitted that equity’s corrective function within international law provides 
support for the taking into account of a host state’s good faith efforts to comply 
with its non-investment related obligations in quantifying the damages payable for 
an IIA breach.  
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Turning next to a situation in which the defence of necessity is successfully 
invoked, as was mentioned in Chapter 4, Article 27 of the Draft ILC Articles does 
not attempt to specify in what circumstances (or to what extent) compensation 
should be payable where the defence is successfully invoked,
151
 albeit that it is 
made clear that Article 27 is not concerned with compensation within the 
framework of full reparation for wrongful conduct. Given the lack of guidance 
provided as to how the compensation payable should be delimited therefore, it is 
submitted that, as is the case in respect of compensation payable for non-material 
injury, equity is well suited to the task of reconciling the two competing 
imperatives which arise in such circumstances (namely the need to recognise that 
the host state acted to protect essential interests in a situation of turmoil and the 
simultaneous need to recognise that IIAs exist to protect foreign investors in such 
difficult situations) in order to arrive at an appropriate award of damages.
152
  
Finally, in cases of procedural breach (and, in particular, in cases where the 
claimant investor’s legitimate expectations have been frustrated), a ‘sliding scale’ 
approach that would consider, in quantifying the damages payable, the loss suffered 
by the claimant investor, the nature and intensity of the procedural breach and the 
public purpose being pursued (including the likelihood that the substantive outcome 
would have been the same in the absence of the breach) was proposed in Chapter 4. 
While it is clear that the loss suffered by the claimant investor is central to the 
quantification of damages, whether the other enumerated factors may permissibly 
be considered as part of the damages quantification process is less obvious. Turning 
first to the question of whether the nature and intensity of the procedural breach and 
the public purpose being pursued by the host state may permissibly be considered in 
quantifying damages, while, under the law of state responsibility, the obligation to 
make reparation is defined principally by reference to the injury arising from 
wrongful conduct rather than by reference to the content of the particular primary 
rule at issue, it has nonetheless been recognised that primary rules have a subsidiary 
role to play in the assessment of reparation and that secondary rules cannot be 
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detached from, or be considered to operate autonomously of, primary rules.
153
 
Accordingly, it is submitted that the nature and intensity of a particular breach and 
the public purpose being pursued by the host state may (and arguably must)
154
 be 
considered within the parameters of the ‘normal’ discretion afforded to investment 
treaty arbitration tribunals in quantifying damages, as supplemented by the role of 
equity, and that the latter would facilitate an overall examination of the context in 
which the breach of the primary rule occurred. In particular, in the case of a breach 
of legitimate expectations, equity would facilitate consideration of the purpose 
underlying the host state’s actions as well as of the nature of the expectation 
protected (e.g. whether, on one end of the spectrum, it arose from a formal decision 
made by a public authority about a person or a limited group or whether, on the 
other, it arose from a general representation that the public authority subsequently 
departed from in light of a shift in general procedure or policy).
155
  
Turning finally to the question of whether the likelihood that the substantive 
outcome would have been the same in the absence of the breach may be considered 
in quantifying the damages payable to a claimant investor, consideration of this 
issue as one factor amongst others in quantifying the damages payable constitutes 
quite a different proposition to applying the plea of ‘hypothetical alternative lawful 
conduct’156 which would require the hypothetical alternative course that the host 
state could have lawfully taken (i.e. had it pursued the same policy and complied 
with the applicable, procedural and/or substantive rules) to be plotted and the 
investor to be restored to the position it would have been in had the host state taken 
that course.
157
 Given that the latter plea would effectively nullify the purpose of 
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procedural guarantees, it has not been accepted in international law generally
158
 nor 
was it accepted by the tribunal in Amco v Indonesia (II), a case involving, inter alia, 
the revocation of the claimant investor’s investment licence by Indonesia (which 
Indonesia argued was justified on the basis that the claimant investor had violated 
domestic and applicable international law). In that case, the tribunal noted as 
follows: 
To argue, as did Indonesia, that although there had been procedural 
irregularities, a ‘fair BKPM’ [the governmental body acting on behalf of 
Indonesia] would still have revoked the licence, because of Amco’s own 
shortcomings, is to misaddress causality. The Tribunal cannot pronounce on 
what a ‘fair BKPM’ would have done. This is both speculative, and not the 
issue before it. Rather, it is required to characterise the acts that BKPM did 
engage in and to see if those acts, if unlawful, caused damage to Amco.
159
 
While, at first glance, this pronouncement would appear to preclude any 
consideration of the question of whether the investor would have suffered 
substantial damages had the host state acted lawfully, the malleable nature of 
causation principles and the need to ensure that the claimant investor is not put in a 
better financial position than it would be in without the damaging event allow for 
consideration of this factor. Furthermore, it is submitted that equity could guide the 
tribunal in its application of causation principles and in its consideration of the 
context in which the procedural breach occurred as well as the position of both 
parties. 
Therefore, it is submitted that equity, when combined with the application of 
customary valuation methods and of causation principles, affords sufficient 
flexibility to tribunals to take account of public interest considerations in a manner 
which allows for the introduction of a degree of reciprocity into the process and 
which takes account of the specific situations in which, it was argued, public 
interest considerations should be taken into account at the remedies stage. 
Furthermore, it is submitted that recourse to equity can, at least in some cases, 
reinforce the doctrinal basis for taking account of public interest considerations at 
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the remedies stage. Overall however, the role of equity at the remedies stage should 
adhere quite closely to the law (albeit that the law is itself flexible).
160
  
Thus, given that equity can play a role in the damages quantification process 
without the need for an explicit reference to equity or equitable principles in the 
relevant IIA, a more open attitude to the application of equity may be all that is 
required in order to take account of public interest considerations at the remedies 
stage. Although it is arguable that tribunals may take account of equitable principles 
implicitly in exercising their ‘normal’ discretion,161 it is submitted that, in order to 
enhance the legitimacy and transparency of the exercise, tribunals should explicitly 
acknowledge their reliance on equitable principles so that justice can not only be 
done but can also be seen to be done.
162
 However, as noted above, tribunals may be 
reluctant to acknowledge the influence of equity as reference to equity could 
potentially render a tribunal’s award liable to post-award challenge and it is 
therefore arguable that a stronger doctrinal basis is required to either support 
tribunals’ reliance on equity and/or to allow for public interest considerations to be 
taken into account at the remedies stage. Accordingly, the next section of this 
chapter will consider the merits and demerits of several proposals in relation to the 
inclusion of language relating to remedies in new or renegotiated IIAs. However, 
before doing so, the question of whether the recognition of public interest 
considerations is possible in quantifying the compensation payable in respect of 
lawful expropriations must be considered separately, given that the nature and 
structure of the expropriation enquiry and the applicable standard of compensation 
differs from that applicable in respect of unlawful breaches. 
(f)  The ‘special case’ of lawful expropriations  
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While the full reparation principle, as a subjective valuation approach, is inherently 
flexible and so allows for public interest considerations to be accommodated, the 
fair market value standard, which has emerged as the dominant criterion under IIAs 
for the quantification of compensation in respect of lawful expropriations, is 
considerably less flexible. This is the case as the fair market value standard of 
compensation is objective or impersonal in nature in that it discounts those 
elements of value that are personal to a given owner of property and instead bases 
the value on the price which a hypothetical buyer would have paid for the property. 
This has lead tribunals and commentators to the conclusion that there is little room 
for public interest considerations to be taken into account, or for equity to be 
introduced, in applying the standard.
163
 Admittedly, like the application of the full 
reparation principle, application of the fair market value standard involves a 
significant element of discretionary choice, particularly given that fair market value 
in most international investment cases must be constructed inferentially from a 
variety of evidence.
164
 The question therefore is whether the exercise of this 
‘normal’ discretion by investment treaty arbitration tribunals is sufficient to take 
account of public interest considerations in quantifying the compensation payable 
in respect of lawful expropriations. It is submitted that this is not the case as, 
although, in constructing the value of an expropriated asset, the social and 
economic circumstances of the host state are taken into account in determining the 
price which a hypothetical third party would pay for the particular asset, this does 
not
 
encompass the regulatory function that the host state is performing.  
Accordingly, in order to take account of public interest considerations at the 
remedies stage in respect of lawful expropriations, deviation from the fair market 
value standard is required and this would need to be provided for in the text of new 
or renegotiated IIAs. The next section will describe some general factors to be 
considered by IIA negotiators and drafters in providing for the taking into account 
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of public interest considerations at the remedies stage and will also analyse some 
specific alternative options for quantifying both the damages payable for unlawful 
acts and the compensation payable for lawful expropriations. 
5.2 New or renegotiated IIAs 
 
UNCTAD’s 2013 World Investment Report notes that, since BIT-making activity 
peaked in the 1990s and has bottomed out since then, the IIA regime is now at a 
juncture that, due to the imminent expiry of many BITs, there exists ‘a window of 
opportunity to effect systemic improvement’.165 However, while it may therefore be 
the optimum time at which to consider the inclusion of language in the text of new 
or renegotiated IIAs which explicitly authorises tribunals to take account of public 
interest considerations in formulating remedies, a number of factors should be 
considered by treaty negotiators and drafters before doing so. First, while inclusion 
of such language could arguably provide investment treaty arbitration tribunals with 
a more concrete basis for introducing public interest considerations at the remedies 
stage in quantifying the damages payable in respect of unlawful acts,
166
 on the other 
hand, enshrining definitive provisions within IIAs could have the unintended effect 
of reducing the discretion or flexibility afforded to tribunals in quantifying 
damages, which could, in fact, result in tribunals being constrained in terms of their 
ability to take account of such considerations.  Conversely, in evaluating the type of 
language that may be appropriate, care should be taken to ensure that the proposed 
language is not too amorphous to provide sufficient guidance to arbitrators. It is 
submitted that this is an important factor to be considered in circumstances where 
the IIA provision in question is intended to displace the conceptually (if not 
actually) straightforward full reparation principle or the objective fair market value 
standard.  
(a) Alternatives to the full reparation principle 
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Turning first to possible alternatives to the application of the full reparation 
principle, one potential option would be to specify that, while full reparation is 
presumptively required in respect of unlawful breaches, derogation from that 
principle is permissible where significant countervailing public interest 
considerations are present. These considerations could be listed or could be left to 
the discretion of the tribunal and whether the burden of proof in terms of rebutting 
the presumption of full reparation is placed on the host state
167
 or whether the 
tribunal can of its own motion consider facts that could rebut the presumption 
should also be specified.
168
 Examples of considerations which could be listed 
include the purpose underlying the host state action, the nature of the breach and of 
the interest protected, whether the measure was taken in pursuance of the host 
state’s duty to comply with non-investment related treaty obligations and the 
intention of the host state in implementing the measure. On the one hand, such a 
provision would provide tribunals with a baseline from which to work in the form 
of the full reparation principle. However, on the other hand, presumptively 
requiring that full reparation be accorded to the claimant investor arguably 
constitutes a more prescriptive approach than that required under the customary 
international law of state responsibility and, therefore, it could constrain tribunals in 
taking account of public interest considerations, particularly if the burden of proof 
in terms of rebutting the presumption of full reparation is placed on the host state. 
Furthermore, where public interest considerations are expressed as matters to be 
taken into account separately to the application of the full reparation principle, there 
is potentially a risk that the full reparation principle may be applied by tribunals 
without regard to the taking into account of such considerations within the 
parameters of that principle. Therefore, it is submitted that, while such a provision 
appears promising, it could, in fact, constrain tribunals in their ability to take 
account of public interest considerations. 
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Turning to a less prescriptive formulation, UNCTAD’s Investment Policy 
Framework for Sustainable Development (IPFSD) suggests a drafting option which 
provides that the amount of damages should be ‘equitable in light of the 
circumstances of the case’.169 IPFSD then goes onto suggest that specific rules on 
damages for treaty breach could potentially be delineated such as excluding 
recoverability of punitive and/or moral damages, limiting the recoverability of lost 
profits (up to the date of the award) and ensuring that the amount of damages 
payable is commensurate with the country’s level of development,170 albeit that the 
connection between damages being ‘equitable’ and these specific rules (if a 
connection was indeed intended) is somewhat unclear. Such a formulation could be 
said to accord with the dictum in the commentaries on the Draft ILC Articles that 
an ‘equitable and acceptable outcome’ should be reached in applying the full 
reparation principle. However, the IPFSD provision in fact goes further than that 
dictum as it does not in any way connect the notion of an award being ‘equitable’ to 
the full reparation principle. While some commentators have criticised the 
application of the full reparation principle in the sphere of investment treaty 
arbitration,
171
 as was argued in Chapter 4, the dispute settlement provisions 
contained in IIAs together with their overall structure encourage application of the 
bilateral notion of corrective justice. In that context, it is submitted that a provision 
which facilitates a complete disaggregation of the amount of damages payable from 
the claimant’s loss (by, for example, requiring that the damages payable be 
equitable in light of the circumstances of the case) is not consonant with the nature 
and functions of the investment treaty arbitration system. Potentially a provision 
that refers to the desirability of reaching an equitable outcome in conjunction with 
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the application of full reparation principle offers more promise. While such a 
provision may not necessarily confer any additional powers on tribunals in terms of 
their ability to consider public interest considerations, it could be of assistance in 
encouraging arbitrators (and host states) to have greater regard to the role of equity 
in the formulation of remedies. 
A third possible provision that could be included in new or renegotiated IIAs could, 
as suggested by Kulick, require the tribunal to first determine the quantum of 
damages payable to the investor exclusively by considering the effect on the 
investment of the host state’s infringement and, in a second step, to consider 
whether the amount of damages payable should be limited according to the 
outcome of a proportionality stricto sensu assessment (i.e. whether a lower quantum 
of damages is necessary, suitable and the least restrictive measure to address the 
public interest considerations underlying the host state measure).
172
 In making this 
assessment, Kulick suggests a number of (over-lapping) factors which can guide 
arbitrators, including the gravity of the infringement by the host state, the legitimate 
expectations of the investor, the importance of the public purpose underlying the 
impugned measure and the seriousness of the host state in pursuing that public 
purpose in light of the evidence as well as the importance of the investor right both 
in abstracto and in concreto.
173
 However, it is submitted that such a provision, in 
focussing solely on the claimant’s loss in the first step of the analysis, may 
constitute a more prescriptive approach than that required under the customary 
international law of state responsibility and, particularly given that the application 
of proportionality stricto sensu in the sphere of investment treaty arbitration is 
difficult, would seem, in the second step, to allow for adjustment of the damages 
payable only in very limited circumstances.  
Finally, rather than attempting to allow for public interest considerations to be 
reflected at the remedies stage generally, more limited provisions could potentially 
be included in new or renegotiated IIAs to deal with specific situations in which it 
may be desirable to recognise public interest considerations at the remedies stage 
(such as where the defence of necessity has been successfully invoked or where a 
fundamental change in the circumstances prevailing in the host state has occurred). 
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Thus, one could specify that, where the defence of necessity or another 
‘circumstance precluding wrongfulness’ (such as the defences of force majeure or 
distress) has been accepted as applicable, this should lead to a downward 
adjustment of the damages payable, or alternatively, that the amount expended by 
the investor should constitute the upward limit on the amount to be awarded.
174
 
While this approach broadly aligns with current international law, arguably the 
latter provision would constitute a more prescriptive approach than that set out in 
Article 27 of the Draft ILC Articles and, thus, could constrain tribunals in their 
consideration of all of the circumstances surrounding the host state breach.   
Similarly, given that a conflict between the host state’s right, or duty, to regulate 
and its IIA obligations may be considered more likely to occur in a crisis situation 
or where a fundamental change in the circumstances prevailing in the host state has 
occurred, a new or renegotiated IIA could provide that, where the IIA breach in 
question occurred in the context of a fundamental change of circumstances, either 
suspension of the host state’s obligations under the IIA or, alternatively, derogation 
from the full reparation principle is permissible.
175
 This would accord with the 
rationale underlying the defence of fundamental change of circumstances or rebus 
sic stantibus which is derived from notions of equity and justice and is recognised 
under the domestic law of many countries and in customary international law as 
confirmed by Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (and, in 
particular, Article 62(3) which provides that fundamental change of circumstances 
can be invoked not only as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty 
but also as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty).
176
 Such a provision 
could be of assistance in addressing, for example, a situation of direct treaty conflict 
or a conflict between IIA provisions and the fundamental rights provisions 
contained in the host state’s highest law in time of crisis. This is particularly 
important given that the lack of flexibility that has been displayed by investment 
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arbitrators in interpreting long-term contracts and IIAs when dealing with 
fundamental changes in circumstances has been identified as a key factor 
underlying the backlash against investment treaty arbitration.
177
 On the other hand 
however, since the socio-economic situation of the host state may largely be 
reflected within the parameters of customary valuation methods (as supplemented 
by equity) and since the customary international law defence of fundamental 
change of circumstances already permits suspension of treaty obligations (albeit 
that such defence has not been prominent in investment treaty arbitration),
178
 it is 
arguable that such provision is not necessarily required. Indeed, as such a provision 
would not address the range of circumstances in which taking account of public 
interest considerations may be appropriate, it could potentially constrain tribunals in 
taking account of public interest considerations, particularly in the absence of 
clarification that the provision does not purport to limit the ability of tribunals to 
take account of matters of public interest in less extreme circumstances.  
In conclusion, while, at first blush, it might seem that the inclusion of language 
relating to remedies in new or renegotiated IIAs would add certainty and ensure that 
public interest considerations are taken into account in the formulation of remedies, 
this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, care must be taken to ensure that the 
wording does not inadvertently constrain arbitrators’ ability to take account of such 
considerations. Furthermore, in evaluating possible provisions, it is submitted that 
the full reparation principle should form the basis for assessing damages and that a 
complete disaggregation of the amount of damages payable from the claimant’s loss 
does not accord with the nature and functions of the investment treaty arbitration 
system. Overall therefore, while inclusion of certain language in new or 
renegotiated IIAs (such as a provision that refers to the desirability of reaching an 
equitable outcome in applying the full reparation principle) could potentially 
encourage arbitrators to utilise their existing ability to take into account public 
interest considerations through the thoughtful application of customary valuation 
methods and through the application of equitable principles, it is difficult to 
conceive of provisions that go further than that without becoming overly 
prescriptive. Therefore, treaty negotiators should, it is submitted, be cautious in 
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deviating from the current approach whereby IIAs generally do not specify the 
approach to be taken to remedying unlawful breaches. 
(b) Alternatives to the fair market value standard 
In considering alternatives to the fair market value standard, many of the same 
considerations apply as when considering alternatives to the full reparation 
principle, albeit that the need to consider alternatives to the fair market value 
standard is greater, given that public interest considerations cannot currently be 
taken into account within the parameters of that standard. Such considerations 
include the need to ensure that sufficient guidance is provided to arbitrators and, 
conversely, the need to ensure that such provisions are flexible enough to allow for 
public interest considerations to be taken into account where the circumstances so 
require. The question therefore is the extent to which deviation from the market 
value paradigm should occur.
179
 
In this regard, it has been suggested that deviation from the fair market value 
standard should be permitted in cases of non-discriminatory large-scale social or 
economic reform programmes as such large-scale takings ultimately relate to a 
state’s right to determine its own political and economic system (which is a right 
recognised by public international law). Therefore, it is argued that takings of that 
nature can be considered a separate phenomenon to individual expropriations
180
 and 
that if prompt and adequate compensation is required in such cases, this would 
render implementation of any major economic or social programme impossible 
since ‘few states can produce the capital value of a large proportion of their 
economies promptly’.181 This proposal finds some support in the World Bank 
Guidelines on the Legal Treatment of Foreign Investment
182
 and in the case law of 
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the Iran-US Claims Tribunal
183
 and of the European Court of Human Rights. In 
particular, the European Court of Human Rights has granted compensation at an 
amount less than the fair market value of the property immediately prior to the 
taking where non-discriminatory, large-scale social reforms entailing large-scale 
interference with private property rights have occurred.
184
 For example, in James v 
United Kingdom,
185
 which concerned a challenge to the acquisition of tenants of the 
freeholds of property for below market value under the Leasehold Reform Act 
1967, the United Kingdom argued that the tenants should not be required to pay for 
the building, because the typical long lease required the tenant to maintain the 
property and, over the period of a long lease, the cost of maintenance would equal 
or exceed the cost of constructing from new. Hence, it was claimed that the owner 
had no moral claim to be compensated and that the legislation was introduced in 
order to secure greater social justice. The European Court of Human Rights 
accepted this argument and, in relation to the availability and amount of 
compensation, recognised that, where measures are introduced for legitimate public 
interest objectives including measures of economic reform and measures designed 
to enhance social justice, reimbursement of less than full market value may be 
justified.
186
 
This approach has the advantage of not significantly deviating from the fair market 
value standard, which brings with it the advantage of certainty (at least 
conceptually). However, this exception is very specific in nature and would be 
capable of being invoked only in rare circumstances. For example, one might 
believe that the Argentine gas and water concession cases would constitute perfect 
candidates for such an approach. However, while the takings which took place in 
those cases occurred against a background of severe economic and political 
instability (where unemployment had reached almost 25 per cent, one quarter of the 
population could not afford the minimum amount of food required to ensure their 
subsistence and per capita spending on social services had been reduced by 74 per 
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cent),
187
 they still amounted to takings of specific investments as opposed to 
forming part of a scheme for large-scale social reform. Given the narrow 
parameters of this exception therefore, it is unlikely that it would be effective in 
allowing for public interest considerations to be taken into account.  
A potentially more broad-ranging exception would be to specify that the fair market 
value valuation standard continues to be the primary or default standard for lawful 
expropriations but that the awarding of compensation of less than fair market value 
is not precluded where such is necessary to maintain a fair balance between the 
public interest and the protection of the investor’s rights or to take account of all 
relevant circumstances including the purpose of the expropriation.  As an example 
of this general approach, the SADC Model BIT suggests the following as a 
potential drafting option: 
Fair and adequate compensation shall normally be assessed in relation to the 
fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the 
expropriation took place (“date of expropriation”) and shall not reflect any 
change in value occurring because the intended expropriation had become 
known earlier. However, where appropriate, the assessment of fair and 
adequate compensation shall be based on an equitable balance between the 
public interest and interest of those affected, having regard for all relevant 
circumstances and taking account of: the current and past use of the property, 
the history of its acquisition, the fair market value of the investment, the 
purpose of the expropriation, the extent of previous profit made by the foreign 
investor through the investment, and the duration of the investment.
188 
This approach has the advantage of being based on the relative certainty of the fair 
market value standard while allowing the flexibility of deviating from that standard 
where the circumstances so require.  
Finally, on the other end of the spectrum to the narrow exception which would 
permit deviation from the fair market value standard only in cases of non-
discriminatory large-scale social or economic reform are provisions that potentially 
allow for the compensation payable in respect of lawful expropriations to be 
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disaggregated completely from the market value of the expropriated asset. Such 
provisions include those that require the compensation payable to be ‘fair and 
adequate’ or ‘appropriate, just or equitable’ without providing any further guidance 
as to how this should be assessed.
189
 While reference to concepts such as fairness, 
justice and equity would seem, on the one hand, to give free rein to arbitrators to 
take account of public interest considerations in quantifying the compensation 
payable, it is submitted that such an approach, by failing to provide sufficient 
guidance to arbitrators, could equally lead to tribunals awarding compensation 
equating to the fair market value of the expropriated property. Indeed, the dangers 
of using amorphous standards already manifested itself during the NIEO debates in 
which the term ‘appropriate compensation’ as the standard of compensation 
applicable in respect of lawful expropriations received support from developing 
countries as the standard of compensation applicable in respect of lawful 
expropriations, the implication being that the compensation awarded would take 
into account the state of development of the country in question, but was 
simultaneously held out by capital-exporting nations as requiring the payment of 
full compensation to investors.
190
   
Somewhat similarly, it has been suggested that an ‘enrichment’ standard could be 
included in the text of new or renegotiated IIAs which would rank equally with the 
fair market value standard for the purposes of determining compensation in 
investment treaty disputes.
191
 The application of such a standard would be based on 
the equitable principle of unjust enrichment and would focus on what the host state 
has gained from the expropriation rather than on the loss suffered by the affected 
investor. However, as with provisions requiring ‘fair and adequate’ or ‘appropriate, 
just and equitable’ compensation to be awarded where a lawful expropriation has 
occurred, the lack of certainty as to the scope of the unjust enrichment principle in 
international law could lead (and, in fact, has led) to the principle being cited as 
justification for awarding full compensation to the claimant investor.
192
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Furthermore, since it is difficult (if not impossible) to place a monetary value on the 
‘gain’ made by the host state as a result of regulatory actions, in particular in the 
case of measures introduced to effect large-scale public goods such as measures 
introduced for environmental or health-related purposes,
193
 it is likely that the 
alternative of the fair market value standard would be applied in such cases. Thus, 
while the amount of unjust enrichment can be (and has been) taken into account as 
an equitable factor when applying both the fair market value standard and the full 
reparation principle and while the extent to which the host state was unjustly 
enriched can be relied on as evidence where there are difficulties in estimating the 
claimant’s loss,194 it is submitted that inclusion of a separate ‘enrichment’ standard 
would not necessarily have the desired result of reducing the compensation payable 
to claimant investors where a lawful expropriation has occurred, particularly where 
that expropriation was indirect in nature.  
Overall therefore, it is submitted that IIA negotiators and drafters should be 
cautious in completely disaggregating the compensation payable for lawful 
expropriations from the market value paradigm in order to take account of public 
interest considerations as disaggregation may not necessarily have such an effect 
and, moreover, would result in the loss of the certainty-related benefits associated 
with the fair market value standard. Instead, it is submitted that provisions that 
allow for deviation from the fair market value standard in exceptional 
circumstances are more likely to address the competing imperatives of conceptual 
certainty and affording sufficient flexibility to allow for public interest 
considerations to be recognised. 
Having analysed in this section some possible provisions that could be included in 
new or renegotiated IIAs to address public interest considerations at the remedies 
stage, the next, and final, section of this chapter will consider how it is envisaged 
that an approach which allows for public interest considerations to be taken into 
account at the remedies stage (whether facilitated by equity or through the inclusion 
of appropriate language in the relevant IIA) would inter-relate with provisions that 
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may potentially be included in new or renegotiated IIAs and that broadly aim at 
introducing a balancing of investor and host state interests into the investment 
treaty arbitration process, particularly at the merits stage. 
5.3 Relationship between the remedies stage and reforms affecting earlier 
stages of the arbitration process  
 
Since the taking into account of public interest considerations at the remedies stage 
is primarily aimed at taking account of public interest considerations that have not 
been taken into account either at all or sufficiently at the earlier stages of the 
arbitral process, this naturally gives rise to the question of how it is envisaged that 
the taking into account of public interest considerations at the remedies stage would 
relate to other public interest/sustainable development-related reforms that 
primarily affect the earlier stages of the arbitral process.
195
 Examples of such 
reforms will be drawn from drafting options proposed in IPFSD,
196
 in the IISD 
Model Agreement on Investment
197
 and in the SADC Model BIT,
198
 which 
collectively constitute the most prominent examples of model treaty templates 
which seek to promote foreign investment for sustainable development, which 
encompasses, amongst other things, recognition of public interest considerations in 
investment treaty arbitration.
199
 
In this regard, a distinction can be drawn between, on the one hand, reforms that 
would complement a balancing of interests at the remedies stage while not 
substantially affecting its sphere of operation and, on the other, reforms which 
would seem to reduce the need for such balancing.  
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As an example of the former, reforms affecting the jurisdiction stage of the arbitral 
process such as the introduction of narrower definitions of ‘investment’, the 
removal of certain types of investment from the scope of protection of IIAs or the 
introduction of differentiation between different types of investment in terms of the 
extent of protection conferred,
200
 while potentially beneficial from a public 
interest/sustainable development perspective, do not directly go to the question of 
how investor and public interests can be, or should be, balanced.
201
 Similarly, the 
inclusion of non-investment related policy objectives in the preambles of new or 
renegotiated IIAs
202
 would accord with the rationale underlying the balancing of 
interests at the remedies stage, as it would emphasise that the promotion of 
development (rather than the promotion of the rights of investors as such) 
constitutes the ultimate purpose of IIAs. While such preambular statements could 
potentially influence the approach taken by tribunals at the merits stage as 
preambular statements form part of the context of the treaty for the purposes of 
interpretation,
203
 such statements would not obviate the need for a balancing of 
interests at the remedies stage.  
On the other hand, reforms which either directly clarify or adjust the scope of the 
existing substantive rights granted to investors under IIAs or which directly affect 
the interpretation of such rights or, similarly, those reforms which introduce new 
carve-outs for measures taken in pursuit of legitimate social or economic policy 
objectives have greater potential to reduce the need for a balancing of interests at 
the remedies stage or to interfere with its sphere of operation. Examples of 
provisions which fall into this category include Article 5 of the IISD Model 
Agreement on Investment which stipulates that clarification should be inserted to 
ensure that the concept of ‘in like circumstances’ used in the context of non-
discrimination standards requires an overall examination of the circumstances of 
the case, including its effects on third persons and the legal community and the aim 
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of the impugned measure
204
 and Article 7 of the IISD Model Agreement on 
Investment which stipulates that the concepts of fair and equitable treatment and 
full protection and security are included within the customary international law 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens and do not create additional substantive 
rights.
205
 Examples of ‘carve-out’ type provisions include a provision stipulating 
that non-discriminatory measures taken by a host state to comply with its 
international obligations under other treaties would not constitute a breach of the 
IIA
206
 and provisions which create a general exception for non-discriminatory 
measures taken in good faith and designed and applied to achieve certain public 
purposes such as measures taken to protect human, animal or plant life, public 
health, the environment or national security.
207
  Similarly, each of IPFSD, the IISD 
Model Agreement on Investment and SADC Model BIT suggest that, to avoid the 
expropriation clause imposing undue constraints on a state’s ability to regulate, 
criteria could be included in future or renegotiated IIAs to distinguish (to the extent 
possible) between, on the one hand, indirect expropriations and, on the other hand, 
legitimate regulation that does not require compensation.
208
 Such criteria could, for 
example, include a provision that specifies that bona fide, non-discriminatory 
regulatory measures that are designed and applied to protect or enhance legitimate 
public welfare objectives do not constitute indirect expropriations.
209
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Turning first to reforms which adjust or clarify existing substantive investor rights, 
such provisions, while indicating, by their tenor, that investor rights should not 
unquestioningly be accorded a broad scope, fundamentally do not make redundant 
the role of investment treaty arbitration tribunals in balancing investor and public 
interests. For example, Article 7 of the IISD Model Agreement on Investment does 
little to clarify the boundary between permissible and impermissible host state 
conduct given that the international minimum standard of treatment of aliens is as 
indeterminate as the FET standard itself
210
 and given that the international 
minimum standard evolves over time.
211
 In the same way, the clarification to the ‘in 
like circumstances’ concept proposed by Article 5 of the IISD Model Agreement on 
Investment leaves open the question of the extent to which the enumerated factors 
should be considered. Therefore, in interpreting such provisions, it would still fall 
to the tribunal in question to balance investor and host state interests and to 
determine the standard of review to be applied in respect of host state conduct.
212
 
Furthermore, it is open to question whether the introduction of ‘general exceptions’ 
clauses would necessarily afford host states greater freedom to regulate.
213
 In 
particular, a problem arises in relation to applying general exceptions to minimum 
standards of treatment as, if a measure meets the requirements of a general 
exception provision (e.g. that it is necessary to meet one of the enumerated 
exceptions, that it was applied in a manner which would not constitute arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination and that it does not constitute a disguised restriction on 
international investment),
214
 it is difficult to envisage a situation in which it would 
have violated minimum standards of treatment in the first place.
215
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Similarly, in accordance with the customary international law doctrine of ‘police 
powers’, it is arguably already the case that non-discriminatory regulatory measures 
that are designed and applied to protect or enhance legitimate public welfare 
objectives should not be considered to be expropriatory in nature. Thus, the 
inclusion of clarificatory language in new or renegotiated IIAs may not necessarily 
radically change the approach taken by tribunals in distinguishing between indirect 
expropriations and legitimate regulation and investment treaty arbitration tribunals 
would still be required to balance host state and investor interests.  
Finally, even assuming that the introduction of such reforms would lead to a 
narrower interpretation of certain investor rights, the wide-ranging nature of other 
IIA rights could effectively defeat such interpretation. For example, if an umbrella 
clause is included in the relevant IIA, a broad interpretation of such clause could 
allow the claimant investors to use investment treaty arbitration in order to seek 
relief for any breach of an investment-related promise by the host state, independent 
of the nature of the obligation and independent of the nature of the breach, without 
having to rely upon another breach of the relevant IIA.
216
 Similarly, unless it was 
specified that the MFN clause does not apply in respect of certain rights and unless 
all IIAs entered into by a particular state are simultaneously amended, reforms 
which purport to narrow the scope of such rights could potentially be rendered 
ineffective by the importation, via the MFN clause, of broader, ‘unreformed’, rights 
from other IIAs to which the state is party.  
Thus, while it is, in reality, impossible to predict how provisions of the nature 
described above may affect the application or interpretation of substantive investor 
rights in future (and without discounting the possibility that provisions that better 
taken account of public interest considerations may be developed), there are 
grounds for suggesting that such provisions would not constitute a panacea in 
respect of the balancing of investor and host state interests and would not obviate 
the need for taking account of public interest considerations at the remedies stage. 
Furthermore, the effect of introducing such reforms would need to be carefully 
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considered so as not to undermine the protection granted to investors by IIAs. For 
example, in the context of the FET standard, while there is a need to take public 
interest considerations into account, stipulating certain factors to be taken into 
account in determining whether the FET standard has been breached could 
potentially undermine its effectiveness as a bulwark against unfair or capricious 
decisions on the part of host state courts or administrative agencies.
217
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, in taking account of public interest considerations at the remedies 
stage, it is submitted that recourse to equity would enrich the valuation process as it 
may be used to guide tribunals in exercising their discretion in quantifying damages 
and in applying causation principles in a manner which takes account of public 
interest considerations and, in some cases, it may reinforce the doctrinal basis for 
doing so. Therefore, notwithstanding the overlap between the role of equity and the 
‘normal’ discretion exercised by arbitrators in quantifying damages, it is submitted 
that arbitrators should avowedly adopt a more open attitude towards the application 
of equitable principles at the remedies stage of the arbitral process.
218
 Inclusion of 
language in new or renegotiated IIAs that explicitly authorises the application of 
such principles by arbitrators could potentially assist in this regard. However, care 
should be taken in formulating any such wording to ensure that it, on the one hand, 
affords sufficient guidance to arbitrators and, on the other, does not inadvertently 
constrain the existing ability of arbitrators to take into account a broad range of 
considerations in quantifying damages. Similar issues arise when considering 
alternatives to the fair market value standard, albeit that the need for reform is 
perhaps more compelling given that there is limited capacity to take account of 
public interest considerations or to have recourse to equity within the parameters of 
the fair market value standard. Finally, while it is impossible to predict how 
suggestions for reform that are targeted at the merits stage may affect the 
application or interpretation of IIA rights, there are reasons to suggest that such 
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provisions, if introduced in new or renegotiated IIAs, will not obviate the need for 
taking account of public interest considerations in the formulation of remedies. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
[W]ays must be found for arbitration of international investment disputes to 
become more sensitive to the need for governments to discharge their 
obligations under international human rights law, and to meet other legitimate 
public interest objectives, even as they ensure investor protection.
1
 
This quotation from an article by Professor John Ruggie encapsulates perhaps the 
most significant issue that falls to be addressed in order for investment treaty 
arbitration and IIAs to continue to operate as an effective means of protecting 
foreign investment. Implicit in this statement is recognition that, although entering 
into an IIA constitutes a commitment by each of the contracting states to limit the 
exercise of some of its sovereign rights (including potentially its right to regulate in 
the public interest), the making of this commitment by states cannot be taken to 
mean that public interest considerations are irrelevant in resolving disputes between 
claimant investors and respondent host states under IIAs. Indeed, as the field of 
investment treaty arbitration has developed, the need to take account of public 
interest considerations in resolving disputes under IIAs has been increasingly 
acknowledged by both academic commentators and investment treaty arbitration 
tribunals. This is the case as it has become progressively clearer that a degree of 
balance between investor and host state interests is necessary not only to preserve 
host state regulatory autonomy in light of the open-ended nature of the rights 
typically conferred on investors by IIAs but also, crucially, to ensure the continued 
participation of states in the investment treaty arbitration system.  
Furthermore, while a balancing of investor and public interests may seem more 
compatible with the characterisation of international investment law as a public law 
system, it is submitted that public interest considerations should be taken into 
account regardless of whether one characterises international investment law as 
forming part of public law or whether one views each IIA as a ‘private’, quasi-
contractual arrangement between sovereign states. Thus, although agreement is 
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unlikely to be reached at least in the near future as to the characterisation of 
international investment law (and the related issue of the suitability of arbitration as 
an adjudication model), an arguably more limited, but nonetheless important, 
consensus is emerging as to the need for public interest considerations to be taken 
into account in resolving IIA disputes.  
Against the backdrop of this incipient consensus however, the question of how such 
considerations should be taken into account remains a contentious one. This thesis 
has argued that public interest considerations can, and should, be taken into account 
at the remedies stage of the investment treaty arbitration process in a manner that 
complements the recognition of such considerations at the merits stage of the 
arbitral process. The remedies stage constitutes an interesting topic of enquiry in 
this regard for a number of reasons, not least because the manner in which remedies 
are shaped can be used to achieve different purposes or policy goals within a 
particular legal system.
2
 In many senses therefore, remedies are more powerful than 
rights since, as encapsulated by the Latin maxim ubi jus ibi remedium, rights 
standing alone constitute simply an expression of social values. Remedies therefore 
define rights by providing specificity and concreteness to otherwise abstract values.  
Furthermore, remedies (and, in particular, the remedy of damages) potentially allow 
for a more nuanced reflection of interests than the black-or-white decision as to 
liability required in determining whether or not a particular right has been violated 
at the merits stage of the adjudicative process. However, despite the potential of the 
remedies stage in this regard and although, in recent years, both the operation of the 
remedies stage and the need to balance host state and investor interests as part of 
the investment treaty arbitration process have each separately received increasing 
attention in the academic literature, the interaction between public interest 
considerations and the remedies stage of the investment treaty arbitration has not 
previously been comprehensively addressed. In particular, the possible inter-
relationship between the merits stage and the remedies stage in terms of taking 
account of such considerations has not been explored nor has the question of 
whether any doctrinal basis exists under the existing investment treaty regime for 
taking account of public interest considerations at the remedies stage been analysed. 
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One possible reason for this lacuna in the academic literature may be the focus of 
much of the literature on remedies on describing the mechanics of the valuation 
methods that are customarily applied in assessing damages as such a technical 
discussion does not easily facilitate consideration of more amorphous issues such as 
the balancing of host state and investor interests. This tendency is also evident in 
arbitral awards as investment treaty arbitration tribunals have, to date, generally not 
referred to public interest considerations at the remedies stage or purported to adjust 
the compensation or damages payable by respondent host states on the basis of such 
considerations.  Furthermore, the predominant focus on the more technical aspects 
of the damages quantification process may have contributed to the perception of the 
remedies stage as being the ‘poor cousin’ of the jurisdiction and merits stage (at 
least from the perspective of lawyers).
3
 Thus, although an understanding of the 
valuation process is essential to any understanding of how damages are quantified, 
the bases for valuation and valuation methods customarily used in quantifying 
damages rank secondary in importance to the issue of the applicable legal standard 
of compensation. Furthermore, viewing the remedies stage through the prism of 
legal principles rather than from a technical standpoint has the advantage of 
allowing issues such as the balancing of host state and investor interests to come 
into sharper focus.   
In considering the suitability of the remedies stage as a platform for public interest 
considerations, it is clear that justification reflecting the distinctive features of the 
investment treaty arbitration system is necessary. Thus, while, on the one hand, 
there is a need to introduce an element of reciprocity into the investment treaty 
arbitration process in order to ensure continuing state co-operation and to reflect the 
underlying purposes of IIAs, on the other, the primary object of the system remains 
the protection of foreign investors and the overall structure of IIAs and their dispute 
settlement provisions encourage application of the bilateral notion of corrective 
justice. Thus, in order to take account of these competing imperatives, it has been 
argued that an approach which takes account of public interest considerations at the 
remedies stage where such considerations cannot be taken into account either 
sufficiently or at all at the merits stage of the arbitration process is desirable. This 
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approach contrasts with an approach which would allow public interest 
considerations that are considered insufficient to override investor rights at the 
merits stage to subsequently be considered de novo in quantifying damages, which, 
it has been argued, would not be consonant with the nature and functions of the 
investment treaty arbitration system and would likely lead to rights dilution. 
Bearing these guiding principles in mind, a number of specific situations in which 
recognition of public interest considerations at the remedies stage may be 
appropriate have been identified: first, where the impugned host state measure was 
taken in furtherance of the host state’s obligations under a non-investment related 
treaty or in furtherance of the fundamental rights provisions contained in the host 
state’s highest law; secondly, where the customary international law defence of 
necessity has been successfully invoked and, finally, in the case of certain breaches 
of a procedural nature.  
Thus, where a host state can either only comply with its obligations under another 
non-investment related treaty (such as a human rights treaty) by failing to comply 
with an IIA (or vice versa) or where the goals of one of these treaties frustrates the 
goals of another treaty without strict incompatibility between their provisions (i.e. 
where a direct treaty conflict occurs), the fact that the host state had an obligation 
to, for example, regulate to protect certain human rights should undoubtedly be 
considered at the merits stage. Fundamentally however, such a direct treaty conflict 
is not capable of being resolved at the merits stage since it involves a direct 
collision of obligations. In such circumstances, taking account of the purpose of the 
impugned host state measures at the remedies stage
 
would introduce a necessary 
element of reciprocity in that it would recognise the host state’s attempt to observe 
its non-investment related treaty obligations as well as taking into account the 
capacity of, and obligation on, potential investors to apprise themselves of the 
socio-economic circumstances of the host state. Similarly, where the impugned host 
state measures were introduced in furtherance of the fundamental rights provisions 
contained in the host state’s highest law (such as its constitution), to disregard the 
purpose for which the measure was introduced would fail to introduce a necessary 
element of reciprocity into the investment treaty arbitration process, given the 
importance of those norms within the host state’s domestic legal framework. 
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Secondly, where the host state has successfully invoked the defence of necessity, 
two competing imperatives exist: on the one hand, the fact that the host state has 
chosen to act in contravention of its obligation to protect foreign investors (albeit in 
circumstances of social and economic collapse) and, on the other, the fact that 
reconciliation of the host state’s competing obligations or interests may not be 
possible in such circumstances and that the host state acted in order to protect 
crucial state interests. Accordingly, given that IIAs are intended to protect foreign 
investors in difficult situations and the status of the defence as a secondary rule of 
customary international law, it is submitted that reconciliation of these competing 
imperatives should most appropriately occur at the remedies stage.  
Finally, turning to the question of procedural breaches, while, on the one hand, it is 
important to recognise the value of procedural guarantees from a rule of law 
perspective, on the other, in circumstances where the procedural irregularities in 
question are of a less egregious nature and where countervailing factors exist, the 
justification for compensating the investor for all the loss it has suffered is less 
compelling. Accordingly, it is submitted that a ‘sliding scale’ approach in respect of 
quantification of damages that takes account of factors such as the degree of 
interference with the investor’s interests, the nature and intensity of the procedural 
breach, the public purpose being pursued and the likelihood that the substantive 
outcome would have been the same in the absence of the breach should be 
considered. In particular, it is submitted that this ‘sliding scale’ approach, in 
allowing sufficient flexibility for both the nature of the interests underlying the host 
state’s conduct and the nature of the investor’s interest or expectation to be taken 
into account, could prove to be particularly suitable in respect of breaches relating 
to frustration of a claimant investor’s legitimate expectations, given the broad range 
of conduct covered by that concept. 
These circumstances do not constitute an exhaustive list of situations in which 
public interest considerations may fall to be considered at the remedies stage. 
However, they are all based on a common premise: namely that, in some cases, the 
fact that the host state acted in pursuance of a bona fide public purpose in 
introducing the measures challenged under an IIA may need to be considered at the 
remedies stage as this fact may not be capable of being considered sufficiently at 
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the merits stage so as to ensure an optimal balance between investor protection and 
host state regulatory sovereignty. This premise equally applies in respect of 
expropriations (and in particular lawful expropriations), notwithstanding the focus 
of the expropriation clause on the loss caused by governmental conduct rather than 
on the nature of that conduct. 
While the normative arguments made in favour of taking account of public interest 
considerations at the remedies stage stand apart from the legal principles applicable 
in quantifying damages and while doctrinal difficulties should not, in principle, 
detract from such arguments, it is nonetheless important to consider whether there 
is a doctrinal basis for taking account of public interest considerations at the 
remedies stage under existing IIAs or whether treaty reform would be required in 
order to do so.  In this regard, although the full reparation principle, in requiring 
that the victim be placed in the same position it would have been in had the 
wrongdoing not occurred, initially appears rather clear-cut and unaccommodating 
towards public interest considerations, in fact application of the principle requires 
significant discretionary judgment. This ‘normal’ discretion, the exercise of which 
is always necessary,
4
 may, in appropriate circumstances, be enhanced through the 
application of equity as, although there is undoubtedly an overlap between the two 
concepts, it is submitted that the dynamism of equity confers on it an additional 
capacity to enlighten the exercise of arbitral discretion and, in some cases, to 
reinforce the doctrinal basis for taking into account public interest considerations at 
the remedies stage. Therefore, the application of equity combined with the 
application of customary valuation methods and of causation principles (which are 
themselves necessarily influenced by equity) affords sufficient flexibility to 
tribunals to take account of public interest considerations in quantifying damages. 
Effectively this means that, since equity can be invoked without the need for an 
explicit reference to equity or equitable principles in the relevant IIA and without 
the tribunal resolving the dispute ex aequo et bono, investment treaty arbitration 
tribunals already possess the tools required in order to take account of public 
interest considerations in the formulation of remedies for unlawful acts.   
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Accordingly, given the degree of flexibility currently afforded to tribunals by the 
customary international law principle of full reparation and the conceptual certainty 
associated with that principle, it is submitted that treaty negotiators should be 
cautious in deviating from the current approach whereby IIAs are generally silent as 
to the approach to be taken to remedying unlawful acts. Similar considerations 
come into play in considering alternatives to the fair market value standard for 
quantifying the compensation payable for lawful expropriations, albeit that the need 
for treaty reform is greater than in respect of unlawful acts  given that the objective 
fair market value standard is not, in itself, accommodative of public interest 
considerations.  
Overall therefore, the question of whether, and in what circumstances, the taking 
into account of public interest considerations at the remedies stage of the 
investment treaty arbitration process (and, in particular, in the quantification of the 
damages payable) should occur is potentially a bold one. Indeed, the question is 
somewhat reminiscent of proposals during the NIEO debates for the compensation 
payable in cases of expropriation to be determined in accordance with the laws of 
the nationalising state (thereby potentially allowing states to abrogate entirely their 
responsibility to pay compensation).
5
 However, despite the potentially bold or 
controversial nature of the question, the answer proposed by this thesis is arguably 
of a modest nature as, first, it assumes that the procedural framework for investment 
treaty arbitration and its focus on investment protection will remain unchanged and, 
secondly, it proposes that the remedies stage should complement rather than 
displace the merits stage in taking account of public interest considerations. Thus, it 
is proposed that public interest considerations should be taken into account in 
quantifying damages in certain circumstances only and that substantial derogation 
from the spirit of the full reparation principle is not necessarily required in order to 
implement such an approach.   
The ‘modest’ nature of the proposal is driven by the fact that states have, as an 
exercise of sovereignty, entered into IIAs and in doing so have ceded part of their 
regulatory sovereignty as, fundamentally, the remedies granted within such a 
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system must reflect that reality as well as the single-minded purpose of the system. 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that, within the parameters of the investment treaty 
arbitration system, this proposal would lead to a more nuanced reflection of public 
interest considerations than the ‘all or nothing’ decision as to liability required at 
the merits stage in determining whether a breach has occurred or not.  
Of course, the question of how the proposals put forward in this thesis would relate 
to other public interest/sustainable development-related reforms affecting either the 
jurisdiction or merits stage of the arbitral process (and which are likely to become 
an increasing feature of IIAs over the coming years) remains open to question. 
However, there are grounds to suggest that the interpretation of the IIA text by 
individual tribunals will remain crucial in maintaining an optimal balance between 
investor protection and host state regulatory sovereignty even for this ‘new 
generation’ of IIAs and that the need for public interest considerations to be 
reflected at the remedies stage will continue to exist. In particular, although certain 
reforms aimed at clarifying or adjusting the scope of existing IIA rights could 
potentially reduce the need for public interest considerations to be taken into 
account at the remedies stage, such reforms may not obviate that need and the 
introduction of such reforms must always tread the thin line between ensuring that 
the protection conferred on investors by IIAs is not undermined and simultaneously 
ensuring that host state interests are effectively taken into account. This reflects the 
tension between investment protection and host state regulatory sovereignty which 
constitutes (and will continue to constitute) an inherent feature of the international 
investment law regime.  
Thus, while the proposals put forward in this thesis cannot, and do not purport to, 
constitute a complete solution to the problem of how to reconcile these competing 
interests, it is submitted that they do constitute a part of the answer to Professor 
Ruggie’s appeal to find ways to make the investment treaty arbitration system more 
sensitive to the needs of governments and to the public interest, while still ensuring 
that its principal beneficiaries – foreign investors – are effectively protected. This 
conclusion does not mean that more wide-ranging reforms of the investment treaty 
arbitration system cannot, or should not, occur. However, it is to argue that ‘system-
internal’ reforms must be considered in conjunction with more wide-ranging 
reforms so as to ensure that, as the investment treaty arbitration regime matures and 
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external forces shape its contours, the baby is not thrown out with the proverbial 
bathwater. 
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Protection of Investments, signed 6 June 2005, entered into force 1 December 2009 
Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Albania, signed 27 
June 1994, entered into force 7 July 1995  
Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the 
Philippines for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed 18 
April 1997, entered into force 1 February 2000 
Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
People's Republic of China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, signed 9 September 2012, entered 1 October 2014 
Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
Republic of Costa Rica for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 18 
March 1998, entered into force 29 September 1999 
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Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United 
Republic of Tanzania for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
signed 17 May 2013, entered into force 9 December 2013 
Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
Republic of Venezuela for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 1 
July 1996, entered into force 28 January 1998 
Agreement between the Government of Finland and the Government of the 
Republic of Albania on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 24 
June 1997, entered into force 20 February 1999 
Agreement between the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of 
Australia for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, signed 15 September 
1993, entered into force 15 October 1993 
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of Antigua and Barbuda for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments, signed 12 June 1987, entered into force 12 June 
1987 
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of Malaysia for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments, signed 21 May 1981, entered into force 21 October 1988 
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of India for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments, signed 14 March 1994, entered into force 6 January 
1995 
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the United Mexican States for the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed 12 May 2006, entered 
into force 25 July 2007 
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the 
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Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 11 December 1990, entered into 
force 19 February 1993 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the 
Government of the Republic of Finland on the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, signed 26 February 2003, entered into force 10 December 2004 
Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Federal Republic of 
Germany on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed 1 
December 2003, entered into force 11 November 2005 
Agreement between the Republic of India and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for 
the promotion and protection of investments, signed 6 November 1995, entered into 
force 1 December 1996 
Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the Swiss Confederation on 
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed 31 March 1997, 
entered into force 23 April 1999 
Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed 11 July 1995, 
entered into force 6 May 1996 
Agreement between the United Mexican States and the Republic of Austria on the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 29 June 1998, entered into force 
26 March 2001 
Agreement on economic cooperation between the Government of the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Singapore, signed 16 May 
1972, entered into force 7 September 1973 
Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Argentine Republic, signed 20 October 1992, 
entered into force 1 October 1994 
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, signed 26 February 2009, entered 
into force 29 March 2012 
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Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, signed 
28 November 1998, entered into force 3 September 2002 
Energy Charter Treaty, 2080 UNTS 95; 34 ILM 360 (1995) 
Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Colombia, signed 21 
November 2008, entered into force 15 August 2011 
Investment Agreement for COMESA Common Investment Area, signed 23 May 
2007 
New Zealand and China: Agreement on the promotion and protection of 
investments (with exchange of notes), signed 22 November 1988, entered into force 
25 March 1989 
North American Free Trade Agreement between Canada, The United States and 
Mexico, signed 17 December 1992, entered into force 1 January 1994 
Romania and Egypt: Agreement on the promotion and mutual guarantee of capital 
investments (with protocol), signed 10 May 1976, entered into force 3 April 1996 
Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, signed 20 April 2005, entered into force 12 October 2007 
Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of Rwanda concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed 19 February 2008, entered into force 1 
January 2012 
Treaty between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, signed 14 
November 1991, entered into force 20 October 1994 
Treaty between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, signed 4 
November 2005, entered into force 1 November 2006 
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United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea, 21 ILM 1261 (1982) 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679, signed 23 
May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980 
 
